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## FIFTY YEARS OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES (1865-1915)

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### I. INTRODUCTION

This paper will plot some of the principal points of departure from which to map the main movement of sociological thinking in the United States during the period indicated in the title. It will incidentally write into the sketch certain details of a semi-autobiographical character. It will serve, further, as an introduction to a subsequent paper to be entitled "The Sociological Categories," and in connection with the latter paper it will attempt to throw light upon open problems of methodology in the entire field of social science.

Referring to the second of these items, no excuses will be offered for rather liberal transgression of the conventionalities of impersonal writing. The years which I have spent in studying the social scientists of the last four centuries have lodged in my mind one indelible impression, viz., that nearly every one of these writers might have done more for the instruction of subsequent generations if each had left on record certain testimony from his personal knowledge, which he probably regarded as trifling and which his contemporaries would probably have pronounced impertinent, than

they did by writing much of a more pretentious nature which they actually transmitted. If each writer in the field of social science had also been a Pepys, or if he had been shadowed by a Boswell, the reasons why thinking in social science had meandered in the precise courses which it has followed might be much more evident than they are. So it has seemed to me more and more that one of the traits of developing historical sense should be increasing consideration for the historians of the future. One hundred, two hundred, three hundred years from now there will be students trying to trace back the evolution of social science. No one who has sifted the monograph material of a past period can doubt that, so long as the volumes of this *Journal* are legible, here and there a historian will search them for clues to interpretation of the period that produced them. Men now living might divulge many things which will never be discovered from mere review of technical treatises, without which the historical significance of the treatises will always be partially misunderstood. Who can read the earlier volumes of the *Edinburgh Review* or the *Westminster Review*, for instance, without being aware that, as no biography of the writers appears between the lines, some of the most instructive signs in what they wrote must be undetected? Accordingly I shall regard it as a duty rather than a liberty to set down certain matters of fact within my knowledge, and also to express certain frank judgments which, whether they prove to be more or less correct, may have a certain index value in the future. I am not without hope that others who have had larger shares in shaping the fortunes of the social sciences during the past generation may be moved to similar contributions.

Certain generalizations may serve as preface to the more concrete details to be scheduled in this paper.

In the first place, all history of science, if written wisely, is less history of what given individuals have thought than of why they have thought it; particularly that part of the reason why they have thought it which is to be found in the manner of thinking that was prevalent at the same time; and, furthermore, in particular occasions at the same time for reconsideration of current thinking. Perhaps more important than any individual's thinking is the kind

and degree of success which it had in getting other people to think the same thoughts.

Again, all history of science consists less of the record of discovery of absolutely new facts or truths at its transition points than of placing modified degrees and combinations of emphasis upon ideas long more or less familiar; or in finding new ways of connecting old ideas with accepted conclusions about physical, mental, or moral relations.

As a general rule, the gains involved in passing from one period of thinking to another, in any division of theoretical or applied knowledge, may be summed up in a very few words, so far as the mere matter of the verbal expression is concerned. The work which bulks largest in distinguishing the new period is, in the first place, the work of abstracting from a mass of ideas, partly more or less permanent, partly already obsolescent, a single idea, or a small group of ideas, which thereafter become a sort of insurgent body, accusing the old thought-complex of incorrectness or insufficiency; then, in the second place, it is the work of restating all the phenomena which fall within the range of the newly projected or newly emphasized idea or ideas in formulas or idioms which correspond with the new valuations called for by the insurgent forces.

Perhaps the most familiar illustration of the sort of change referred to in the last paragraph is the revolution which has taken place within the last twenty-five years, in all thinking about human experience, through shifting the emphasis from the assumed individual agent to the *group* in which persons are now seen to be subordinate factors. Our reference in this paper is always implicitly to this category, and it will come under direct discussion both in this paper and in the one to follow.

Once more, changes in types of thinking are likely to have as one of their marks a restless rhythm between concrete and abstract interests within the field immediately covered; between narrowly specialized interests in details and highly generalized interests in the largest possible theoretical or practical organization and control of the elements involved.

As a case in point we may cite the swing of interest, between the middle of the eighteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth,



from the writing of so-called universal history, and so-called philosophy of history, to the collection of evidence going into minute details about selected episodes of history, and the most microscopic textual, philological, psychological, and sociological criticism of this evidence.

Now these generalizations, not to schedule others, have been illustrated by the career thus far of American sociology. Instead of specifying instances at the outset, I shall try to outline the story of the American sociological movement in such a way that these generalizations will be confirmed. In short, like every other distinct thought-phenomenon, the American sociological movement was a child of its time. It was not an isolated, alien, detached curiosity. It was a part of the orderly unfolding of native conditions.

The fact is of like kind with the development of sociology in Europe. In my judgment it will be common knowledge some day that historians, economists, and particularly political philosophers toward the middle of the nineteenth century focalized attention upon questions which turned out to be the problems now called sociological. In other words, the course of thought in older divisions of social science led inevitably to the sociological phase of human problems.<sup>1</sup>

The connection between the earliest onsets of American sociological interest and movements of a kindred nature in Europe has never been very clearly made out. There is an opportunity here for investigation which, if successful, would amount to a notable piece of historical work. Not attempting, therefore, to go farther back, I find little room for doubt that one of the roots which produced American sociology found its nourishment in the soil that was broken up by our Civil War. Just as American development in agriculture may be traced in part to influences set free by that war, so it was with the thinking that later took shape as sociology. The limits of this sketch forbid examination of evidence on this point. Enough that some of the men whose thought-world had

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Small on Von Mohl and Ahrens, *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII, 457-59. In some respects more tell-tale than either of the authors referred to in the above passage is Treitschke, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*, published in 1859.

been stirred to its depths by the war found themselves in 1865 star-gazing in social heavens that had never before looked so confused nor so mysterious. To express a familiar judgment more literally: At the close of the war the intelligent people of the country were more sophisticated than at its beginning. They realized in part that the country was not the primitive, simple affair which it had been when all its inhabitants were pioneers. They had been jostled a good deal in the fondest of American illusions that a constitution and laws enacted in pursuance thereof would automatically produce human welfare. They became acutely aware that life in the United States was not altogether a success. They perceived more or less distinctly that work was ahead to bring American conditions into tolerable likeness to American ideals. Some of these men reacted to the situation by trying to understand it as theorists and philosophers. Emerson was far and away the most notable of this type. Yet Emerson could least of all be claimed as one of the producers of sociology—he certainly could not be credited with intentional and direct work to that end. He was an interpreter either of the individualistic or of the transcendental phases of life. The association of Americans, as a concrete actuality composed by the interaction of all Americans upon one another, never presented itself to him as a much more substantial reality than the dagger that Hamlet could not clutch. There can be little doubt that John Fiske's approaches to sociological problems in *Cosmic Philosophy* would have been less objective if no Civil War had occurred. Though our knowledge of the precise connections between Lester F. Ward's army experiences and his subsequent thinking is deplorably meager, yet it is incredible that he could have arrived at his breadth of world-consciousness in an environment as provincial as that of the United States would have remained for a long time without the upheaval of the sixties.

## II. FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The first men to make an overt movement toward mobilizing the newly aroused social consciousness into an effort which turned out to be in the general direction of sociology were of a quite

different type from those just named. They have put on record a brief account of themselves, as they were understood by Franklin B. Sanborn, the man who more than any other for many years succeeded in keeping the movement in motion. The movement itself took shape under the title, the American Social Science Association.<sup>1</sup>

In brief, the period 1865-85 in the United States was a time of benevolent amateurishness with reference to questions which have since been distributed among the historical, political, economic, sociological, and philanthropic divisions of positive social science. There were a great many Americans of the type represented by most of the members of the Social Science Association, who had more or less of the spirit which William G. Sumner held up to ridicule in variations of his dictum: "The type and formula of most schemes of philanthropy or humanitarianism is this: A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall be made to do for D."<sup>2</sup> There were also a considerable number of Americans who were teaching, in professorships and editorial chairs, more or less undiluted versions of the classical economics.<sup>3</sup> There were only a

<sup>1</sup> For an outline of Mr. Sanborn's career see Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, title "Sanborn, F. B."

For an account of the origin of the Association, see Tolman, *American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 797.

At the meeting of the American Sociological Society in New York in 1909, President Finley of the Social Science Association asked a place on the program for what seemed to some of the persons present the swan-song of that venerable organization. It was a sort of autobiography composed by Mr. Sanborn. It may be found in the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 16, and in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 591-95.

<sup>2</sup> *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883, p. 123; cf. p. 112 *et passim*.

<sup>3</sup> For convenience of reference a few details collated from the *American Encyclopedia of Biography* are noted here in connection with the following men of the earlier part of this period who made an impression beyond their immediate groups:

Henry C. Carey, b. Philadelphia, 1793, d. there, 1889. Educated as bookseller, entered his father's store at age of eight, remained there, pursuing his elementary studies in literature and learning the business till he was admitted as a partner in 1814. At the death of his father in 1821 he became the head of the publishing business of Carey & Lea, which for a time was the leading publishing concern of the country. In 1835 he withdrew from business to devote himself to political economy. He was originally a zealous advocate of free trade, but became convinced that real free trade with foreign countries was impossible, in the existing state of American industry, and that a period of protection must precede it. In this view, free trade is the ideal toward which we ought to tend, and protection the indispensable means of reaching it. He

small number of men who were trying to teach history,<sup>1</sup> and until the later years of the period still fewer who had been affected very much by the critical methods which had been developing in Germany since the first decade of the century. In political science the work of Francis Lieber at Columbia University stands out before our present retrospect as far and away more notable than any other factor in his field. Yet we must regard his work as chiefly a scattering of seed upon soil scantily prepared. The yield of his sowing has

has been ranked in the United States as the founder of a new school of political economy opposed to the rent doctrine of Ricardo and the Malthusian theory of population. (The career of List in this country and in Germany should be considered if the propriety of this reputation is in question.) Of Carey's writings the chief is: *Essay on the Rate of Wages, With an Examination of the Causes of the Difference of the Condition of the Laboring Population throughout the World* (1835). This monograph was reproduced in greatly expanded form under the title *Principles of Political Economy*, 3 vols. (1837-40). The best known of his later writings is *Principles of Social Science*, 3 vols. (1858-59).

Francis Wayland, b. New York City, 1796. President of Brown, 1827-55. *Elements of Political Economy* (1837); *ibid.*, abridged (1840).

Amasa Walker, b. Woodstock, New Hampshire, 1799, d. 1875. Common school education. Entered business in 1814. Withdrew from business in 1840. Lectured on political economy at Oberlin, 1842-48. In politics in Massachusetts. Annual course of lectures in political economy, Amherst, 1859-69. "Reformer." *Nature and Use of Money and Mixed Currency* (1857); *Science of Wealth, a Manual of Political Economy*, 8 editions (1866).

Francis Lieber, b. Berlin, 1800, d. New York, 1872. In Prussian army of 1815. Imprisoned as liberal after the war. Prohibited from studying in Prussian universities and went to Jena; persecuted there and in Halle. Took part in Greek revolution. One year in Rome as tutor to Niebuhr's son. After more persecution went to England in 1825, and then in 1827 to New York. Professor of history and political economy, University of South Carolina, 1833-56. Same chair in Columbia University, 1856-60. From 1860 to his death, professor of political science in Columbia University Law School. *Manual of Political Ethics*, 2 vols. (1838); revised by Theodore D. Woolsey 1875; *Civil Liberty and Self Government*, 2 vols. (1852); new edition adopted as text book at Yale (1874).

Arthur L. Perry, b. Lyme, New Hampshire, 1830. Graduated from Williams, 1852. Professor of history and political economy, *ibid.*, since 1853. Wrote editorials for *Springfield Republican* and *New York Evening Post*. Earnest advocate of free trade. *Political Economy* (1865); *Introduction to Political Economy* (1877).

Francis A. Walker (son of Amasa W.), b. Boston 1840, d. 1897, Professor of political economy and history in Sheffield Scientific School, 1873-81. President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1881-97. President of American Economical Association, 1885-97. *The Wages Question* (1876); *Money, Trade and Industry* (1879); *Land and Its Rent* (1883); *Political Economy* (1883).

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 777.

never been very precisely estimated. His two chief works have doubtless influenced, in some degree, all subsequent teachers of the subject in the United States, but that influence has evidently been largely unconscious in notable cases.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A year ago I tried to test this with the following well-known professors of political science: President Judson (Chicago) replied to my question, to the effect that at the time of his graduation from college (Williams, 1870) Lieber was known to him simply as author of the military regulations adopted during the Civil War. He did not, until some time later, get him into focus as a teacher of political science.

Professor Burgess (Columbia) wrote: "Lieber's books on *Political Ethics* and *Self-Government* first excited in me the desire to develop the study of the political sciences in the United States. These books were recommended to me by Professor Theodore W. Dwight, warden of the Columbia Law School, New York, about the year 1870. The fact that Lieber was a German had no small influence in sending me to Germany at that time to study these sciences. As you probably know, I became Lieber's successor at Columbia in 1876, and kept not only his memory but his works alive and active among the Columbia students. From Columbia chiefly his influence has radiated, but also from Yale, as Dr. Theodore Woolsey, former president of Yale, was a great disciple of Lieber. Lieber's name is perpetuated at Columbia by the professorship of political philosophy."

Professor John J. Halsey (Lake Forest) answered: "I have two distinct impressions of Francis Lieber. The first is through the original thirteen-volume *Encyclopaedia Americana* which he edited, and out of which I got a large part of my early education—reading a large portion of it topically before I went to college. The other is his great influence internationally through his *Instructions for the Guidance of the Armies of the United States in the Field*, issued in 1863, which have so largely shaped the conduct of war ever since."

Professor William W. Folwell (Minnesota) testifies: "I can say without the least hesitation that Lieber's influence on my thinking and teaching was very great. It is not easy, after so many years of retirement, to speak definitely of the *kind* of influence. Of course it enlarged my horizon and moderated views which might have gone to extremes. His employment of the historical method seemed to me admirable, especially in the *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*. Of all Lieber's writings known to me, that which lingers strongest in my memory is his *General Orders*, No. 100, 1863, which was the basis of my teaching in one branch of international law. I believe you are doing an important service in reviving interest in Lieber."

Professor Jesse Macy (Iowa College) is less emphatic. He says: "As to Francis Lieber, I have a dim recollection of having years ago read some of his writings with a feeling of surprise that he was not more often quoted and more fully recognized. Since then he has almost entirely passed out of my mind. I have probably gone on using impressions derived from Lieber without giving credit or without a knowledge of their source. If I were called upon now to pass an examination in Lieber it would be a blank failure. Not one distinct idea can I recall. I have written this without doing anything to refresh my memory, as this is my understanding of the object of your question."

My own personal testimony is that my undergraduate course was in a small New England college into which at the time no political theory of any sort had made its way,

It may some day be possible to reconstruct the history of social science in general in the United States, and of sociology in particular, in a strict chronological order. I confess that I do not see a way clear to map out even the sociological part of the development in precise conformity with temporal succession. Fully to make out the relations of cause and effect, it would be necessary in the first place to evaluate the activities of the American Social Science Association between 1865 and 1885. For this purpose more impartial judges would be desirable than its early or surviving members on the one hand, or on the other hand members of the sociological group, who never felt drawn to that pioneer body. The publications of the society are of course the most authentic evidence as to the quality of its work.<sup>1</sup> It represented humanitarian sentiment more distinctly than a desire for critical methodology. It belongs rather among philanthropic and patriotic programs than in the course of strictly scientific development. It may be dismissed from our consideration then with this brief reference; and our attention must turn to a more direct antecedent of the sociological movement proper.

### III. THE ORGANIZATION OF INSTRUCTION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES<sup>2</sup>

Until 1876, there was absolutely no instruction in social science in this country which could by any stretch of the imagination be called "advanced."<sup>3</sup> With the exception of an occasional instructor except that which might occasionally emerge in unrecognized shape in the course of grammatical construction of the classics. In my Senior year (1875-76) the president, Dr. Henry E. Robins, nearly precipitated a revolution in the faculty by smuggling into his instruction in "Mental and Moral Philosophy" a short course based on Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, and another with Wayland's *Political Economy*, as the chief book of reference. In connection with one of these courses Dr. Robins put me on the track of Lieber's two major works. They were to me oases in the desert. They helped me to consciousness of my intellectual interests. They were distinct factors among the impulses that sent me to Germany three years later, and I have frequently recurred to them meanwhile as samples of the spirit in which social problems should be studied, rather than as direct sources of social doctrine.

<sup>1</sup> See note on Tolman, *supra*, p. 726.

<sup>2</sup> The paper already referred to by Mr. Frank L. Tolman (*American Journal of Sociology*, VII, 797), entitled "The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States," laid the foundations for a history of the movement.

<sup>3</sup> See Giddings and Tenney, "Sociology," in *Cyclopedia of Education*, V (1913).

who was "inspirational" to a high degree, all the persons who were supposed to teach anything now regarded as within the range of the social sciences were going through the most elementary type of classroom program, guided by the crude textbooks then available. The opening of Johns Hopkins University in 1876 marked the beginning of a new academic era in this country, and this general transition affected the social sciences along with all other departments of knowledge.

Yet it cannot be said that the social sciences had a development at Johns Hopkins commensurate with that of the physical sciences. Nevertheless, with fewer men and inferior equipment, the Hopkins workers in the field of social science made an impression which is still felt throughout the United States and beyond. The whole range of subjects now distributed through what is known at the University of Chicago as "the social science group"<sup>1</sup> was within a single department at Baltimore. That department had the title "History and Politics." Its outlook has never been symbolized better in a brief formula than in the aphorism quoted from the historian Freeman and emblazoned on the wall of the principal lecture-room of the department, called "The Seminary Room," viz.: "History is past politics, and politics is present history."

No adequate account of the early years of this department is available. Its main dynamo was Herbert B. Adams, the head of the department.<sup>2</sup> Richard T. Ely did not begin his career there as instructor in economics until 1881. He remained until 1892, when he became head of the Department of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin.

In his collection of papers under the title *The Launching of a University* President Gilman has only this paragraph (p. 117) bearing directly on the department of history and politics:

In history and politics many able students were soon assembled, under the inspiring leadership of Herbert B. Adams, whose instructions were reinforced in economics by Dr. Richard T. Ely. The instructors and the students made

<sup>1</sup> This proposition does not refer to the more elastic sense in which for certain purposes that phrase is used to include philosophy, psychology, and education.

<sup>2</sup> See Professor Jameson's appreciation in paper cited below p. 776-78.

investigations especially in the domain of American institutional history, which were printed in successive numbers of a series entitled "Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Politics." These papers were widely circulated, and attracted so much attention that persons connected with other institutions offered their contributions. The long series published under this title constitutes one of the most important works of reference for those who would become acquainted with the development of American institutions. The allusions to its value by Professor Freeman and by John Fiske are not to be overlooked.

President Gilman might have added that the series was of evident service to Mr. James Bryce, when he was collecting the material for *The American Commonwealth*.

One whose memory reaches back into the seventies might easily yield to the temptation to linger at this point for personal reminiscences illustrating the sterility of academic activities in general at this period throughout the field of the social sciences. I will restrict myself to brief notice of certain waymarks about which more information is within easy reach, with the addition of two or three contributions from my own experience.<sup>1</sup>

While there can be no doubt that the establishment of the Department of History and Politics at Johns Hopkins deserves to stand as the inauguration of critical as distinguished from elementary study of social science in the United States, yet it is equally evident that this development was itself an effect of causes which manifested themselves in various ways during the previous decade. Incidentally the query may be raised as to the extent to which Mr. Gilman himself, while teaching geography at Yale, was

<sup>1</sup> In recording the fact that he was one of the disappointed applicants for a fellowship in history and politics at Johns Hopkins in its opening year, the present writer wishes furthermore to confess that his college course had qualified him for no registration beyond courses I and II in history and economics in an undergraduate sequence.

Not all American college graduates at the time were necessarily as naïve with reference to those particular subjects, but only the larger institutions had begun to offer enough instruction to carry students beyond beggarly elements. I am moved to confess also that my abiding respect for Johns Hopkins is in large measure due to the further fact that the fellowship which I did not get in 1876 was awarded to Henry C. Adams.

Incidentally it may be remarked that Professor Adams' monograph entitled *Relation of the State to Industrial Action*, published in the "Johns Hopkins Studies in History and Politics" in 1880, has stood the test of the intervening years, and that it may still be cited as containing the fundamental principles of adaptation between individualistic and collectivistic ideals.



already breaking ground for the sort of study of the humanities which was about to begin.

Because of his connection with sociology in particular, it will not be out of place to schedule at this point, and as a sign of promise in the field of academic instruction in the social sciences, the career of William G. Sumner.<sup>1</sup> Without implying a judgment upon the question touched upon in the last two references in the previous note, Professor Sumner's priority in the sociological field may be referred to as incidental to the more general fact of awakening academic interest in social science.<sup>2</sup> Professor Sumner's course in sociology, announced in 1876, seems to have been withdrawn during the years 1880-85, and to have reappeared in 1885-86, or at the beginning of President Dwight's administration.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> B. 1840, graduated from Yale, 1863, d. 1910. Studied at Göttingen and Oxford. Tutor at Yale, 1866-69. Ordained in Episcopal church and was assistant rector in New York City, 1869-72. From 1872 until his death "professor of political and social science" at Yale. *History of American Currency*, 1874; *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883. See account of Sumner by Keller, *Popular Science Monthly*, XXXV 1889, reprinted in *The Challenge of Facts*, p. 3. Cf. Walker, "Note on Sumner," *American Journal of Sociology*, XX, 829.

<sup>2</sup> I am indebted to my colleague, Dr. C. H. Walker, for the information that light is thrown upon the status of sociology at Yale at this early period by an article entitled "Sociology and Theology at Yale College," *Popular Science Monthly*, XVII (June, 1880), 268-69.

<sup>3</sup> Professor Sumner rather early acquired the rank of a Yale tradition. Several of his students have told me that in their day he was lecturing on what might be described as *the sort of opinions that ought to be held on things in general by a Yale man*. They added that no one was supposed to have "done" Yale as a gentleman should, without having taken at least one course with "Billy" Sumner.

Professor Sumner's place in American sociology has not yet been permanently assigned. At present he represents to the sociologists at large a curious double personality—the author of *Social Classes* at one extreme, and the author of *Folkways* at the other. His pupil, Dr. A. G. Keller, now his successor at Yale, is editing Professor Sumner's papers, and it is to be hoped that he will be able to interpret the author in such a way that students of the history of sociology a century hence will see him in a different perspective from that in which he appeared to his contemporaries—either close at hand or from a distance.

One of the frank utterances of which I was thinking in the opening paragraph of this paper (p. 721) is in point here. To this day I have not succeeded in thoroughly revising the opinion I formed of Professor Sumner while reading his *Social Classes* shortly after it appeared in 1883. It came to me consequently as a surprise and a shock that he was thought of as second president of the American Sociological Society.

As especially notable symptoms of this awakening, in the spirit to be sure of the "social science" as characterized above,<sup>1</sup> reference should be made first to the recommendation of President White of Cornell, in 1871, as to "a course of practical instruction calculated to fit young men to discuss intelligently such important social questions as the best methods of dealing practically with pauperism, intemperance, crime of various degrees and among persons of different ages, insanity, idiocy, and the like,"<sup>2</sup> It was not until 1884 that President White's suggestion resulted in the authorization at Cornell of a course on the subjects specified. It was given by Mr. Frank B. Sanborn.<sup>3</sup>

Further notable evidence that a new ferment was at work in the academic mind is contained in a suggestion by Professor Peirce of Harvard in 1878.<sup>4</sup> Without suspecting at the time that I was qualifying myself to give first-hand evidence a generation later upon the question whether this and other seed-thoughts about the social sciences had borne fruit at Harvard, I went to Cambridge in the spring of 1888 to find out for myself what was going on in the way of graduate study of the social sciences. For seven years I had been occupying what Dr. Holmes called a "settee," from which I attempted to give instruction covering the whole range of the social sciences. I had been voted a leave of absence for one year, and was eager to get into the company of men who were trying to develop critical methods along the lines of my chief interests. I

At that time (1907) he was not within my field of vision as even nominally a sociologist. I had forgotten that he had by implication referred to himself as a sociologist in the book which still seems to me a moving picture of what a sociologist should not be. I have never been able to satisfy myself as to whether, or in what degree, Professor Sumner in later years changed his attitude toward problems of social improvement. I have been unable to rid myself of the impression that, on the side of social initiative, he remained the American echo of *laissez faire* as represented in England by Herbert Spencer. On the other hand, his book *Folkways* is on a scientific level even higher above the *Social Classes* than Spencer's *Descriptive Sociology* is above the plane of *Man vs. The State*.

<sup>1</sup> Tolman, note 1, p. 726.

<sup>2</sup> Tolman, *op. cit.*, p. 800.

<sup>3</sup> For details, see Tolman, *ibid.*, p. 803.

<sup>4</sup> See Tolman, *ibid.*, and Sanborn, "The Threefold Aspect of Social Science in America," *Journal of Social Science*, XIV, 26.

was introduced to Professor Peirce, as "Dean of the Faculty of the Graduate School." I stated my errand, and he seemed very much embarrassed. After some hesitation he began to expatiate upon the resources of the library. I told him I had some appreciation of a library, but that I wanted to get into the company of men who were more alive than books. Presently he confessed that, so far as he was aware, no work was carried on in my subjects at Harvard except in courses planned for undergraduates. He advised me, however, to confer with Professor MacVane of the history department. I did so, and he reluctantly confirmed Professor Peirce's statements.

It is an evidence of the state of academic publicity at the time, that I was much better acquainted with men and programs in the German universities than I was with other American institutions of higher learning. It was one of the most fortunate "accidents" of my life that at this time one of my colleagues was an enthusiastic alumnus of Johns Hopkins.<sup>1</sup> Although not directly acquainted with the social science field, he stimulated my interest in Johns Hopkins to such an extent, particularly by putting into my hands Dr. Ely's little book, *Problems of Cities*, that I went to Baltimore for the academic year 1888-89.

Although Dr. G. Stanley Hall had been lost to the Department of Philosophy, and Dr. Jameson had just resigned from the Department of History, I found a company of graduate students in the Department of History and Politics in number and character combined probably never surpassed in an American university. Their eagerness, breadth, and intelligence in the pursuit of knowledge, together with the leadership of the instructors in the same spirit, constituted an almost ideal academic environment. The men whom I remember gave credible promise of the usefulness which they later achieved. Amos G. Warner had just received his Doctor's degree, and was a sort of connecting link between the graduate students and the faculty. He had already begun the work which made his brief life memorable. Woodrow Wilson was also a recent graduate, and his visits to the seminary contributed to

<sup>1</sup> Dr. W. S. Bayley, now professor of geology, University of Illinois.

the stimulus with which it was charged. It is enough to mention without further comment names of members of that seminary whom I recall:

C. M. Andrews, professor of history, Yale University; J. William Black, professor of history, Colby College; F. W. Blackmar, professor of sociology and economics, University of Kansas; Jeffrey R. Brackett, director of School for Social Workers, Boston; John R. Commons, professor of political economy, University of Wisconsin; John H. Finley, state superintendent of education, New York; ex-president of Knox College, College of City of New York; Robert J. Finley, deceased; Douglas H. Gordon, vice-president of Baltimore Trust Company; Charles H. Haskins, professor of history, Wisconsin and Harvard universities; Toyokichi Iyenaga, lecturer and adviser of Japan Society, New York; Charles D. Lanier, business manager of *Review of Reviews*, New York; J. H. T. McPherson, professor of history, University of Georgia; Colyer Meriwether, teacher, Business High School, Washington, D.C.; W. B. Shaw, associate editor of *Review of Reviews*; Sidney Sherwood, became associate professor of economics, Johns Hopkins University (died 1901); Charles Lee Smith, professor of history, William Jewell College; president of Mercer University, Georgia; now in business, Raleigh, North Carolina; F. W. Spiers, professor of political economy, Drexel Institute and Swarthmore; editor of *Book Lovers Magazine* (died 1905); Bernard C. Steiner, librarian of Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore; Andrew Stephenson, professor of history, DePauw University, to 1913; William Howe Tolman, director of New York Museum of Safety and Sanitation; F. J. Turner, professor of history, Wisconsin and Harvard universities; J. M. Vincent, professor of history, Johns Hopkins University; S. B. Weeks, specialist in United States Bureau of Education; J. Leroy White, capitalist, Baltimore; W. K. Williams, teacher (died 1897); J. A. Woodburn, professor of history, Indiana University.

Before 1892, Columbia College, as it was then called, had scarcely been visible on my horizon. It was at Columbia, however, that the first comprehensive prospectus of social science was published, in accordance with a resolution passed by the trustees of Columbia College, June 7, 1880.<sup>1</sup> This action established the "School of Political Science," which presently occupied one of the most commanding positions in the United States in the whole field of the social sciences. On the personal side, Professor John W. Burgess was the chief impulse behind this enterprise, but I doubt if it would ever have become much more than a dream in his brain

<sup>1</sup> See Tolman, *op. cit.*, p. 805.

if the tremendous stimulus in Baltimore had not disturbed the sleeping giant in New York.<sup>1</sup>

For reasons that will presently be stated more in detail, it is in accordance with historical perspective to reproduce Professor Burgess' program almost in full. The Columbia catalogue issued in May, 1892, as a prospectus for the year 1892-93, has the following statement (Part V, p. 3):

#### PURPOSES OF THE SCHOOL

The School of Political Science was opened on Monday, the fourth day of October, 1880.

The faculty aims to give a complete general view of all the subjects of public polity, both internal and external, from the threefold point of view of history, law and philosophy. The prime aim is therefore the development of all the branches of the political sciences. The secondary and practical objects are:

- a) To fit young men for all the political branches of the public service.
- b) To give an adequate economic and legal training to those who intend to make journalism their profession.

<sup>1</sup> John W. Burgess, b. Tennessee, 1844, A.B., Amherst, 1867. Admitted to bar, 1869. Professor of English literature and political economy, Knox College, 1869-71. Studied history of public law, and political science, Göttingen, Leipzig, Berlin, 1871-73. Professor of History and Political Science, Amherst, 1873-76. Since 1876 Professor of Political Science and constitutional law at Columbia. Chief books: *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, 2 vols.; *The Middle Period: The Civil War and the Constitution*, 2 vols.; *Reconstruction and the Constitution*.

Mr. Tolman (*op. cit.*, p. 804) quotes from Professor H. B. Adams' *Study of History in American Colleges and Universities*, as follows: "Professor Burgess was largely instrumental in the discovery of the European world of history and politics which was to the scholastic mind of young Amherst a real renaissance. It was the opening of a new hemisphere of thought and culture. Students began to appreciate that the world is truly round. An unusual number of graduates in 1874 (the first class taught by Professor Burgess) went to Europe for study and travel. Individual Amherst students had indeed gone to Germany before this time to study natural science, and some, quickened by the same personal influence which doubtless first moved Professor Burgess, went to study history and political science. The students of Professor Burgess went to Berlin in shoals. They went in such numbers that they began to be called 'The Burgess School.' They all went to hear Droysen lecture; and came home with trunks full of Droysen's *Preussische Politik* and of the writings of Leopold von Ranke. Not all of these young men have since become historians; but none of them are the worse for their travels. Some are extremely clever fellows, and have practiced law and politics with considerable success. A few developed qualities suited to academic life; and from the chosen few Professor Burgess has gathered recruits for the School of Political Science now to be described."

c) To supplement, by courses in comparative law and jurisprudence, the instruction in private municipal law offered by the Faculty of Law.

d) To educate teachers of political science.

To these ends courses of study are offered of sufficient duration to enable the student not only to attend the lectures and recitations with the professors, but also to consult the most approved treatises upon the political sciences, and to study the sources of the same.

Young men who wish to obtain positions in the United States civil service—especially in those positions in the Department of State for which special examinations are held—will find it advantageous to follow many of the courses under the Faculty of Political Science. Some of the subjects upon which applicants are examined are treated very fully in the curriculum of the school. Thus, extended courses of lectures are given on political geography and history, diplomatic history and international law, government and administration.

Full opportunity is given in the School of Arts for the study of the principal modern languages, and all the courses in that school are open to the students of the School of Political Science.

It is evident from a later paragraph that at the beginning the School of Political Science at Columbia was, as a matter of fact, principally an arrangement of courses for the Senior year in college. It is not clear whether, in 1880, the trustees had any definite purposes with reference to strictly graduate courses. I suspect that Professor Burgess looked farther ahead than the trustees did, and was an opportunist with reference to development. It appears from the catalogue that in 1892 the plan was for students to begin at the opening of their Senior year the curriculum indicated below, and to arrive at their doctorate three years later, i.e., after two years of graduate work.<sup>1</sup>

A rather full abstract of the plan of instruction in the Columbia School of Political Science, as it was projected in 1892, is subjoined.

<sup>1</sup> In this program for the academic year 1892-93 the following were scheduled as members of the Faculty of the School of Political Science: Seth Low, president; John W. Burgess, professor of history, political science, and constitutional law, dean of the faculty; Richmond Mayo-Smith, professor of political economy and social science; Monroe Smith, professor of Roman law and comparative jurisprudence; Frank J. Goodnow, professor of administrative law, secretary of the faculty; Edwin R. A. Seligman, professor of political economy and finance; John Barrett Moore, professor of diplomacy and international law; Herbert L. Osgood, adjunct professor of history; William A. Dunning, adjunct professor of history and political philosophy.

Besides these there were scheduled five "lecturers," including one "assistant" in economics. It does not appear that these five were expected to play an important rôle as teachers.

It may seem at first glance like any other advertisement of intellectual goods for most of which most students today have little use. That ought not to be the effect upon any student of the history of sociology. The Columbia scheme of study in social science is certainly the best considered, most comprehensive, and most coherent attempt up to that time in the United States to organize team-work in the social sciences so as to cover all the ground which needs to be surveyed in that field. The attempt exhibits strong if not completely adequate apprehension of those underlying relations which it has fallen to the sociologists more actively to represent—viz., the phenomena of the *interconnections* of all human activities, and the consequent interdependence of all divisions of intellectual procedure aimed at understanding of these activities. The outline is the first respectable attempt of a group of academic men in the social sciences in the United States—or anywhere else so far as I know—to organize themselves as co-operative expositors of the principal phenomena of human life in such a way that their combined work would afford a rationally systematized view of modern civilization in its purposes, its technique, its results, and its open problems. This attempt was sure to pave the way for a *criticism* of the underlying conceptions on which this whole co-ordination was projected. That is, it stimulated the inevitable demand for general sociology, while it is questionable whether a single individual in the Columbia group in 1892 had a distinct perception that such a demand was involved, still less that he was helping to create it.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile, I have for several years past recommended to my graduate students that they take to heart this Columbia survey as a fair indication of the field of knowledge with which every man who intends to work in the social science field ought to be acquainted in such fashion as a beginner is acquainted with anything. Such basic acquaintance with the whole field is the only proper preparation for specialization in any part of the field. With the addition of the sociological courses in the following years, this Columbia

<sup>1</sup> Possibly the association at that time between Professor Mayo-Smith and Professor Giddings had already been so significant that some modification of this statement would be necessary if the whole situation were to be explained.

conspectus marks an ideal by which it would be salutary for every specialist in the social sciences occasionally to test his mental vision. With certain abbreviations the prospectus is as follows:

# I. HISTORY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

## A. POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

The student is supposed to be familiar with the outlines of European history, ancient and modern. Students who are not thus prepared are recommended to take the undergraduate courses in mediaeval and modern history. The courses of historical lectures are as follows:

1. *General political and constitutional history*.—This comprehends in detail: a view of the political civilization of imperial Rome; the history of the development of the government of the Christian church into the form of papal monarchy; the overthrow of the imperial system and the establishment of German kingdoms throughout Middle, Western, and Southern Europe; the character and constitution of these kingdoms; the conversion of the Germans to the Christian church, and the relations which the Christian church assumed toward the Germanic states; consolidation of the Germanic kingdoms into the European empire of Charlemagne; character and constitution of the Carolingian state; its disruption through the development of the feudal system and the independent hierarchic church, and division into the kingdoms of Germany, France, and Italy; character and history of the feudal system as a state form; re-establishment of the imperial authority by the reconnection of Germany with Italy; conflict of the Middle Ages between church and state; the political disorganization and papal despotism resulting from the same; the development of the absolute monarchy and the reformation; the limitation of absolute kingly power and the development of constitutionalism; and lastly the realization of the constitutional idea of the nineteenth century. Four hours a week, first session. Professor Osgood.

2. *Historical and political geography*.—The purpose of this course is to give a description of the physical geography of Europe, to point out the various sections into which it is naturally divided, to trace the territorial growth of modern European states, and to describe the geographical and ethnic conditions of the present states of the European continent. One hour a week. Professor Goodnow.

3. *The political and constitutional history of England*.—The object of this course is to trace the growth of the English constitution from the earliest to the present times, dwelling upon foreign relations during periods when they had an important influence. . . . About the beginning of the nineteenth century, and largely in consequence of the industrial revolution, the democratizing of the constitution began. The account given of the development of this tendency closes with the Reform Bill of 1832. The work of the first term will close at



1640. The history subsequent to that date will be treated during the second term. Two hours a week. Professor Osgood.

4. *The relations of England and Ireland.*—In a general way, the Irish question has been the question of imposing upon the last and most persistent remnant of the old Celtic race the Teutonic ideas and institutions that have been developed in England. Three phases of the process are clearly distinguishable in history—the political, the religious, and the economical. It is designed in the lectures to follow out in some detail the modifications in the relations of the two islands affected by the varying prominence of these different phases. . . . One hour a week, first session. Professor Dunning.

5. *Political and constitutional history of the United States.*—This course of lectures covers the history of the Colonies and of the Revolutionary War; the formation and dissolution of the confederate constitution; the formation of the Constitution of 1787; and its application down to the Civil War: the changes wrought in the Constitution by the Civil War, and the resulting transformation of the public law of the United States. Four hours a week, second session. Professor Burgess.

6. *Political history of the Colonies and of the American Revolution.*— . . . Four hours a week, one session. Professor Osgood.

7. *The United States during Civil War and Reconstruction.*—The object of this course is to describe the constitutional principles which came into play during the period from 1860 to 1877. . . . Two hours a week, second session. Professor Dunning.

8. *Political history of the state of New York.*—The purpose of this course is to give a knowledge of the constitutional development and political history of the state of New York, beginning with the foundation of the colony by the Dutch and extending to the present time. It gives a brief account of the condition of the colony of New York, and the constitution of its government; then of the constitution made in 1777, and of each of the constitutions of 1821 and 1846, the amendments of 1875, together with the conventions in which each of these constitutions was made; also the history of political parties in the state of New York, showing their particular relation to these constitutions, and showing finally the methods of procedure, or "practical politics" of other states, and of the great national political parties. . . . One hour a week. Mr. Whitridge.

9. *Charter and political history of New York City.*—This course treats of the relations of the city to the state, showing the growth of municipal independence. The early charters conferred but few rights on the city, the selection of the most important city officials being made at Albany. Tammany Hall has been the most important and powerful party organization. A brief history of the Tammany organization, its rulers, and its method of nominating public officers will be given. The "Tweed Ring" and the efforts to purify city politics since its downfall will be described, including the reform charter of 1873, the amendments of 1884, the report of the Tilden Committee of 1875, and

of the Roosevelt and Gibbs investigating committees. One hour a week, first session. Dr. Bernheim.

#### B. LEGAL HISTORY

##### 1. *History of European law*.—

Book I. Primitive law.

Book II. Roman law.

Book III. Mediaeval law.

Book IV. Modern law.

Two hours a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

2. *History of diplomacy*.—Two hours a week, first session. Professor Moore.

3. *History of American diplomacy*.—Two hours a week, second session. Professor Moore.

4. *Diplomatic history of the United States during Lincoln's and Johnson's administrations*.—One hour a week, second session. Dr. Bancroft.

#### C. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Every people known to history has possessed some form, however vague and primitive, of political government. Every people which has attained a degree of enlightenment above the very lowest has been permeated by some ideas, more or less systematic, as to the origin, nature, and limitations of governmental authority. It is the purpose of this course to trace historically the development of these ideas, from the primitive notions of primitive people to the complex and elaborate philosophical theories that have characterized the ages of highest intellectual refinement.

*Book I*, after a short survey of the theocratical system of the Brahmins and the rationalistic doctrine of Confucius, treats mainly of the political philosophy of Greece and Rome, with especial attention to the profound speculations of Plato and Aristotle.

*Book II* discusses the political doctrines of early Christianity and the Christian church, with the controversy of Papacy and Empire, and the elaborate systems of St. Thomas Aquinas and his adversaries.

*Book III* treats of that age of renaissance and reformation in which Machiavelli and Bodin, Suarez and Bellarmini, Luther, Calvin worked out their various solutions of the great problem, how to reconcile the conflicting doctrines of theology, ethics, and politics.

*Book IV* covers the period of modern times, as full of great names in political philosophy as of great events in political history. Here are examined the doctrine of natural law, as developed by Grotius and Puffendorf, the doctrine of the divine right of kings, with its corollary of passive obedience, as in Filmer and Bossuet, the theory of the constitutionalists, Locke and Montesquien, the idea of social contract, made most famous by Rousseau, and the various additions to and modifications of these doctrines down to the present day. Two hours a week first session, three hours second session. Professor Dunning.

## II. PUBLIC LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

## A. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. *Comparative constitutional law of the principal European states and of the United States.*—Comprehending a comparison of the provisions of the constitutions of England, United States, France, and Germany, the interpretation of the same by the legislative enactments and judicial decisions of these states, and the generalization from them of the fundamental principles of public law, common to them all. Three hours a week, December to March. Professor Burgess.

2. *Comparative constitutional law of the several commonwealths of the American Union.*—In this course of lectures comparison is made in the same manner of the constitutions of the forty-four commonwealths of the Union. Dr. Bernheim.

3. *International law.*—This course treats of the general principles of international law, as it has been developed by positive agreement, in the form of treaties and conventions, and by common usage, as shown in legislation, in the decisions of international tribunals and of municipal courts, and in the conduct of nations. The rules thus discovered are discussed in the light of the principles of reason and justice as scientifically presented by writers on international law, and an effort is made to trace the systematic establishment of the rules which govern intercourse among nations at the present day. Two hours a week. Professor Moore.

4. *Conflict of criminal law, extradition and nationality.* . . . Two hours a week, second session. Professor Moore.

## B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. *Comparative administrative law of the United States and the principal European states.*—[Long description omitted.] Two hours a week. Professor Goodnow.

2. *The law of municipal corporations.*—[Description omitted.] Two hours a week, first session. Professor Goodnow.

3. *The law of taxation.*—[Description omitted.] Two hours a week, second session. Professor Goodnow.

## C. ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

1. *Institutes of Roman law.*—One hour a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

2. *Systematic jurisprudence.*—This course of lectures presents succinctly the leading principles of modern private law. One hour a week. Professor Monroe Smith.

3. *Conflict of private law.*— . . . Two hours a week, first session. Professor Monroe Smith.

### III. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

#### A. POLITICAL ECONOMY

"It is presumed that students possess a knowledge of the general principles of political economy as laid down in the ordinary manuals by Walker or Mill, before entering the school. Students who are not thus prepared are recommended to take the undergraduate course on the elements of political economy."

The courses of lectures are as follows:

1. *Historical and practical political economy*.—This course is intended to give the student a knowledge of the economic development of the world, in order that he may understand present economic institutions and solve present economic problems. The principal topics are: introduction, concerning the study of political economy and its relation to political science; general sketch of the economic development of the world; the institutions of private property, bequest, and inheritance, and the principle of personal liberty as affecting the economic condition of the world; the problems of production, such as land tenure, population, capital, different forms of productive enterprise, statistics of production, particularly the natural resources of the United States; problems of exchange, such as free trade and protection, railroads, money, bimetalism, paper money, banking, commercial crises, etc.; problems of distribution such as wages, trades unions, co-operation, poor relief, factory laws, profit and interest, rent, progress and poverty; and finally a consideration of the function of the state in economic affairs. Three hours a week. Professor Mayo Smith.

2. *History and criticism of economic theories*.—This course comprises two parts. In the first the various systems are discussed, attention being directed to the connection between the theories and the organization of industrial society. In the second, the separate doctrines—e.g., of capital, rent, wages, etc.—are treated in their historical development. The first part is subdivided as follows:

- I. *Antiquity*: Orient, Greece, Rome.
- II. *Middle Ages*: Aquinas, Glossaton, writers on money, etc.
- III. *Mercantilists*: Stafford, Mun, Petty, North, Locke, Bodin, Vauban, Forbonnais, Serra, Galiani, Justin.
- IV. *Physiocrats*: Quesnay, Gournay, Turgot, etc.
- V. *Adam Smith and precursors*: Tucker, Hume, Cantillon, Stewart.
- VI. *English School*: Malthus, Ricardo, Senior, McCulloch, Chalmers, Jones, Mill, etc.
- VII. *The Continent*: Say, Sismondi, Hermann, List, Bastist, etc.
- VIII. *German School*: Roscher, Kines, Hildebrand.
- IX. *Recent development*: Rogers, Jevons, Cairnes, Bagehot, Leslie, Toynbee, Marshall, Wagner, Schmoller, Held, Brentano, Menger, Sax, Böhn-Bawerk, Leroy-Beaulieu, De Laveleye, Gide; Cossa, Nazzani, Loria, Ricca-Salerno, Pantaleoni; Carey, George, Walker, Clark, Patten, Adams, etc.

Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

3. *Railroad problems: economical, social, and legal.*—These lectures treat of railroads in the fourfold aspect of their relation to the investors, the employees, the public, and the state, respectively. A history of railways and railway policy in America and Europe forms the preliminary part of the course. All the problems of railway management, in so far as they are of economic importance, come up for discussion. Among the subjects treated are: financial methods, railway construction, speculation, profits, failures, accounts and reports, expenses, tariffs, principles of rates, classification and discrimination, competition and pooling accidents, employer's liability, etc. Especial attention is paid to the methods of regulation and legislation in the United States, as compared with European methods, and the course closes with a general discussion of state versus private management (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

#### B. SCIENCE OF FINANCE

1. *Science of finance.*—This course is historical as well as comparative and critical. It treats of the expenditure of the state, and the methods of meeting the same among different civilized nations. It describes the different kinds of state revenues, especially taxes, and discusses the principles of taxation. It is therefore in great part a course on the theories and methods of taxation in all civilized countries. It considers also public debt, methods of borrowing, money, redemption, refunding, repudiation, etc. Finally it describes the financial organization of the state, by which the revenue is collected and expended. Students are furnished with the current public documents of the United States Treasury, and the chief financial reports of the leading commonwealths, and are expected to understand all the facts in regard to public debt, currency, and revenue therein contained. Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

2. *Taxation and distribution of wealth.*—This course treats of the history of taxation in Europe and America; the effect of indirect taxation on the production and distribution of wealth; the income and the property tax; taxation of natural monopolies; taxes affecting morality and education; socialism; the single tax; progressive taxation; and the moral and political effect of direct taxation proportioned to the wealth of the taxpayers. One hour a week. Dr. Spann.

3. *Financial history of the United States.*—"This course endeavors to present a complete survey of American legislation on currency, finance, and taxation, as well as its connection with the state industry and commerce . . . (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

4. *Industrial and tariff history of the United States.*— . . . (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Seligman.

#### C. STATISTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. *Statistical science: Methods and results.*—This course is intended to furnish a basis for social science by supplementing the historical, legal, and economic knowledge already gained by such a knowledge of social phenomena

as can be gained only by statistical observation. Under the head of statistics of population are considered: race and ethnological distinctions, nationality, density, city and country, sex, age, occupation, religion, education, births, deaths, marriages, mortality, tables, emigration, etc. Under economic statistics: land, production of food, raw material, labor, wages, capital, means of transportation, shipping, prices, etc. Under the head of moral statistics are considered: statistics of suicide, vice, crime of all kinds, causes of crime, condition of criminals, repression of crime, penalties and effect of penalties, etc. Finally are considered the method of statistical observations, the value of the results obtained, the doctrine of free will, and the possibility of discovering social laws. Two hours a week. Professor Mayo-Smith.

2. *Communistic and socialistic theories*.—"The present organization of society is attacked by socialistic writers, who demand many changes, especially in the institution of private property and the system of free competition. It is the object of this course to describe what these attacks are, what changes are proposed, and how far these changes seem desirable or possible. At the same time an account is given of actual socialistic movements, such as the international, social democracy, etc. Advantage is taken of these discussions to make the course really one on social science, by describing modern social institutions, such as private property, in their historical origin and development, and their present justification" (1893-94). Two hours a week. Professor Mayo-Smith.

3. *Sociology*.—The courses of sociology, of which several are expected to be given, will be announced later.

IV. *Seminaria*.—"Outside of the regular instruction in the various subjects by lecture, it is the intention to furnish the students of the school an opportunity for special investigation of historical, legal, economic, and social questions under the direction of the professor. This is done by means of original papers prepared by the students. The papers are read before the professor and the students, and are then criticized and discussed. The number of meetings and the topics to be discussed are determined each year. Attendance at a seminarium is necessary on the part of candidates for all degrees."

#### ORDER OF STUDIES

It is recommended by the faculty that students who intend to devote their whole time to the courses of study offered by this faculty, take them in the following order:

First Year	Hours per Week
Constitutional History.....	6
Institutes of Roman Law.....	1
Political Economy.....	2
Science of Finance.....	3
History of Political Theories.....	22
Financial History of the United States.....	$\frac{1}{2}$
Historical and Political Geography.....	2

First Year— <i>Continued</i>		Hours per Week
Political History of New York.....	1	
Relations of England and Ireland.....	1	(1st session)
History of Diplomacy.....	1	
Second Year		
Comparative Constitutional Law.....	3	
History of European Law.....	2	
Comparative Administrative Law.....	2	
History of Political Economy.....	2	
Social Science: Communistic and Socialistic theories...	2	
Industrial and Tariff History of the United States....	1	
Colonial History of the United States.....	2	
Third Year		
Comparative Jurisprudence.....	2	
International Public Law.....	2	
Conflict of Law, Public and Private.....	2	
Law of Taxation.....	1	
Law of Municipal Corporations.....	1	
Social Science: Statistics, Methods, and Results.....	2	
History of Political Economy.....	2	
History of the United States 1860-77.....	1	

The same catalogue gives the names of students in this School of Political Science for the year 1891-92. The number is 128. Deducting 6 who are registered in other parts of the university, and 46 who have no Bachelor's degree, the total of college graduates appear to have been 76.

In the catalogue for 1893-94 the number registered was 41. Of these, 9 were students either in the General Theological Seminary or in Union Theological Seminary. Thirty-four (34) more were members of the Senior class in the School of Arts but were taking certain courses under the political science faculty. One hundred and eighteen (118) law students were registered for political science courses, and finally thirty-three (33) who were not candidates for a degree, making a total of 226 doing their work wholly or in part under the political science faculty.

In this catalogue of 1893-94, Professor Giddings appears with the title "Lecturer on Sociology." The courses in sociology are not described as in the earlier catalogue. All that is said of them appears to be on pp. 35, 36, viz.: Under the general head "Economics and Social Science" we read:

COURSES IN SOCIOLOGY AND STATISTICS

XVI. *Physical geography and anthropology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, second term. Dr. Ripley.

XVII. *Practical statistics*.—Lectures, practical exercises, and private readings. Two hours, first term. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XVIII. *The science of statistics*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XIX. *Sociology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, first term. Professor Giddings.

XX. *Socialism and communism*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours. Professor Mayo-Smith.

XXI. *Crime and penology*.—Lectures and private reading. Two hours, second term. Professor Giddings.

XXX. *Seminarium in social science*.—Two hours bi-weekly. Professors Mayo-Smith and Giddings.<sup>1</sup>

While the Harvard catalogue of 1891-92 seems to show a different state of things from that which I found when in 1888, I tried to discover something that would make it worth while for a graduate student in the social sciences to spend a year there, I have no reason to think that graduate work in these subjects existed at Harvard in 1891-92 to any great extent, except on paper. It is certainly true that there was no clear distinction, even on paper, between graduate and undergraduate work.<sup>2</sup>

The portion of the catalogue which sets forth the character of courses offered bears the title "Courses of Instruction Provided by the Faculty of Arts and Literature" (p. 56). The Graduate School is not scheduled and described until nearly 200 pages later (p. 239). In the latter section under the heading "Divisions and Departments of the Faculty of Arts and Science" (p. 258), Division V is entitled, "History and Political Science." Professor Dunbar, the economist, was chairman of the division. Turning back to the scheme of instruction (p. 80), we find under "Political Economy" two courses described as *primarily for undergraduates*; six courses, entitled "For Graduates and Undergraduates," and under the heading "Primarily for Graduate Courses of Research," there is this paragraph: "In 1890-91 Professors Dunbar and Taussig will guide competent students in investigations of topics to be selected after conference with them. Graduate students who take the courses 'for graduates and undergraduates' are encouraged to carry on special investigations in the subjects treated."

In other words, no plans for organized graduate study in economics had been developed at Harvard.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Professor Giddings' note below, p. 761.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. above, pp. 733-34.



In history the case seems to have been somewhat different. Fourteen courses were offered for undergraduates. Under the head "Primarily for Graduates," fourteen courses were offered, including three seminars. There is no separate department of political science. One course, "for graduates and undergraduates," was offered in Roman law.

It is not a violent conclusion, therefore, on the basis of what is in and between the lines of this catalogue, together with the results of my personal investigation three years earlier,<sup>1</sup> that up to 1892 Johns Hopkins and Columbia were setting the pace in the social sciences, and all that need be added about the beginnings of sociological instruction may be submitted in the form of individual testimony.<sup>2</sup>

#### IV. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES

The most complete understanding of the American sociological movement which our present knowledge makes possible requires correlation of that movement with the whole modern development of social science in the largest sense. In a word, sociology of the type with which this monograph is concerned is an enigma and an offense, if it is judged upon the presumption that it is an isolated phenomenon, or even an ordinary case of fractious sectarianism.<sup>3</sup> The movement, on the contrary, at once takes on significance, not only for itself but as a phenomenon of social science in general, when it appears as an inevitable phase of that expansion of DEMAND FOR OBJECTIVITY in social science which found voice in Adam Smith, and which became the beginning of a program in the methodology projected by Eichhorn, and Savigny, and Niebuhr, and Ranke.<sup>4</sup>

The present writer hopes to complete an outline description of the missing link in methodological evolution between the type of social science that culminated in the eighteenth century<sup>5</sup> and the psychological social science which the sociologists have helped to

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, pp. 733-34.

<sup>2</sup> See below, pp. 759-63.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. p. 820.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. my paper, "The Sociological Stage in the Evolution of the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, XV (1910), 681.

<sup>5</sup> See Small, *The Cameralists*.

produce. The restrictions of this sketch compel us to take the immediately preceding stage of the evolution for granted, and to focus our attention upon the American phases of the movement since 1865.

The first notable evidence that a differentiating thought-movement was gathering momentum in this country in the realm of the social sciences was the appearance in 1883 of Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*.<sup>1</sup>

The first point that impresses me as I try to place Ward historically, less by means of my own recollections than by examining the internal evidence of his writings, is that he felt himself to be a voice crying in the wilderness. The most direct sign of this may be found in a comparison of the preface to the first (1883) edition of *Dynamic Sociology* with the second (1897) preface. Both these prefaces are printed in the second edition. Everyone at all interested in the development of American sociological theory should compare these two statements. They are speaking witnesses to the advance in Ward's own relations to the subject. When he wrote *Dynamic Sociology*, he had only the most meager knowledge that anyone else had worked in the same field. His most intimate associations had been with physical scientists. The only previous thinkers named in the first preface as having had even a remote connection with sociology are (in a negative way) Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, Mill, Spencer, and John Fiske; and (by implication) Comte in a positive way. Silence about other writers does not prove that he was unacquainted with them, but I have no reason to think that, in 1883, Ward had heard of any European movements toward sociology except the dubious attitude of the men named. He felt that he was putting completely new landmarks on the map, as indeed he was; but more than that, he supposed that, with the

<sup>1</sup> Ward's principal works are: *Dynamic Sociology*, 1883, second edition 1897 (the Preface alone differs from the contents of the first edition); *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, 1893; *Pure Sociology*, 1903; *Applied Sociology*, 1904. Appreciation of Ward: *American Journal of Sociology*, XI, 61-78; Small, announcement of Ward's *Pure Sociology*, *ibid.*, VIII (1903), 710; "Notes on *Pure Sociology*," *ibid.*, IX (1904), 404, 567, 703. Light is thrown upon Ward's personality by a review of the first three volumes of his minor writings, entitled "Glimpses of the Cosmos," *ibid.*, XIX (1914), 659.

exceptions indicated, he was the first explorer who had started out to find the landmarks.

This detachment of Ward from the course of development of the social sciences in Europe, including, according to his own confession, psychology, not only made his own work provincial, but it helped to keep in countenance a provincialism which has not yet entirely disappeared from the thinking of American sociologists. I mean by this not that in recent years we have neglected current developments in European sociology, but that we have regarded sociology too much as a thing by itself. We have betrayed relatively little interest in finding out to what extent sociology is a phase of the methodological evolution in history, political philosophy, and economics during the first half of the nineteenth century. We have given immeasurably more attention to our later interrelations with psychology. We have not yet fully found ourselves in the succession of men who earlier confronted phases of the same problems which began to challenge us particularly after 1890. The development of American sociological theory might not have been more rapid; it certainly would have been more impressive among others than the sociologists, if Ward and his successors after a decade had been familiar with the German gropings in the direction of sociology at about the middle of the nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

Another fact about Ward must receive more attention than has been paid to it, so far as I know, if he is to be correctly understood as

<sup>1</sup> Cf. note above, p. 724. On von Mohl and Ahrens, see *American Journal of Sociology*, XVIII (1913), 457-59. At the present moment it is a matter of peculiar interest that the final word on the demand for or the possibility of a science of sociology was supposed to have been spoken in the negative in 1859, by Treitschke, so widely known in later years as historian and as preceptor of a large section of academic Germany in the spirit and theory of militarism. The monograph in which this conclusion was argued is entitled, *Gesellschaftswissenschaft* (1859). Although Treitschke was more elaborate than von Mohl in his argument that the idea of a science of sociology is fallacious and confusing, although he came to the conclusion, in opposition to Ahrens, that the foremost demand of social theory was the widening and deepening of political science, so that it would absorb and assimilate everything that had been suggested as material for a science of "society," the very discussion in which he expounded this opinion might have been used by Americans to save themselves much preliminary work of clarifying their ideas about that illusive concept "society." It took American sociologists more than twenty years from the publication of *Dynamic Sociology* to get themselves sufficiently oriented about this initial obscurity to be resolute in abandoning pursuit of the intangible, and in devoting themselves to objective study of men and women in their actual groupings.

a waymark. It may be stated roughly in this way: Ward was professionally a museum investigator. His daily work was to sift botanical evidence, to draw up reports on the evidence, to label and pigeonhole specimens, with a high degree of probability that both reports and specimens would rest forever after in undisturbed oblivion. At most they were indexed for the use of anyone who cared to call at the museum in search of them or to consult his monographs describing them. Responsibility for adapting knowledge of them to the mental needs of less scientific minds, or for putting it into such shape that it would be most convincing, must have been the weakest of the considerations to which he gave attention.

On the other hand, there has been scarcely another American thinker who has left a visible impress upon sociological theory who has not had a considerable amount of the responsibility of a teacher—not merely the sort of teaching which an author does, but teaching by word of mouth in the presence of the student.

As a consequence, Ward's writings have always impressed those who knew him best as, in the first place, specimens of work done by a man urged by his own interest in the work, and to satisfy his own ideals of good workmanship, but lacking certain mental plasticity which would have made his results more appealing if, while they were in the shaping, they had been subjected to contact with the reactions of unconvinced minds. Whether Ward wanted it to be so or not, his work was moreover always more insulated from that of men engaged on the same problems than was good for the author and his products.

Another aspect of the same fact was Ward's pontifical estimate of his own conclusions. Although in the later years of his life, especially as a summer lecturer at several universities, and then as professor at Brown, he had some of the experiences of a teacher, yet he grew more and more unable to abide anyone who showed signs of thinking that he might not have said the final word on the subject of sociology.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This was first brought to my attention as a result of my perfectly innocent taking him at his word in connection with the publication of *Pure Sociology*. In the preface of that book he deplored the fact that there was so little criticism of one another's work by the sociologists. In entire good faith I proceeded to criticize his latest book as vigorously as I knew how (*American Journal of Sociology*, IX, 404, 567, 703). Instead

One of the results of these facts was that his system of sociology had a very evident form and spirit as though, so to speak, it were addressed to absolute mind, not to the still finite human beings from whom every theorist must gather his disciples. Although Ward afterward wrote three major works<sup>1</sup> beside two minor ones and numerous monographs in exposition of his views, I have never discovered that, in any essential particular, they added to or subtracted from the system contained in *Dynamic Sociology*. Ward's sociology seems to have received form and substance, as the Germans say, *aus einem Gusse*. All that he did later was the enlarging of replicas of details. This is a unique and impressive intellectual achievement. It gives Ward a position of solitary distinction. At the same time, after the sociological movement began to gain momentum, everyone in it recognized him as its initiator in this country, and no one has approached him in grasp of the relations between cosmic evolution in general and the evolution of human associatings.

The other prominent American sociologists, as just now observed, have all been academic teachers. More than that, they have evidently all been conscious of getting their sociology as they went along. They did not enter upon their work in possession of a complete system of interpreting the physical and moral universe, still less with a foreordained place and manner for the fitting of the human incident as a detail into the cosmic system. This was, on the one hand, a great disadvantage for Ward's sociological successors. As framers of systems of thinking they were evidently handicapped in comparison with him. They were far less sure of their physical universe. They were consequently far less sure how the human world geared into the physical world.

On the other hand, this contrast with Ward was also greatly to the advantage of his successors. Their ignorance in fields where

of responding in kind, Dr. Ward sent me a most bitter letter charging me with "the arrogance of the academic caste toward those not in their ranks." For two years we ceased to exchange letters. After the former friendship had been resumed, in a discussion during the meeting of the Sociological Society in New York in 1911, he blandly read Professor Hayes and myself out of the ranks of the sociologists because we had dissented from certain of his views about the problems of sociology.

<sup>1</sup> See note, p. 749.

he was wonderfully informed was in one sense comparative vacant-mindedness, but in another sense comparative open-mindedness. It left them with oppressive and even depressing consciousness that the relations which they wanted to understand were a labyrinth to which they had not found a very satisfactory guide. They were perforce inquirers. They had to work in a fashion which was a rough sort of induction. They had all broken away from orthodox moorings of one kind or another—historical, economic, political, philosophical, theological—and they had launched out on a quest of their own for an answer to the question: Of what sort is this human lot of ours? Not one of them has even yet arrived at an answer as complete in form as Ward's was in the beginning. For myself, I think we have arrived at something better. The human lot is not reducible to as simple formulas as Ward supposed. Discovery and acceptance of this fact are long steps beyond satisfaction with a version of the human lot which makes it simpler than it is.

We have discovered that human reactions have a baffling way of showing thoughtless independence of antecedent logic. We have discovered that we must pry into actual human facts to find out how they work; and that preconceptions which we carry into the facts, no matter how much presumption goes with them from knowledge of better analyzed relations, are quite likely to be discredited by the actual findings. We have learned that the human lot which we encounter in positive exploration makes up a bigger and more formless composite than our minds are able to reduce to complete symmetry without violence to reality. In other words, we have taken seriously to heart the knowledge which was close to everyone docile enough to receive it, that the human lot is an unmeasured and, so far as our present powers go, measureless complex of uncompleted processes. We accordingly find our task to be, in the first place, the making out of workings within those ranges of the processes which we can bring within the grasp of our understanding. We have given up the notion that it is feasible to arrive at a survey of human experience so complete and precise that it may be reduced to a miniature, as we make reduced models of our physical world, or of our solar system.

Furthermore, the mental experience of the teacher-explorer, in the course of arriving at the present outlook of the sociologists, has involved inevitable mistakes, inconsistencies, changes of front, and reformulations. This has been not merely the consequence of collecting new observations. It has also been due to the fact that many of the advances in perception or expression have been in the course of attempts to meet students' minds at their precise point of outlook. This has necessarily involved frequent over-emphasis of considerations peculiarly pertinent to the difficulties met in the given student group.

What then was the gist of Ward's sociology? His own answer is given in the preface of the first edition (repeated, pp. xxvi f. of the second edition):

Sociology is reproached, even by those who admit its legitimacy, with being impracticable and fruitless. The prevailing methods of treating it, including those employed by its highest living advocates, to a great extent justify this charge. There are dead sciences as well as dead languages. The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however agreeable its study, is lifeless. Sociology, which of all sciences should benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or dead sciences. It is the object of this work to point out a method by which the breath of life may be breathed into its nostrils. . . .

If, in the detailed unfolding of this system, any comprehensive principles have been announced, to which attention has not heretofore been especially directed, the chief of these will, perhaps, be recognized in—

1. The law of Aggregation, as distinguished from that of Evolution proper.
2. The theory of the Social Forces, and the fundamental antithesis which they imply between Feeling and Function.
3. The contrast between these true Social Forces and the guiding influence of the Intellect, embodying the application of the Indirect Method of Conation, and the essential nature of Invention, of Art, and of Dynamic Action.
4. The superiority of Artificial, or Teleological, Processes over Natural, or Genetic, Processes, and finally—
5. The recognition and demonstration of the paramount necessity for the equal and universal Distribution of the extant knowledge of the world, which last is the crown of the system itself.

While there certainly have been adumbrations of many of these truths, it is believed that thus far no one of them has been systematically formulated or distinctly recognized.

*Dynamic Sociology* turns out to be, by way of introduction, a cosmic philosophy. It is afterward, in its more specific purpose,

a thesis in social psychology. As I shall repeat, after further quotations from Ward, his historical importance does not stand or fall with the validity of his psychology. It rests upon the significant timeliness of his antecedent profession of faith that psychic initiatives are actual differentiating factors in the distinctively human stages of evolution. This whole feature of Ward's theory centers about the concept "social forces." This concept played an important rôle in changing the current of American sociological thinking from the course which English theory has followed as a rule up to the present time. As the concept was introduced by Ward in 1883, it amounted to the first impressive challenge of the fatalistic implications of Herbert Spencer's rendering of the evolutionary theory.

Whether Spencer would have accepted the categorical statement or not, many and for a while the most aggressive of his disciples got the impression from his interpretation of evolution that the development of society is beyond voluntary control. It was supposed to be determined rather by those physical laws of the redistribution of forces found working in the lower scale of nature. It was inferred that human volition can neither hasten nor retard the pace of this social evolution. Englishmen are still dubiously asking the question whether evolution of society in directions selected by human agency is in any sort or degree thinkable. Ward was a biologist, with his special work in the division of paleontological botany. He was such a convinced disciple of Darwin that he was often mistaken for an unqualified materialist. His approach to sociological questions was from the frankly positive standpoint, and he was an avowed admirer of Comte. In his case there was no symptom of bias in favor of a moral or spiritual as distinguished from a mechanical interpretation of society. His bias rather against a psychical interpretation of society gave tremendous force to the book in which, for the first time, the evolutionary theory was used by *an evolutionist* as the basis for an exposition of social evolution by means of psychic forces. This exposition has never been accepted in detail by sociologists who were scrupulous about their psychology. Because of its central contention, however, it fairly ranks as the foundation of American sociology. It



has furnished a basis on which sociology has flourished for a generation in this country, while for most of the same period it languished in England.<sup>1</sup>

One of Ward's most elementary statements is worth quoting. It is in his introductory chapter. In it he throws down his gauntlet to the dogmatists of societary fatalism as follows (I, 35):

[Our problem is] whether it is possible for society to improve itself. Society is simply a compound organism whose acts exhibit the resultant of all the individual forms which its members exert. These acts, whether individual or collective, obey fixed laws. Objectively viewed, society is a natural object, presenting a variety of complicated movements, produced by a particular class of natural forces. The question, therefore, simply is, Can man ever control these forces to his advantage, as he controls other, and some very complicated, natural forces? Is it true that man shall ultimately obtain the dominion of the whole world *except himself*? I regard society and the social forces as constituting just as much a legitimate field for the exercise of human ingenuity as do the various material substances and physical forces. The latter have been investigated and subjugated. The former are still pursuing their wild, unbridled course. The latter still exist, still exhibit their indestructible dynamic tendencies, still obey the Newtonian laws of motion, still operate along the lines of least resistance. But man, by teleological foresight, has succeeded in *harmonizing these lines of least resistance with those of greatest advantage to himself*. He has made the winds, the waters, fire, steam, and electricity do his bidding. All nature, both animate and inanimate, has been reduced to his service. One field alone remains unsubdued. One class of natural forces still remains the play of chance, and from it, instead of aid, he is constantly receiving the most serious checks. This field is that of *society itself*. These unreclaimed forces are the social forces; of whose nature man seems to possess no knowledge, whose very existence he persistently ignores, and which he consequently is powerless to control.

But we have said that the very *systems*, moral, religious, political, of which mention has been made, are but so many direct attempts to control society and improve its condition. True: and they failed to accomplish their object because they did not recognize the very laws and forces which they sought to control. The extraordinary influence which they have, in fact, exerted shows how great would have been the result had they really been directed in channels of human advantage. They recall the misdirected efforts and hopeless dreams of the crazy inventors of "perpetual motion," and, as attempted inventions, they have failed for the same reason; their complicated machines have not

<sup>1</sup> I am aware that the disciples of Sir Francis Galton would regard this statement as false.

worked because they were contrived in ignorance of the forces they were expected to control.

Again, the defenders of *laissez faire* will object that society has always done better when let alone; that all efforts to improve the moral or material condition of society by legislation and kindred means have not only been inoperative, but have in the majority of cases done positive *harm*, often to the very cause they were intended to subserve.

If it could be proved that they had always been absolutely inoperative, the case would perhaps be somewhat discouraging, but if they can be shown to have had an evil effect, this is all we can hope or desire. For if they can do harm, they can do something, and nothing is left but to make them do good. Legislation (I use the term in the most general sense) is nothing else but invention. It is an effort so to control the forces of a state as to secure the greatest benefits to its people. But these forces are *social* forces, and the people are the members of society. As matters are now and have thus far been, government, in so far as the improvement of society is concerned, has been to a great extent a failure. It has done good service in protecting the operation of the natural dynamic forces, and for this it should receive due credit. But it has also to be charged with a long account of opposition to science and oppression of aspiring humanity. But why has it failed as a promoter of the social welfare to which it has laid such special claims? Because legislators, as inventors, have proved mere bunglers; because they have been ignorant of the forces over which they have sought to exercise control. Success in invention must be limited by the acquaintance of the inventor with the forces that are to propel his machine.

As I intimated at the beginning of this reference to Ward, the importance of his main contribution to sociology does not consist in the accuracy of his psychology. It consisted rather in the force of his argument *from the biological side*, that there are social forces in addition to the merely impersonal cosmic forces—that human initiative, as distinct from purely physical causation, is a reality and not an illusion. In homely terms, Ward's assertion adopted into science of the most sophisticated type the untutored impression of the plain man that the human will is an actual power in the world, for weal or for woe, that it is not a mere way in which a fatalistic mechanical world displays misleading appearances of human initiative. In other words, Ward acted as the spokesman of physical science in supporting the immemorial conviction of plain people that men and women are morally responsible beings, simply because it is within their power to do good or to do evil. Ward made it a

scientific proposition that this popular belief is a conviction authorized by the facts of life. Men are psychic agents, capable of psychic causation, which not only within limits compels matter to do its bidding, but which, also within limits, organizes moral energies into constructive and creative action. Moreover, this psychic influence, according to Ward, is something more than a mere medium for doing what the action of physical forces would have done anyway.

Ward's assertion does not of course amount to a solution of all or any of the problems of psychology. It merely adds a new impulse to the study of psychology; because with the aid of that study, if at all, the mysteries of the action of the psychic forces, which are the social forces, must be resolved. Ward therefore furnished reinforcement, from the biological side, to previous interest in the study of the psychic factors in human life. He went farther than that, and made an elaborate analysis of these psychic factors, in answer to the question, What are the social forces? Thus he virtually proposed a system of individual and social psychology.<sup>1</sup>

As to the value of Ward's psychological system in detail, it is not necessary at this point to express an opinion. A vigorous attack on Ward's theory of the social forces has been made by Professor E. C. Hayes, under the title, "The Social Forces Error."<sup>2</sup> The essence of Professor Hayes's contention against Ward, as I understand it, is not an impeachment of Ward's underlying idea, but it takes issue with certain of Ward's renderings of the concept "social forces." In brief, Hayes charges Ward with falling into interpretations of "social forces" which virtually nullify his other attempts to set them apart from mechanical forces. Whether Ward always kept the distinction clear or not need not be discussed here. His radical purpose was to explain that there is a realm of social forces which are psychical, not physical, and that in the use of these forces lies the sphere of the highest achievements of society.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For Ward's classification of the social forces, cf. *Dynamic Sociology*, I, 472.

<sup>2</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XVI, 613.

<sup>3</sup> See Ward's paper "Mind as a Social Factor"; *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, III, 361.

## V. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL INSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The difficulty of choosing wisely between logical and chronological presentation of details becomes embarrassing in discussing this and the two following titles. It seems on the whole wisest to place certain occurrences under a title by themselves, in a sort of neutral zone, in the two sections following this, although they had intimate relations, both of cause and of effect, with the advances referred to under the present subtitle and the sections VIII and IX (pp. 728 and 827).

The article by Mr. Tolman already cited (above, p. 726) furnishes information about the growth of demand for instruction in "social science," particularly at Cornell and the University of Michigan, during the eighties. Reference has already been made to Professor Sumner's beginnings of sociological instruction at Yale in 1876 and to subsequent ventures in the same line (above, p. 732). A few personal notes will serve as partially satisfactory connecting links between the earlier and the later periods. Professor Weatherly, of the University of Indiana, writes:

You are right in assuming that there has been an unbroken succession of courses in sociology here since 1885. The record is as follows:

Arthur B. Woodford came here in 1885 as assistant and associate professor (so the title is given in the catalogue) in economics and sociology, but these subjects were given that year in the department of History and Political Science as a subdivision. In that year, 1885-86, along with courses in economics he gave this course:

XIII. *Sociology*.—The aim of this course is to bring before the student the latest results of this new department of scientific investigation in life as it is manifested in human societies. Senior year, second term (5); required of Seniors in the course of Philosophy; may be taken as Senior specialty in the course in Economic Science.

The next year, 1886-87 (still Woodford), the Department of Social Science and Economics was set off from History. In that department course V was thus described:

V. *Sociology*.—Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, Wilson's *Anthropology*, and Letourneau's *Sociology Based upon Ethnography*. First and second terms, three times a week.

Woodford continued this until he left in 1889. Then came Jenks, and the department was renamed Economics and Social Science. In 1889 the course was called "Anthropology and Sociology," but the following year it was called

"Introduction to Sociology," and there was also given a one-term five-hour course on "Social Problems." Jenks was followed by Ross, 1891-92; Ross by Commons, 1892-95; Commons by Fetter, 1895-99; and since 1899 the work has been in my charge. At various times through this period since 1891 new courses have been added, and in 1915 the title of the department was changed to Economics and Sociology. The Spencerian cast of the early years may be accounted for by the fact that Woodford was a Yale man.

The following is from Professor Blackmar:

In the early spring of 1889, the regents of the University of Kansas came to Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, searching for a man to take charge of a new department to be formed in the University of Kansas. They asked me to take charge of the department and name it. On being told what they wished the department to include, I thought it best to call it "History and Politics." Whereupon the regents were very much excited, telling me it would not do to give a department that name, because "the people of Kansas would not tolerate a Department of *Politics* in the University, as they had politics enough in the state already." But being held responsible for naming the new child, I told them I thought "History and Political Science" would be the name they desired. Again I met with rebuff when they told me the word "political" would not do in connection with the University. Finally, as a last resort, I chose the title of "History and Sociology." So far as my knowledge goes, this was the first time that the word "sociology" was used in connection with the name of a university department in the United States.<sup>1</sup>

While you were taking your major in sociology at Hopkins, I took my major in history of institutions. During my three-year course at Hopkins, I took lectures under the late Amos G. Warner on "Charity and Charitable Institutions," and did some social work among the laboring men, factory hands, and negroes of Baltimore, and also gave a few extension lectures. I also gave some attention to Comte, Ward, De Greef, and other writers of sociology.

I entered the University of Kansas as professor of "history and sociology" in the autumn of 1889, and began to teach sociology, although it was largely overshadowed by history and political economy. In the University of Kansas, the American history and civics were set off in a separate department, and subsequently the European history and finally the economics were made into separate departments, which leaves the sociology as a distinct department which is developing satisfactorily.

To supplement Professor Blackmar's recollections I may add the following details:

After returning as President to Colby College, following the Sabbatical year spent at Johns Hopkins, I offered to the Seniors in the spring term of 1890,

<sup>1</sup> Professor Blackmar seems to be correct on this point. No evidence of priority in this respect over the University of Kansas is known to the writer of this paper.

as I then supposed, the first course in sociology ever given in the United States. As a basis for the instruction I managed to hustle together a printed syllabus of 149 pages. Dr. Ward refers to it in the preface to the second edition of *Dynamic Sociology*. I devoutly hope that the interleaved, crowdedly annotated and nearly worn-to-pieces copy in my own possession is the only specimen extant. I still believe that in writing it I was conscientiously following a spark of inner light, but it led me through a jungle of moral philosophy, theology, history, economics, and hortatory reflection, in which I set up here and there the notice, "Sociology wanted." I am not ashamed of the attempts I made, during the three years in which I continued at Colby, at the head of a bunch of loyal but no doubt bewildered Seniors, to blaze some paths through the labyrinth which the world of human experience then seemed to be. These efforts were respectable, but it is needless to confess that they were far back in the dead-work preliminary to science. In my *President's Report* for the year 1889-90, I find this paragraph (p. 16): ". . . I have introduced the class to modern sociological philosophy. To the best of my knowledge this is a line of study which has never been opened to undergraduates in American colleges. The field to be surveyed is but partially explored, and it is impossible to present as exact data as in the older sciences; but I am sure that the plan of study which I have outlined is a profitable one with which to complete the college curriculum."

Professor Giddings adds this important statement:

After much searching I have dug up copies of the Bryn Mawr College programs of 1889 and 1890 which enable me to answer your question. I had despaired of ever finding them.

I went to Bryn Mawr in the fall of 1888 to take up the work that Woodrow Wilson had suddenly left. His title there was associate professor of history and political science.

As set forth in the program of 1889, the subjects that I taught by lecture and seminar were: (1) Development of Political Institutions; (2) Political Economy, including Economic Theory and Economic History; (3) Methods and Principles of Administration; and (4) Methods and Principles of Charity and Correction.

These topics, with minor changes, I taught in 1890 and subsequent years; but also in the program of 1890, I find under the head of "Graduate Courses" the following:

*"Modern Theories of Sociology.*—The lectures on Sociology are intended to accomplish three things, namely: (1) to provoke thought on the question whether a philosophic science of society as an organic whole is possible; (2) to acquaint the student with what has been done already toward the construction of such a science; (3) to apply sociological conceptions and methods to a few chosen sociological problems. Fellows and graduate students expecting to do advanced work in this course must have, besides their equipment in History

and Political Economy, at least a general knowledge of the History of Philosophy and some acquaintance with Modern Biology and Empirical Psychology."

Among the preliminary readings suggested were Galton's *Natural Inheritance*, and Richmond Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Economics*.

My interest in sociology, as I have on various occasions told, began while I was yet a youth, when accidentally a copy of the first number of the *Popular Science Monthly* fell into my hands a few days after its publication, and I read the first chapter of Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*. Before I entered college I had read a lot of Darwin, Tyndall, and Huxley, and nearly half of what Spencer had then printed. At college, and during ten subsequent years of newspaper work, I kept up my interest and my reading in sociology and was ready to improve the first chance that offered to teach it after I went to Bryn Mawr.

My work at Columbia began when Professor Mayo-Smith, who was going abroad for a year, asked me to give a course of lectures here during the academic year 1891-92, in substitution for his social science course which was largely statistical in content. I was asked to continue these lectures after his return and did so during the academic years 1892-93 and 1893-94, and in the latter year I was called to the University to the newly established chair of sociology. While my recollections on this point are somewhat vague, an impression lingers in my mind that the action of Chicago in establishing the Department of Social Science had an appreciable influence upon the action of Columbia.

You speak of a syllabus of sociology which you prepared at Colby College, and you vainly cherish the hope that your copy of it is the only one in existence. I beg to assure you that my copy of it is intact and that you could not buy it of me if you tried.

I am indebted to Mr. Edward Cummings, pastor of the South Congregational Church, Boston, for the following description of the first course in sociology offered at Harvard. It was in the academic year 1891-92.

3. *The Principles of Sociology*. Mon., Wed., and (at the pleasure of the instructor) Fri., at 1:30. Asst. Professor Edward Cummings.

Course 3 begins with a general survey of the structure and development of society; showing the changing elements of which a progressive society is composed, the forces which manifest themselves at different stages in the transition from primitive conditions to complex phases of civilized life, and the structural outlines upon which successive phases of social, political, and industrial organization proceed. Following this is an examination of the historical aspects which this evolution has actually assumed: primitive man, elementary forms of association, the various forms of family organization, and the contributions which family, clan, and tribe have made to the consti-

tution of more comprehensive ethical and political groups; the functions of the state, the circumstances which determine types of political association, the corresponding expansion of social consciousness, and the relative importance of military, economic, and ethical ideas at successive stages of civilization. Special attention is given to the attempts to formulate physical and psychological laws of social growth; to the relative importance of natural and artificial selection in social development; the law of social survival; the dangers which threaten civilization; and the bearing of such general consideration upon the practical problems of vice, crime, poverty, pauperism, and upon mooted methods of social reform.

The student is thus acquainted with the main schools of sociological thought, and opportunity is given for a critical comparison of earlier phases of sociological theory, with more recent contributions in Europe and the United States. Regular and systematic reading is essential. Topics are assigned for special investigation in connection with practical or theoretical aspects of the course.

Mr. Cummings adds these particulars:

I think the establishment of the Robert Treat Paine Fellowship in Social Science, in 1887, was the first step toward the new line of work at Harvard. It had the effect of giving me an opportunity to pursue abroad the studies I had already begun in Cambridge. Up to that time, no one had given me the slightest encouragement to believe there was any "academic future" for "sociological" work. Indeed the opinion that it had no academic future was freely expressed by my advisers.<sup>1</sup> The sudden demand for instruction in sociology in the early nineties was widespread; and academic opportunities became correspondingly numerous.

In the light of all that has been said thus far, together with details now to be added, there need be little hesitation about selecting the date 1892 as memorable, not merely for American university work in general, but for sociology in particular. This latter phase of the facts is not altogether the achievement of the sociologists themselves. After 1892 sociology came out into the open as an accredited university subject, but I very strongly doubt if this consummation would have been reached at that time—I am not sure that it would have occurred at all—if the University of Chicago had not been founded.

This is not a preface to self-laudation by Chicago sociologists. I am again claiming the license spoken for in the opening paragraphs to contribute to the history of sociology certain facts of which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Professor Jameson's similar testimony *in re* history, below, p. 777.



I have first-hand knowledge and—as evidence of an inferior order, submitted for what it is worth—certain impressions which the facts made on me while they were occurring before my eyes. I repeat that, in my judgment, for reasons to be indicated at once, there would have been neither so rapid nor so extensive development of instruction in sociology as has occurred since 1892, if the University of Chicago had not been founded. On the other hand, I want to be equally unequivocal in my expression of belief that the influence of instruction in sociology at the University of Chicago was primarily not because of intrinsic merits, but because of the galvanic effects of the University of Chicago itself upon the whole academic situation in the United States. In some respects Leland Stanford Junior University, founded the same year, was a similar dynamic factor, but it was so remote geographically that it did not produce the same visible effects.

In a word, all the older universities were at first thrown upon the defensive by the founding of the University of Chicago. The mythical belief spread at once that this upstart institution had the intention, and the resources back of the intention, to do for the older institutions what the Standard Oil system had done for many of its rivals.<sup>1</sup> Much of the suspicion and fear stimulated by the name of Mr. Rockefeller in business was paralleled by the reaction of the older universities toward the new “Rockefeller University” in Chicago. It is doubtful if higher education in the United States has ever received as much stimulus from a single event as came to it from the founding of the University of Chicago. In certain aspects it may be compared with the military awakening of Great Britain after the German invasion of Belgium.<sup>2</sup> Jealousy and fear

<sup>1</sup> How extravagant this belief was will be shown in the forthcoming *History of the University of Chicago*, by Dr. T. W. Goodspeed.

<sup>2</sup> It is notable that of the Harvard faculty in 1891-92, out of 151 members in the Arts and Literature group, only 31, or 20.5 per cent, had the degree of Ph.D. Out of the corresponding 139 members of the faculty at the opening of the University of Chicago, 66 or 47.4 per cent had the same degree. To be sure, some of the strongest men in each institution did not have the degree, and in that respect the one offsets the other. Yet the larger proportion of Doctors of Philosophy in the new Chicago faculty was a fair index of the relative alertness, at the time, of the two institutions. Of course it was not long before the shock of the contrast reacted in such a way that Harvard renewed her youth, and regained her relative prestige.

drove each of the stronger institutions to their utmost exertions to maintain their positions. They kept close watch on every move of Dr. Harper. There were at first many attempts to discount and discredit his idealism. Ridicule of his actual or supposed plans became an inflated coinage of the American republic of letters. The collateral behind this coinage was a rather slow accumulation of perception that a modern university spirit had found means of expression, and that the older institutions must in self-defense take knowledge of it. The institutions with the most readily available resources rather promptly set themselves the task of equaling or exceeding Dr. Harper's achievements. It is superfluous to add that in many ways they were successful; sometimes in part, sometimes wholly.

Perhaps there was no single detail in which Dr. Harper's example turned out to be more constructive than in opening the way for the subject of sociology in curricula which otherwise might not for years have made room for that division of social science. At all events, there is no doubt in my mind that the rapid increase of academic attention to the subject of sociology in the United States after 1892 must be credited very much less to intrinsic merit of work done by the members of the new department at Chicago than to the general academic rivalry stimulated by Dr. Harper's aggressiveness.

To be sure, this particular effect of Dr. Harper's initiative has not even yet appeared at Harvard or Johns Hopkins or Princeton—to mention only the most conspicuous exceptions. To this day no one of these universities has given sociology its proportionate share of opportunity. It would be out of place to speculate about the reasons. On the other hand, I hope that those who have first-hand knowledge of the facts may be induced to testify as to whether or not the example of Dr. Harper in establishing a department of sociology at Chicago turned the scale in favor of a similar innovation at Columbia. It is hardly conceivable that sociological instruction in this country could have attained its actual rate and dimensions of expansion without the pioneering of these two universities.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Professor Giddings' testimony (above, p. 762) tends to confirm my hypothesis.

The Social Science Group, as we now call it, in the University of Chicago, started with seven instructors in political economy, scheduling nineteen courses; four instructors in political science, scheduling sixteen courses; six instructors in history, scheduling forty-eight courses; and six instructors in "social science and anthropology," scheduling thirty courses.<sup>1</sup>

I must confess that a look at the schedule of the latter department now brings blushes to my seasoned cheeks. It is ocular proof of the boldness of the bluff we were putting up. We were dimly aware of problems not yet investigated, and in our zeal we rushed into the advertising of courses some of which now stand as an indictment on charge of ignorance. At present I can merely enter a candid plea of guilty, with prayers for the mercy of the court.

The extenuating circumstances are phases of the fact that the rest of the world of social science, or rather the American portion of it, was at the time as ignorant as we were, with a considerable amount of unconfessed conviction of sin, about methodology in general. The conventional type of ignorance was smug and intolerant. The sociological type was bumptious and possibly, not in purpose but in effect, insolent. Even in the conventional ranks, or perhaps it were more correct to say among the younger students of the social sciences who had not yet become hopelessly conventionalized, there was a lot of skulking suspicion that current ways of dealing with social realities had not gone far below the surface. Here was a program which looked strange enough to be impressive. The overt reactions were of course much more generally unfavorable than favorable. More jeering than admiration was in evidence among the followers of both popular and scientific tradition; but it was jeering not according to knowledge. It did not understand either the merits or the demerits of what it was

<sup>1</sup> This designation was never used by members of the staff. They promptly called the attention of the Board of Trustees to the fact that it was analogous with the conceivable title "mathematics and algebra." The Trustees at once authorized the change of designation to "Sociology and Anthropology." This has been the official title since 1893. In the *Register* for 1893-94 the name of George E. Vincent appears as assistant in sociology, and that of William I. Thomas as Fellow. Each of these began to offer courses in that academic year.

jeering at. It contained more fear of having its idols smashed than precise insight into the prematurity of the idol-smashers. While the rashness of these latter was also more creditable for its courage than for its clearness of vision, it may be compared, in the mode of its operation, to the influence of any other righteous disturbers of the peace. It was a demonstration against the futility of the existing order both of social conditions and of theories about the conditions. It made some people think that something must be the matter, both in society and in the science of society, else no one would be guilty of behavior so presumptuous. It fixed attention on an alleged hiatus in social thinking. The disturbance enlisted a small nucleus of sympathetic followers.

Meanwhile our Chicago sociological staff had jumped into a flood in which it was a case of sink or swim. We simply had to grow wiser than we were when we took the plunge. As I look back on these beginnings now, I realize that if I could have taken my own measure I never should have had the courage to assume the risk. I had only the dimmest suspicion of how far I now see that I was from having thought through the reality with which I had undertaken to deal in a virtually untried way.

There is, however, another side to the case. All my previous training in the social sciences, and my eleven years of college teaching, had forced me into a sort of Christopher Columbus attitude toward the unknown unexplored, and also toward the insufficiency of anybody's knowledge about the known explored. For a decade I had been growing more and more certain that our conventional interpretations of human experience had merely scratched the surface of the facts. So far as history was concerned, I was in a state of mind to welcome the aphorism which I did not hear of till several years later: "History is always interesting but never instructive." I felt that the work of the historians might be divided into two classes: first, that which ends with solemn conclusions which are not convincing; secondly, that which reaches no conclusions at all, but merely a litter of facts which, as such, are not worth getting. It seemed to me that the study of history ought to arrive at something that would make the living generation wiser, better, and more capable. While I could offer

few specifications to justify my feeling, I did not try to conceal my belief that the historians must change their attitude very radically before their work would do its utmost for human intelligence.

I had also been growing more and more dissatisfied with the ways in which the men were proceeding who had the impulses which I most respected about efforts to control the facts of society in the interest of social betterment. Not merely those cheerful dowagers of both sexes who thought they were solving social problems over safely isolated teacups, but even the vigorous pioneers who had organized the American Economic Association seemed to me, in very unlike ways to be sure, liable to the charge of attempting to prescribe before having a diagnosis.<sup>1</sup> It seemed to me that the members of the latter group were putting excessive stress upon projects for improving economic activities, and often for improvement of activities which were less economic than something else, while they were neglecting the crying fundamental need of probing into the deeper nature of human society, human resources, and human wants. More knowledge in these directions seemed to me to be the demand of the hour, rather than projection of reforms for the society which was only vaguely understood.

I remember this idea was active in my mind in connection with Professor Ely's stimulating little book *Problems of Cities*.<sup>2</sup> It was made up of articles that had appeared as a series in the *Baltimore Sun*. The argument was relatively novel on this side of the Atlantic, and not only in Baltimore but all over the country it was provocative of wholesome discussion. I was on the whole inclined to accept in the main Professor Ely's views about municipal control of public services, but at the same time it seemed to me that the case had been built so far too much upon mere opinion, and that a foundation should be constructed for it by penetrating into the essentials of urban life, and demonstrating the vital character of municipal activities as modes of human effort in general. I had an undeveloped feeling that more might be brought to light about the meaning of human society in the large, which would place the whole conception of public control of municipal services in a more demonstrative light.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, pp. 779 sq.

<sup>2</sup> Referred to *supra*, p. 734.

That is, all of my acquaintance with generalized thinking about society, all of my own reflections upon the "true inwardness" of human relations, all of the programs for concrete improvement of human conditions, had been converging upon the central conclusion: The human race does not understand itself very well yet. Even the wisest are partially blind leaders of the blind. Both for large theoretical purposes, and for the minutest concrete devices of betterment, the most pressing need is a scrapping of our old apparatus for explaining society, and a new procedure for finding out just how the wheels actually do go around in human affairs. I am expressing now, not my present thought about these things, but as nearly as I can reproduce it the state of mind with which I undertook my work at Chicago in 1892. I was far enough along at the time to have formed and to have professed the definite aim to have a hand in the work of inventing a new way of looking human facts straight in the face; of finding out, without deference to any previous conceptions about the matter, just what people are doing in the world, why they are doing it, why they partially succeed or fail, what means we have of deciding when and where it is desirable that men's present purposes should succeed or fail, what means we have of deciding what purposes would be more fit for success, what means we have of procuring the whole or any part of those successes which our best knowledge would sanction.

Of course this was an ambitious program. Whenever it was indicated, even in part, it was greeted with all sorts of ridicule. Unless I am greatly mistaken, however, every man who has added to the momentum of the sociological movement has been impelled by some such impulse. I am confessing for myself only, as far as details are concerned; but all the other sociologists, as far as I can gather, have been stirred by a similar sense of need and have pursued a similar purpose. I have neither regrets nor apologies for this youthful zeal. Still less have I any retractions of principle to make. In its spirit this sociological movement was genuinely scientific. It recognized limitations of knowledge in a certain area, and it set itself to investigate in that area. It was in its way as commendable as the scientific efforts of Galileo or Columbus. Moreover, it had to answer for itself to a learned public which was

scarcely more sympathetic than the publics which Galileo and Columbus had to confront. Its respectability consisted, not in its having arrived, but in its willingness to start on an untried search. More than this, it was necessary from the beginning for the sociologists to manufacture the more special tools for their research as their work progressed.

As it turned out, Dr. Harper responded to another true prophetic instinct. He insured from the beginning mutual reinforcement between men who were primarily interested in the theoretical phases on the one hand, and the applied phases on the other, of sociological knowledge. In so far as the University of Chicago has been a factor in promoting the sociological movement, the evidence in my possession leaves no doubt in my mind that, without Dr. Harper, whatever might have been done for sociology at Chicago would have been an exaggeration of one of these phases at the expense of the other, and consequently in the long run to the discredit of both. Dr. Harper brought together, as the nucleus of the Department of "Social Science," two men who were not only strangers to each other, but whose approach to the common problem was from opposite angles. The Department of Anthropology was attached to the Department of "Social Science," as a mere convenience of bookkeeping. It has always been essentially as independent as the Departments of History and Political Economy. Similar considerations of convenience originally linked the Department of Home Economics with "Social Science." In this case, too, there was independence, except on paper. Dr. Henderson and the present writer were therefore the sociological staff until it was recruited by Dr. Vincent and Dr. Thomas.

Although Dr. Henderson's center of attention was social betterment, and mine was the methodology of social investigation, we never from first to last had the slightest difference of opinion about the division and correlation of our own work and that of our students. Each of us recognized in the other's program the correlate of his own. I have never had a shade of interest in abstract sociology except as a necessary preliminary to the most intelligent conduct of each and every part, from least to greatest, of the whole range of human life. Dr. Henderson took the same view of the

relation between general sociology and concrete applications. While he devoted himself primarily to investigation of concrete conditions crying for immediate relief, he consistently regarded all plans for social betterment as tentative in the degree in which there is uncertainty about the underlying theories of larger social relations upon which the working plans have been based. So long as he lived, he was frequent in generous tribute to the basic importance of the more abstract phases of the work in the department.

How consistently and profitably the department has interpreted human experience in these blended phases of the general and the special is another matter. Moreover, as to both theory and practice, the relations in the country at large between general sociology and social technology still remain in an unsettled and unsatisfactory condition. Inability to do justice to the subject compels me to make this survey partial by omitting the whole history of the technological phases of the sociological movement. I restrict myself, first, to remarking that a comprehensive view of the sociological movement in the United States for the last fifty years would include such a survey as Professor Francis G. Peabody of Harvard, or Professor Graham Taylor, or Miss Jane Addams, or Dr. Devine might supply;<sup>1</sup> and, secondly, to insertion of the personal profession of faith that it will be a grievous mistake, and in its results unfortunate for both as well as for the public whose interests must ultimately evaluate the work of both, if the representatives of the generalizing and of the concrete phases of the sociological movement do not develop consciousness of interdependence, and ability to express that consciousness in mutually appreciative and sympathetic co-operation.<sup>2</sup>

There is room for an informing treatise on the state of demand for general sociology in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Truth to tell, so far as articulate opinion might be taken as the sole evidence, the ratio of requisition for a distinctive sociological technique, as compared with call for other techniques, would probably be represented by a coefficient of several decimal places.

<sup>1</sup> See Professor Lindsay's article on "Schools of Philanthropy," in Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, ed. of 1908.

<sup>2</sup> See the passage on divisions of labor in sociology below, p. 828.



In other words, few people spoke for sociology and many against it.<sup>1</sup> Those who spoke for it seemed to each other and to nearly everybody else to be "speaking with tongues." Very little could be made of their jargon.

As I have elsewhere implied,<sup>2</sup> a few people were listening to an inward voice calling them to the peril of condemnation as Quixotic, in the attempt to stir study of the human lot into greater objectivity. These men were more amply equipped with a sense of lack, a feeling of the futility of conventional knowledge of society, than with divining rods certain to point out sources of more satisfying knowledge. They had a respectable faith, however, that there are such sources, and they took their lives in their hands in search for them.

No one could fully realize it at the time, but a psychological necessity, such as has been illustrated whenever distinctive principles of thinking have disturbed the peace of previous programs, was forcing a reckoning between the social sciences and the new "biology," particularly with the evolutionary conception as projected into all thought by the biologists.<sup>3</sup> In the first quarter of the nineteenth century the most characteristic variants of speculation about society had been conceptions of pure mathematics. In the second quarter the peculiar variants were those of physics. In the third and fourth quarters sociological interpretation of the most venturesome sort cast itself in the physiological mold. Of course each of the ruling tendencies in physical science struggled for mastery in social science.

It must be remembered too that in the early nineties there were scarcely any available "helps" for the men who tried to get a hearing for sociology in the universities. There was no standard literature of any sort which could be used according to the classroom methods of the older social sciences. Each instructor was thrown upon his own resources to an extent which made his task desperate,

<sup>1</sup> As symptoms of the situation, see report of remarks by Small, Patten, Giddings, Ward, and Ashley, at the meeting of the American Economic Association, *Proceedings*, X, 1895, p. 106 ff.; also note the apologetic tone of the Preface to Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, 1895. Cf. letter in Vol. I, No. 2, p. 210, of *American Journal of Sociology*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. pp. 769, 823 *et passim*    <sup>3</sup> Cf. Small, *Meaning of Social Science*, pp. 71-85.

as compared with that of the historians, economists, and political scientists. Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, and Schaeffle's four volumes on the structure and life of society (*Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*) were attempts to state objective facts of human experience in terms of physiological analogies. They were ridiculed by a hundred academic men to every one who was willing to consider them seriously. For several years my lectures were elaborations of Schaeffle, with one eye constantly on Spencer and Ward. This is a deliberate confession that during those years these writers about social phenomena got between me and the reality itself.<sup>1</sup> While the emptiness of this sort of work now almost makes my teeth chatter, I feel no conviction of sin for it. From my present outlook I cannot see how transition from the older ways of thinking about human affairs to our present process conceptions could have been effected more promptly and surely than by using those writers for what they were worth.

The present division of this paper may be treated as merely introductory to those parts of the study by Mr. Tolman which have not already been referred to,<sup>2</sup> and to the papers continuing the record by Professors Bernard and Clow.<sup>3</sup>

#### VI. EXTRA-ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION FOR PROMOTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is not the purpose of this section to record the experience or to evaluate the work of organizations outside of the sociological field. It is still farther from the present purpose to imply a right on the part of sociologists to censor their purposes or their programs. The sociologists have been more or less conscious of interests in common with those of these organizations. The sociologists have been more or less influenced by the work of these organizations. The present writer is unable precisely to estimate or to characterize that influence in very much detail. The obvious fact, to be set as

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Vincent will probably not object to the statement that our little book referred to above, p. 772, was his attempt to infuse some human interest into my interpretation of Schaeffle's social anatomy and physiology.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, pp. 726 *et passim*.

<sup>3</sup> "The Teaching of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 164; "Sociology in Normal Schools," *ibid.*, XVI, 253.

nearly as possible in its proper place in this survey, is that American sociology has been one expression among many of movement in the whole realm of social science and social practice. A functional history of either of these movements would have to make out how each influenced and was influenced by all the others, and how motion in the evolution of social science in the large sense resulted.

A document referred to above contains the claim that the American Social Science Association was the mother of all subsequent social science organizations in the United States.<sup>1</sup> Whether the claim was made, or was intended to be taken very seriously, is a question which this paper does not attempt to answer. It can hardly be doubted that the existence of the society named had something to do with the formation of the later societies. The important matter is that particular interests within the range of social science and social practice successively gained organized expression.<sup>2</sup>

Without attempting to prejudice the question as to the nearness or remoteness of the relation between these organizations and the general sociology with which we are principally dealing, some of the better known of these organizations are listed in the order of their formation, as evidence of miscellaneous busy social consciousness. It would be preposterous to suppose that general sociology was altogether independent of the same underlying influences which produced these organizations, or that it was altogether unaffected by the organizations themselves. For further information or sources of information about most of these bodies, cf. Bliss, *Encyclopedia of Social Reform*, ed. 1908.

1865 The American Social Science Association.

1866 The National Labor Union.

1867 Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange.

1867 Knights of St. Crispin.

1868 Knights of Labor.

1870 The National Prison Association (since 1907, the American Prison Association).

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 726.

<sup>2</sup> *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 16; *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 591-95.

- 1870 The International Prison Congress (reorganized).
- 1872 The Catholic Total Abstinence Union.
- 1874 The National Woman's Christian Temperance Union.
- 1874 The Sovereigns of Industry.
- 1876 The American Secular Union and Free Thought Federation.
- 1879 The National Conference of Charities and Corrections.
- 1880 The Farmers' National Congress.
- 1881 The National Civil Service Reform League.
- 1881 National League for the Protection of the Family.
- 1884 National Education Association (expanded from National Teachers' Association, 1857).
- 1884 The American Historical Society.
- 1885 The American Economic Association.
- 1886 The American Federation of Labor.
- 1887 The American Protective Association.
- 1887 The Anti-Poverty Society.
- 1887 The Church Association for the Advancement of the Interests of Labor.
- 1888 The American Statistical Association. (Although this society was founded earlier than the period covered by our survey [1839], it is proper to schedule it here—i.e., at the time when it entered upon its major importance with publication of its *Quarterly*.)
- 1889 National Curfew Association.
- 1889 American Academy of Political and Social Science.
- 1889 The Society of Christian Socialists.
- 1880 The Farmers' Alliance.
- 1890 The Consumers' League (incorporated 1898).
- 1891 National Christian League for the Promotion of Purity.
- 1891 The American Christian Social Union.
- 1893 National Household Economic Association.
- 1893 The American Proportional Representation League.
- 1893 The American Railway Union.
- 1893 The Anti-Saloon League of America.
- 1894 National Municipal League.
- 1895 The American Purity Alliance (incorporated as continuation of the New York Committee for the Prevention of State Regulation of Vice).
- 1895 The Citizens' Industrial Association of America.
- 1896 National Direct Legislation League.
- 1897 The American Forestry Association.
- 1898 League for Social Service (after 1902 the American Institute for Social Service).
- 1898 The Anti-Imperialist League.
- 1899 The National Consumers' League (incorporated 1902).
- 1899 National Irrigation Association.
- 1900 Civil Service Retirement Association.
- 1900 The National Federation of Churches and Christian Workers.
- 1901 National Civic Federation.
- 1901 The National Anti-Cigarette League.
- 1902 The Immigration Restriction League.

- 1903 The American Political Science Association.
- 1904 The American Civic Association.
- 1906 The National Association for Labor Legislation.
- 1906 The Christian Socialist Fellowship.
- 1907 League of American Municipalities.
- 1909 The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
- 1912 The National Institute of Social Sciences.

*The American Historical Association.*<sup>1</sup>—It would be impossible from the present point of view to substitute for Professor Jameson's sketch an equally illuminating account of the origin, character, and work of the American Historical Association. If the perspective of the present survey were to be made as accurate as possible, the whole of Professor Jameson's paper would be inserted here. Space limits forbid this, but brief quotations from the paper will serve to indicate the necessity of consulting it for further information:

The last twenty-five or thirty years have witnessed the growth of many such societies, so many that for each of the departments of study recognized in a modern American university there exists a society national in its scope and in the extent of its membership, which binds together the scattered devotees of the particular specialty, brings them into mutual acquaintance, friendship, and regard, effaces local jealousies and chauvinistic zeal for individual universities, and increases devotion to the scientific ends pursued in common. The phenomenon has an importance beyond what is apparently suspected by the average man. No millionaire endows these societies. When the American rich man wishes to do something for the endowment of research, he still does it through the conventional channels of the universities. Yet it may be doubted whether the universities, pressed by numbers increasing with unexampled rapidity, have with all their wealth done in recent years so much for the advancement of pure research as have the poor but single-minded associations of specialists. Indeed, it might be doubted a priori whether the American university, in its typical organization a body of specialists ruled over by a body of "prominent citizens," could ever be expected to promote the progress of the sciences so effectively as the scientific society, composed of specialists alone and working in unhampered devotion to intellectual ends.

Of such organizations, none has been more fruitful of good works than the American Historical Association, founded at Saratoga on September 9, 1884.

. . . .

How much there was for superior organization to achieve, how much has in twenty-five years been accomplished by the American Historical Association,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. account of the founding and sketch of the first-quarter century of the Association, by Professor J. Franklin Jameson, *American Historical Review*, XV (October, 1909), 1-20.

and other agencies working in connection with it, can only be understood by giving a glance at the condition of American historical scholarship in 1884. It is now only a minor part of the members of the Association whose age permits remembrance of those conditions; and not all of these can without effort recall the situation in detail. The state and local historical societies were perhaps not half as numerous as now, their membership, their endowments, their libraries not half as great. State historical departments, or working archive establishments, of the modern type, were unknown. The *Magazine of American History* was the only general historical journal. In all the universities and colleges of the country there were apparently only fifteen professors and five assistant professors who gave all their time to history. "When a chair of history was established here," writes one of these teachers in 1883, "grave professors, educated under the old order of things, regarded it as an unwarranted expenditure of time and money. History should, they thought, be made auxiliary to some other department."

In most cases it was thus subordinated or annexed, the catalogues showing combinations with political science, political economy, English literature, philosophy, comparative philology, geology, natural history, German, and French, and the chair becoming, in Dr. Holmes's phrase, a settee. The writer of these papers, then a youthful aspirant for academic promotion, well remembers that several institutions, now abounding in historical teachers and courses, were then cautiously considering whether a professorship of history, or of history and something else, could or could not be established. He well remembers the rueful feelings with which he heard President Eliot, when discoursing to an academic audience at about that time on the unequal regard then paid to different studies in America, describe an interview with two promising young men who asked him if in his judgment it would be wise for them to fit themselves for professorships in history: "I was obliged to tell them that under existing circumstances it would be the height of imprudence." . . .

Plainly, the organization of historical studies in America was not far advanced. But organization, numbers, and quantities are not all. The graduate student of that time, it is agreed on all sides, was superior to the graduate student of today. . . . The professors were few but they included—to mention only the *stelligeri* in the catalogue—such teachers as Torrey and Gurney, Moses Coit Tyler and W. F. Allen, Herbert B. Adams and Charles Kendall Adams. Able young Americans, who had studied history in German universities when German historical instruction was in the height of its glory, were coming home full of enthusiasm, determined to make history flourish abundantly on American soil. . . . The truth is that, defective as our organization might be, we stood, without knowing it, at the beginning of a new and most fruitful era in the development of American historiography. To the student of historical writing there is nothing surprising in this. It was as natural that the great war for nationality should be followed within twenty years by a great outburst of historical activity as that the Reformation should

breed historians, or that the first epoch-making works of Niebuhr and Boeckh and Ranke in Germany, of Guizot and Mignet and the Thierrys in France, should appear within twenty years after the Napoleonic conflict. The time was ripe for the American Historical Association in 1884 as it was for the Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde in 1819. . . .

Many persons interested in history must have been impressed with the value of the American Social Science Association, founded in 1865, . . . and of similar bodies. . . .

The call for the meeting at which the American Historical Association was founded was signed by the president and secretary of the Social Science Association (John Eaton and Frank B. Sanborn), Charles Kendall Adams of Ann Arbor, Moses Coit Tyler of Ithaca, and Herbert B. Adams. But it has never been questioned that the main influence in the movement was that of Herbert Adams, professor in the Johns Hopkins University. . . .

The simple constitution then framed, and adopted the next day,<sup>1</sup> has with slight alterations served the Association to the present time. But its preparation brought up at once some of the gravest questions in the society's future, questions vividly debated in the committee. Should the effort be made to form something like an Academy of History, small in numbers, imposing in the weight of its individual members, and exerting through that weight a powerful influence on the development of the science; or should the society be a more popular body, into which any respectable and educated person interested in history might be admitted? One who stood upon the losing side of the question has since described it as being "whether we should try to be as big as possible or as good as possible." This has a specious sound, but "good" in such matters is good in relation to the existing conditions and the possibilities of achievement. Nothing has prevented any member from presenting to the Association as learned and profound a paper as he might have presented to a select forty having thirty-nine specialties different from his, and in any body the older heads have their full share of influence. On the other hand, how largely has the American public, scientific or other, shown itself disposed to defer to the authority, in any line, of forty immortals—immortals voiceless for lack of endowment and unable to obtain governmental support unless, with governmental selection? Diffusion of influence, diffused participation, is the democratic mode. The older element is quickened and helped by the presence of the younger; the wiser, even by the presence of those whom in American life they must perforce address. It would be hard to persuade anyone who has attended a meeting of the American Historical Association and carefully watched what goes on, in and out of the formal sessions, that a gathering from which nine-tenths of the present attendants were absent would do as much good for the common cause.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> September 10, 1884.

<sup>2</sup> Important among the other contents of Professor Jameson's paper is the explanation of the relation of the Association to the United States government.

*The American Economic Association.*—Instead of offering an independent version of the facts, the present summary will be most objective if it quotes a few passages from the records.<sup>1</sup>

Before the American Economic Society was born, Dr. Edmund J. James, assisted by Professor Simon N. Patten, proposed the formation of an organization to be called the "Society for the Study of National Economy." The draft of the constitution drawn up by Professors James and Patten doubtless represented the state of mind of a certain active few better than the less programmatic "Statement of Principles" eventually adopted.<sup>2</sup> Professor James said at the twenty-fifth anniversary: "The Verein für Socialpolitik had just gotten fairly to work, having been organized in October, 1872. Dr. Johannes Conrad, professor of political economy in the University of Halle, called the attention of his students to this organization and its work in one of his lectures, dwelling upon the causes which had led to the establishment of this organization in order to find a voice for new sentiments and new developments. It represented a protest against the extreme tendencies of the so-called orthodox school, and Manchesterthum as represented by the Volkswirtschaftlicher Kongress.

"I remember very distinctly Conrad's speaking to us Americans who were in his seminary one evening, urging us to organize a similar association in the United States upon our return, emphasizing the fact that times were changing. The old order was passing away, and if economic students were to have any influence whatever upon the course of practical politics, it would be necessary to take a new attitude toward the whole subject of social legislation; and if the United States were to have any particular influence in the great social legislation and the great readjustment of society on its legal side which seemed to be coming, an association of this sort would have very real value. I decided then that, as soon as I could, I would begin the agitation for such an association. . . . In February, 1883, I made a visit to several of our leading institutions. I remember very well on this occasion having held interesting and, to me, very profitable conferences with Henry Carter Adams of Michigan, Arthur Latham Perry of Williams, Dunbar and Laughlin of Harvard, John B. Clark of Smith, Sumner and Farnham of Yale, Francis A. Walker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Smith and Seligman of Columbia, Richard T. Ely of Johns Hopkins, and Robert Ellis Thompson and Albert S. Bolles, Jr., of Philadelphia; and with all of them I raised the question whether the time had not come for the organization of an economic association of the sort suggested above.

<sup>1</sup> See "Report of the Organization of the American Economic Association," by the secretary, R. T. Ely, *Publications of the American Economic Association*, I, 5-16; also *American Economic Association Quarterly*, 3d Series, XI, No. 1 (1910), 1-111, being the report of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the society.

<sup>2</sup> The James-Patten draft is in the *Quarterly*, 3d Series, XI, 50-53. Cf. Professor James's reminiscences, *ibid.*, pp. 107-11.



"I found a general agreement that possibly such an association might do useful work, but in some cases also the view that the American Social Science Association practically performed the only available function of such an organization.

"Upon my return from Europe in the autumn of 1883 I entered the University of Pennsylvania, and here I took up again at various times the agitation in favor of a new organization which should have quite a different attitude toward our economic problems from that which was characteristic even of the Social Science Association, broad and liberal as that was.

"My own feeling then—and I may say it has not altered since—was very thoroughly in favor of an organization with a definite program and platform—that is to say, as definite a program as the Verein für Socialpolitik had, a declaration, if you please, that the time had come for a new attitude and a new outlook and the elaboration of a program, if possible, upon which those economists who were willing to join in such an association could agree.

"I am free to say that I found but little sympathy for this particular proposition, and when it was evident that I could not secure the co-operation of any large number of men upon the basis which I proposed, I was quite willing to do the next best thing, and join in with other men and do what I could toward making an organization of the economists upon another basis, believing that in the long run time and tide and circumstance would be on my side and in favor of my views."

Professor Ely's report as secretary at the first meeting in 1885 opened with the following statement: "The need of an association designed to promote independent economic inquiry and to disseminate economic knowledge was keenly felt long before any determined effort was made to establish the desired organization. Suggestions looking to the formation of a society of economists were heard from time to time, but no active steps in this direction appear to have been taken before the spring of 1885,<sup>1</sup> when it was agreed that the time was ripe for action, and it was determined to test the feeling in this matter of those who would be likely to prove helpful in associated work in economics. The class of men required for this purpose was, it was believed, a large and constantly growing one. Men were wanted who were investigators, men, consequently, who did not believe that the entire range of economic knowledge had been compassed. It follows from this that it was not proposed to form a society of advocates of any political opinion or set of political opinions, as, for example, free trade or protection. It was not meant to deny that a free-trade club or a protectionist club might have its legitimate sphere, but it was held that this sphere lay outside the realm of science. Likewise it was not aimed to form a society to champion any class interests, either of rich or of poor, either of employer or of employee. What was desired was a society which, free from

<sup>1</sup> At this time Professor Ely was evidently not fully informed about the incidents to which Professor James testifies.

all trammels, should seek truth from all sources, should be ready to give a respectful hearing to every new idea, and should shun no revelation of facts, but, on the contrary, should make the collection, classification, and interpretation of facts its chief task. The ideal of this new society, as it presented itself to the minds of its projectors, was to seek light, to bear light, to diffuse light—ever the highest aim of all true science.

“A statement of the objects of the proposed association and a platform were drawn up, which, while intended to be merely provisional, would be calculated to attract those who believed in economic research, who thought that there was a great work to be done in economics, and who for other reasons might be able to work together profitably. This platform, it must be distinctly asserted, was never meant as a hard-and-fast creed which should be imposed on all members, and least of all was it intended to restrict the freest investigation.”

In order perfectly to understand the situation, it must be observed that, at the time, the men who promoted the movement for organization of progressive economists had the very definite belief that they must fight for their scientific and academic existence. They held that certain men, whom they were not unwilling to mention by name in private conversation, occupied a relation to the ideas and prospects of most of the men who were fresh from their studies in Germany, closely similar to the relation of the members of the Volkswirtschaftlicher Kongress to the innovators who formed the Verein für Socialpolitik. They felt that these men were virtually if not avowedly a trust to control the opportunities for economic recognition in this country, and that the alternatives were to be stifled by the current orthodoxy or to combine for the preservation of independence.

It would be difficult to find within equally brief space more revealing evidence of conflicting ideas, and of types of interest striving for mastery, than is presented by the contrast between the “objects and proposed platform,” in the call to the meeting for organization and the “Statement of Principles” finally adopted.<sup>1</sup> The form agreed upon after lively debate was as follows:

#### CONSTITUTION

##### ARTICLE I. NAME

This society shall be known as the American Economic Association.

<sup>1</sup> The former is printed in the *Publications of the American Economic Society*, I, 6; the latter in *ibid.*, p. 35. The former is republished in 3d Series, XI, 57, and the latter, in *ibid.*, p. 49.

## ARTICLE II. OBJECTS

1. The encouragement of economic research.
2. The publication of economic monographs.
3. The encouragement of perfect freedom in all academic discussion.
4. The establishment of a Bureau of Information designed to aid members in their economic studies.

## ARTICLE III. STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

1. We regard the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable conditions of human progress.
2. We believe that political economy as a science is still in an early stage of its development. While we appreciate the work of former economists, we look not so much to speculation as to the historical and statistical study of actual conditions of economic life for the satisfactory accomplishment of that development.
3. We hold that the conflict of labor and capital has brought into prominence a vast number of social problems, whose solution requires the united efforts, each in his own sphere, of the church, of the state, and of science.
4. In the study of the industrial and commercial policy of governments we take no partisan attitude. We believe in a progressive development of economic conditions, which must be met by a corresponding development of legislative policy.<sup>1</sup>

In his historical review, at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Association, Professor Ely said:

Rightly or wrongly to many, the Statement of Principles seemed like a proclamation of emancipation. At this time the enthusiasm with which we were greeted may appear a little difficult to comprehend. . . . Why this jubilation? Why this feeling of emancipation? It was felt by many that political economy was opposed to the recognition of any ethical element in our economic life, that it opposed all *social* reforms for social uplift as futile, that it exalted into a principle of economic righteousness the individual and unrestrained pursuit of self-interest, that it almost deified a monstrosity known as the economic man, that it looked upon *laissez faire* as a law of beneficent providence, and held that free trade must be received as an ethical dogma, being a practical application of the command, "Thou shalt not steal," for here inconsistently an ethical principle was admitted as all controlling.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This note was added: "This statement was proposed and accepted as a general indication of the views and the purposes of those who founded the American Economic Association, but it is not to be regarded as binding upon individual members."

<sup>2</sup> Everyone who wants to understand the economic factor in the development of the social sciences in the United States should read thoughtfully not only the whole of Professor Ely's historical paper, but the entire series of addresses contained in the anniversary report (*Publications*, 3d Series, pp. I-III).

*The American Political Science Association.*—In the *Political Science Quarterly* for March, 1904,<sup>1</sup> Professor W. W. Willoughby writes:

The interests of political science, political economy, and history are so closely related that an attempt wholly to separate them, or to pursue their study as absolutely independent subjects, would be as practically impossible as it would be undesirable. Of the relation between history and political science it has been said by the late Sir John Seeley that politics without history has no root, and that history without politics has no fruit. The connection between economics and politics, is, if anything, more intimate. . . . And yet, intimate as are these relationships, the field of political science is one that may be clearly distinguished from that of history, as well as from that of economics, and the topics which the field includes, in order to be treated adequately, need to be studied as distinct subjects of inquiry. . . .<sup>2</sup>

The foregoing description of political science is sufficient to indicate not only the propriety, but, in the interest of scientific progress, the necessity of recognizing the study of matters political as an independent discipline. Within recent years this recognition has been especially shown in the creation in our colleges and universities of departments and chairs of politics as distinct from those of history and economics. Not until December 30, 1903, however, did this recognition lead to the establishment of a political science association whose exclusive interests should be political in character. Upon that date there was established at New Orleans, Louisiana, at the time when the American Historical and American Economic Associations were holding their annual meetings in that city, an association whose title is the American Political Science Association, and whose object is, as its constitution declares, "the encouragement of the scientific study of politics, public law, administration, and diplomacy." . . . By those who have been most active in its establishment, it is declared that this new association is intended and expected to attract the support not only of those engaged in academic instruction, but of public administrators, lawyers of broader culture, and, in general, of all those interested in the scientific study of the great and increasingly important questions of practical and theoretical politics. . . . It is believed that, just as the establishment of the two older of these bodies marked the beginning of a new period in the scientific study in America of the subjects with which they are concerned, so the creation of the American Political Science Association will, in years to come, be looked back upon as at once indicating the definite recognition of the fact that political science is a department of knowledge distinct

<sup>1</sup> XIX, 107.

<sup>2</sup> The editors add this note: "The establishment of this *Quarterly*, in 1886, naturally raised the same questions which are here discussed, viz., the interdependence of all the social sciences, and the existence of a distinct science of politics. See Monroe Smith, 'The Domain of Political Science,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, p. 7."

from that of the other so-called social sciences, and as marking the commencement of a new period in the scientific study and teaching of matters political in the United States.

*The American Sociological Society.*—It was not until 1905 that American sociologists became sufficiently aware of one another to constitute a self-conscious group. That such a development occurred was due, more than to any other individual, to Professor C. W. A. Veditz. The members of the group had all previously been members of one or more of the Historical, the Economic, or the Political Science Associations. The essential facts may be presented most conveniently by reprinting the editorial announcement in the *American Journal of Sociology* for March, 1907.<sup>1</sup>

In December, 1905, a number of persons interested in promoting the study of sociology met at Baltimore, during the sessions of the Historical, Economic, and Political Science Associations, and organized the American Sociological Society. The first annual meeting of the society was held in connection with the meetings of the cognate societies at Providence, R.I., December 27–29, 1906. The proceedings of that meeting are contained in the following pages.<sup>2</sup>

The establishment of the American Sociological Society marks a notable stage in the positive investigation of human conditions. Not many representatives of the older forms of social science are ready to admit that there is a function for sociology. A sufficient nucleus of scholars has been differentiated from the traditional social sciences, however, to give sociology the prestige of a visible personal following. Together with the Institut International de Sociologie, and the Sociological Society of London, the American Sociological Society bears witness that a few men and women, in full possession of their senses, are convinced that something is lacking in methods of interpreting human experience, and that the most effective means of supplying the lack must be sought without rather than within the older sciences of society.

This organization demonstrates, in the first instance, merely that its members have the courage of their convictions. Since those convictions have now taken corporate form, they must henceforth command a somewhat heightened degree of attention. More will be said, and more definitely, and with more confident emphasis, from and about the sociological point of view. What is said from this point of view will necessarily attract more notice from

<sup>1</sup> XII, 579.

<sup>2</sup> The last sentence refers to the fact that this *Journal* at first printed the proceedings of the Society, and gave the use of the type for reprints to be bound as separate volumes. This practice continued until the membership became large enough to support separate publication of the *Proceedings*. This desirable consummation was reached with Vol. XX, i.e., for the session of 1915.

both theorists and practical men who have hitherto regarded sociology as negligible. The sociologists do not imagine that they are appointed to destroy the vocation of other investigators of society. They feel themselves called to represent factors in the problems of human association which have thus far received less than their share of attention. In organizing a society, they are not beginning, but continuing, the work of winning for those neglected factors the appreciation they deserve. The society makes no appeal for credit. It simply proposes to encourage sociological inquiry and to await competent judgment of results. It believes that it can add an essential factor in promoting both special research and correlation of special investigations among the phenomena of human association. It maintains that our last attainable insight into the meaning of life must be derived from organization of such special researches. It heralds the faith that all the social sciences are unscientific in the degree in which they attempt to hold themselves separate from each other, and to constitute closed systems of abstractions. It demands correlation of the social sciences, to the end that real knowledge of human life as it is may increase; that insight into the quality of life as it is capable of becoming may expand; and that effort to realize the possibilities of life may grow more concerted and more intelligent.

## VII. JOURNALS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

A chapter in the history of social science in the United States should be devoted to the evidences of thought-currents to be found in the leading social science journals. The writer has not made the sort of survey which would qualify him to write such a chapter. Merely as a memorandum of a piece of research that should be undertaken the titles of those journals, assuming two or three liberties in the use of the term, are subjoined:

*American Anthropologist*, New Series. "Organ of the American Anthropological Association, the Anthropological Society of Washington, and the American Ethnological Society of New York." Vol. XVII, 1915.

*American Economic Review*. "Published Quarterly by the American Economic Association." Vol. V, 1915.

*American Historical Review*. Vol. I, 1895. "The *American Historical Review* originated in a conference of some twenty-six persons interested in history, held in New York in April, 1895. That conference resolved upon the founding of such a Journal. . . . A considerable fund being necessary to sustain the *Review*, the Board and other friends of the undertaking proceeded to raise money in the form of guarantees for three annual payments. . . . The first number of the *Review* was issued in October, 1895. . . . In November and December, 1897, the guarantees having expired without the *Review's* becoming self-supporting, the Board began

negotiations with the American Historical Association, with a view to aid. The Association had up to that time had no connection with the *Review*. . . . At its Cleveland meeting of December, 1897, the Executive Council of the Association voted a subsidy to the treasury of the *Review*. . . . A year later, the Association, at its New Haven meeting, in December, 1898, proceeded to make a more permanent arrangement with the Board. . . . Acting under the terms of this arrangement, the Council immediately elected a member of the Board, in place of one whose term was then expiring, and has since annually made one such election, for a term of six years in each case, and has filled vacancies otherwise arising."—Statement of the Board of Editors, 1915.

*American Journal of Sociology*.<sup>1</sup> "By agreement with the American Sociological Society the officers chosen by that body become, during their term of office, the Advisory Council of this Journal." Vol. XXI, 1915-16.

<sup>1</sup> In this connection, an item should be recorded because of its possible interest to later historians of sociology. Among the appropriations in the first budget of the University of Chicago was a subsidy for a University extension magazine. Late in the spring of 1895, after he had stubbornly contested the conclusion for three years, Dr. Harper was forced to the decision that the attempt to create a constituency for such a journal must be abandoned. It was a matter which had never in any way come to my knowledge, and I was taken completely by surprise when, as I was about to leave his office after a consultation on routine business, Dr. Harper abruptly remarked, "We have got to give up the *University Extension World*. It would be a pity for that subsidy to be transferred to anything but publication. Are you willing to be responsible for a journal of sociology?" The audacity of ignorance to which I confessed above (pp. 766-67) had never gone to the extreme of imagining that our department commanded the necessary resources for maintaining such a venture. On the other hand, it was no time and place for men who would flinch at a challenge, and there was no room for doubt that Dr. Harper intended his suggestion as a "dare." After brief consultation with my colleagues, Henderson, Thomas, and Vincent, I reported to Dr. Harper that we believed there was a vocation for a journal of sociology, and that we were ready to undertake editorial charge of such a publication. When the announcement was made shortly after that the *University Extension World* was to become the *American Journal of Sociology*, the editors had not even promises of material enough to fill the first number. More than that, some of the men whom we tried to interest as contributors advised us to reconsider our purpose, as there could not possibly be in the near future enough sociological writing to fill such a journal. Nevertheless, we issued the first number in July, 1895, while it was still uncertain whether material for a second number the following September could be obtained. Without the prompt and hearty co-operation of Lester F. Ward, followed closely by Professor Ross, the enterprise would scarcely have survived its first year.

After so much of this note was in type I recovered from my files a letter dated April 25, 1895, which I am not humble enough to publish; but I will acknowledge its existence, and its location, for the benefit of some future historian of American social science. He may also be assured, with cordiality in direct ratio with his remoteness,

*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* "The Academy was organized December 14, 1889, to provide a national forum for the discussion of political and social questions. . . . The Academy publishes annually six issues of its *Annals*, dealing with the six most prominent current social and political problems. . . . The Academy publications, now approaching one hundred and fifty in number, give the most comprehensive account anywhere obtainable of the political and social questions that have been before the American people during the past quarter century." Vol. LVII (Whole Number 151), 1915.

*Annual Reports of the American Historical Association.* 1889—.

*Columbia University Studies in Political and Social Science.* Vol. 1, 1897. Vol. LXIV (Whole Number 155), 1915. Now entitled *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*.

*Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.* "Under the direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science." Series XXXIV, 1915.

*Journal of American Folk-Lore.* Issued by the American Folk-Lore Society. "Designed for the collection and publication of the folk-lore and mythology of the American Continent." Vol. XXVIII, 1915.

*Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.* Vol. VI, 1915. "Published bi-monthly for the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, by Northwestern University Press." "The object of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology shall be to further the scientific study of crime, criminal law and procedure, to formulate and promote measures for solving the problems connected therewith and co-ordinate the efforts of individuals and of organizations interested in the administration of certain and speedy justice."

*Political Science Quarterly.* "Edited for the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia

that I do not begrudge him the temporary relaxation which perusal of the letter will afford from labors not frequently mirth-provoking.

The letter was addressed to Dr. Harper. It was written at his request, for use with the Board of Trustees. It was a statement of the functions which, in my opinion, a journal of sociology might, could, would, and should perform, and therewith of the opportunity presented to the University of Chicago to serve the world. The records do not show whether Dr. Harper read the letter to the Trustees or not, but something persuaded them not merely to transfer the previous subsidy of the *University Extension World* to the proposed journal of sociology, but to increase the amount by the sum of \$800.00.

Although this *Journal* has realized only a fraction of the expectations expressed in the letter, I venture to hope that, in the final appraisal, the *Journal* will be held to have justified its existence.

The letter has been filed in the minutes of the University of Chicago Trustees, in connection with the record of the vote which established this *Journal*.



University." "The *Quarterly* follows the most important movements of foreign politics, but devotes chief attention to questions of present interest in the United States." Vol. XXX, 1915.

*Publications of the American Economic Association.* Vol. I, 1886. 3d Series, Vol. XI, 1910. Merged into the *American Economic Review*, 1911.

*Quarterly Journal of Economics.* "Published by Harvard University." Vol. XXIX, 1915.

*Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association.* Vol. XIV (New Series No. 110), 1915.

*The Survey: Social Service Weekly.* "The *Survey* is a co-operative, non-commercial venture in journalism, for all those who have a genuine interest in the public welfare. Its supporters are the social and civic workers of the country, and public-spirited citizens who are helping to make their city and state a better place in which to live and work."

*Yale Review.* Founded in 1892 as "A Quarterly Journal of History and Political Science." New Series, Vol. V, 1915.

#### VIII. DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY IN THE UNITED STATES

For a dozen years or so after 1892 American sociology was chiefly an experimentation with method, and a many-sided debate about method. It must be admitted that for a long time we were as unreal in this debate as Ahrens and von Mohl and Treitschke had been in the fifties in their attempts to define "state" and "society." Yet this schematic debate was necessary. If we have a hole to bore in a plank, a common auger will do it. If we have to bore a hole in an armor plate, a tougher tool has to be invented. Tools had to be fashioned for making our technique of social analysis more penetrating. We used up much time and strength adapting mental means to this purpose. Of course most of our talk during this period, and in a lesser degree the same is still true, was more about these means than about the work for them to do. We were still duplicating the fatuities of our predecessors. Many a man who had never done a day's real historical investigation in his life was noisy in discussing "the province" of history or the methodology of history. Many a man who was merely a repeater of economic formulas waxed valiant in defending a presumed "domain" of political economy, or a method of political economy, or in trying to oust someone from the supposed preserve of political economy.

It is not to be denied that the sociologists for years did the same thing. Our talk was of methodology for finding out something, but we did not find out much of anything by use of the methodology. We were all the time more or less consciously tempering drills for our particular kind of boring, but we did comparatively little boring after we had produced the drills. Many people get so interested in the tools that they forget all about the work which the tools are expected to do. The common problem of the social sciences is to understand people, past, present, and if may be future; but we get so wrought up in championship of our favorite *method* of approaching people that we may omit to deal very intimately with people themselves. As we have seen, the last decade of the nineteenth century was a time of much empty-seeming wrangling in the United States about the "province" of history, the "scope" of political economy, the "field" of political science, the "problems" of sociology. It was a time of attack and counter-attack upon methods of procedure that were insisted upon in the various divisions of social science. This seeming emptiness was in reality vacuity only in the sense that it yielded no immediate results.

There is, however, another side to the case. All this abstract discussion was actually a testing out of machinery previous to setting it to work. The people who got least out of this discussion were people who had least of the spirit or power of discovery or of construction. They did not really get hold of the conception that there could be anything to discover either about the past or about the powers of people.

The upshot of all these apparently fruitless years of wrangling about methods is that those who have had the benefit of the process can now take for granted many important things which were not to be understood at all twenty-five years ago. We can now proceed in a commonplace way to investigate the human reality by means of thought-tools which have meanwhile become familiar as a direct or indirect result of these seemingly useless discussions.

It may be years since readers of these pages have seen a horse shy at an automobile. Twenty years ago, and less, there were few horses, either in town or in country, that could pass an automobile without hysterics. Nearly all horses of the present

generation have been nearly as familiar from birth with the sight of automobiles as of other horses, and they take the one as much as the other for granted. It is very much so with the ideas of objectivity which psychological and sociological methodology have at last lodged in the most reluctant minds.

These generalizations, however, have anticipated certain details which must be drawn into the picture. For the sake of adding illustrative particulars I turn back to the year 1892.

As evidence of the operation of factors which the subsequent years were to test, I would recall Ward's paper on "The Place of Sociology among Sciences,"<sup>1</sup> Vincent's on "The Province of Sociology,"<sup>2</sup> Thomas' on "Scope and Method of Folk Psychology,"<sup>3</sup> and the book which I have found cited more frequently by European writers than any other American sociological work—Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*.<sup>4</sup>

It would not be in accordance with my present purpose to deal with the specific contents of either of these essays—considered as proposals of method each of them may be referred to in that way. Without discussing individual characteristics of these early sociological ventures, I refer to them as evidences of an attitude of mind which was typical of the American sociologists at the time, whether they had published much or little. That is, we were all more or less consciously and avowedly devoted to search for or to assertion of some single, central genetic principle, or force, or method of human society in all times and places. We were less inclined at that time to propose the problem: *How many* different kinds of influences operate in human affairs, in how many different ways, in what different combinations, depending upon what variations of circumstances? That is, we were inclined to beg a fundamental question, and this fallacy was a serious impeachment of our earlier procedure.

The question to which we were all more or less in danger of assuming an affirmative answer as our first point of departure was: Is it to be supposed that society is to be explained at last by relating it to a single ultimate cause of some sort or other?

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, I (1895), 16.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 473, especially pp. 485-88.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 434.

<sup>4</sup> 1896.

Doubtless there were more reasons for this tendency than those of us who illustrated it would be able to exhibit. I confine myself to one among them. In some cases, at any rate, the tendency was most obviously a survival of our associations with the philosophers of history. I confess that this now seems to me to have been the strongest determining influence in this direction in my own case. I do not now feel ashamed of the fact that for years I had diligently studied the best known philosophers of history. I was stimulated by the devout hope that somewhere among them I might find the Holy Grail of sufficient explanation. If anyone had asked me, even as early as 1890, what I thought about the philosophers of history as guides to the interpretation of society, I should have said—as indeed I did say to my students in history before I gave my first course in sociology—that the philosophers of history deserve our veneration as eager searchers for the light, but in effect they were blind guides. My reason at that time, however, was not distinctly that I doubted the possibility of an explanation of history as the working of a single causative principle. I simply realized that no such explanation had been discovered.

On the other hand, it is easy to see now that many mental associations formed before our declaration of independence of the conventional social sciences clung to us after the secession, and we were still a great deal influenced by lingering hopes of discovering some single master-key which would prove to unlock all the secrets of social evolution. If Professor Giddings was more sanguine than some others, his very confidence made him more stimulating than most others. Whether the rest of us believed that he was following a reliable or an unreliable clue, all of us were provoked to more zeal in the common cause by his enterprise. His proposal of the combination to unlock the mystery of society is made most briefly on p. 17 of the *Principles*:

But in the subjective interpretation it will be necessary, as we already know, to start from that new datum which has been sought for hitherto without success, but which can now no longer remain unperceived in the narrowing range of inquiry. Sociology must go right from this time forth, as Mr. Spencer says that humanity does in the long run, because it has tried all possible ways of going wrong. Since contact and alliance are phenomena obviously more special than association or society, and imitation and impression are phenomena

obviously more general, we must look for the psychic datum, motive, or principle of society in the one phenomenon that is intermediate. Accordingly, the sociological postulate can be no other than this, namely: The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *consciousness of kind*. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.

Without recalling the various phases of discussion which Professor Giddings' doctrine aroused, I would add that his reasoning at this point and in the context provokes curiosity as to the extent of his share in that trait of our sociological thinking at the time to which I am referring, namely: Just as we had not shaken off all the unfortunate effects of our associations with speculative methods, so we had not assimilated all the regulative principles of the positive and evolutionary conceptions. In this, to be sure, we were simply in the same predicament with those physical scientists who were certain that they had found in the evolutionary idea a final solution of the cosmic puzzle.

The simplest statement of a fallacious conception of evolution which lurked in the subconsciousness of many physical and social scientists alike at the time is that the word "evolution" was supposed to stand for a single principle, which single principle was understood to be the causal nexus between a given antecedent condition and a given consequent condition. I must guard my meaning by the qualification that probably no responsible thinker, either in physical or in social science, would have admitted twenty-five years ago that the version of evolution which I am about to indicate had any likeness except by way of caricature to his own thoughts on the subject. What I am trying to say is that, as I see it, there was a pretty general tendency at the time, and I think Herbert Spencer was involuntarily a pace-maker in it, to try out schemes of social interpretation which derived encouragement from tacit reference to the sort of evolutionary conception which I must further characterize.

Of course the truth is that the term "evolution," or the supposed enlargement of it in the phrase "natural selection," is merely a symbol for a concurrence of processes the details of which are in most cases to be explored. Either phrase is in one sense an affirmation, but in a more vital sense it is virtually an interrogation. It

stands at a point at which the assumption has been accepted as beyond dispute that any subsequent situation is actually a consequence, not merely in time but as an effect, of antecedent situations. But "evolution," or "natural selection," is a phrase which, in the present state of our knowledge, actually advertises our ignorance of the precise concurrences of causes which bridge over the gap between the antecedent conditions, whatever they may turn out to have been, and the subsequent situation, as it appears in the great majority of cases which have thus far attracted reflective attention.

As an alternative form of expression we may put the matter in this way: We have before us the organism, or for the present purpose the *social type* EFGHI. The loose quasi-scientific form of expression which we have in mind is to the effect that "evolution" has brought




Diagram 1




Diagram 2

EFGHI into existence as a more finished elaboration of another presupposed structure, say ABCD. The picture in our minds, either as cause or as effect of that formula, is something like this:<sup>1</sup> That is, the straight line  $xy$  connecting ABCD and EFGHI symbolizes our conception of what has taken place in the production of the latter; viz., a single secret of metamorphosis, the operation of a unique manner of causation, has wrought over an earlier type of thing into a later type of thing, and this same secret of metamorphosis, or unique manner of causation, always accounts for the change of an earlier type of anything into a later species of the same genus. If, therefore, we have the name of that secret of metamorphosis, or unique type of causation, we have therewith the master-key to all metamorphoses, whether physical or social.

<sup>1</sup> See Diagram 1.

But the fact turns out to be very different. Suppose again we have the derived type of society EFGHI.<sup>1</sup> To the best of our knowledge, that cross-section of social relationships, whether it can properly be regarded as a metamorphosis of a real or imaginary antecedent structure ABCD or not, is a resultant of the confluence of innumerable influences, *abcd . . . . n*, within as well as without the group of people composing the society; but this is the crucial matter: In effect the term "evolution" or any substitute for it is mostly an interrogative symbol for the formula of the co-operation of all those factors, ascertained or not ascertained, which have actually had a part in producing EFGHI. Neither the word nor the fact "evolution," if we remotely apprehend the value of either, can figure in our calculations as a talisman to produce objective phenomena, nor as a code key automatically to interpret the phenomena.

An enlightening parallel may be drawn between the word and the process *evolution* and the word and the process *strategy*. If the word "strategy" were issued to a commanding general, it would not automatically win victories. No more would application of the omnibus word "strategy" to victories won in the past reveal the concrete content of the strategy of a single campaign, still less the contrasts between the strategy of two or more campaigns. The word "strategy" is simply a generic term for methods by which means are applied to the accomplishment of military ends. It does not of itself give knowledge of adequate means, and it comprehends combinations of operations which make one campaign more or less unlike another. Accordingly, the word "strategy" alone does not, even after the events, reveal the program by which the objects of the specific campaign were accomplished. It merely serves as an algebraic expression for the details which may be an enigma to a given person using the word, and which must be found out by examining the available evidence in each case.

So with the word "evolution." In and of itself it is only an advertisement of our conception that there is coherence and con-

<sup>1</sup> Diagram 2. It is unnecessary to cumber this discussion with details in which the precise method of the evolution of this social form must have been different from the details involved in the evolution of an organic form.

tinuity of cause and effect in the world of experience. Neither the word nor the reality to which it refers releases us from the task of finding out the factors and methods of the coherence and the continuity involved in a given case, nor from the necessity of reconciling ourselves to the fact that the actuality subsumed under the concept "evolution" is not a flash of magic, but a more complex process than any one imagined physical or social causation to be before the evolutionary generalization had been reached.

Returning to the central proposition of this section, for some years after 1892 the American sociologists were zealously publishing the proposition that society is something that has been evolved, and they were boldly assuming responsibility for showing how it was evolved; but what we actually did besides was hardly more than calling attention to statical relationships in human society which had attracted comparatively little notice. Incidentally we labored to convince ourselves and one another that ways might be found for more adequate exposition of society under the operative aspects of evolution. It seems to me that our situation was weak at the time in our unpreparedness to strike out in search of social causes, and in our virtual standing still in our tracks peering about for *the social cause*. In other words, the clue which we expected under the evolutionary title was in effect not so very different from the kind of clue sought by the philosophers of history.

The fact here pointed out must be considered later in another connection, viz., its relation to the earlier arrogations of the sociologists with reference to the rank of their division of labor in "the hierarchy of the sciences." For instance, Ward says in the paper cited above:<sup>1</sup>

We come to the last and highest of the sciences, viz., sociology. . . . We see, then, the high place which sociology, properly defined, should hold among the sciences, and how clear and incisive are the boundaries which mark it off from all other branches of learning. It is the cap sheaf and crown of any true system of classification of the sciences, and it is also the last and highest landing on the great staircase of education.

Here again, that in the sociologists' ways of thinking which was most offensive to their colleagues was merely a consistent application of statical assumptions about science which in principle were

<sup>1</sup> P. 790.



accepted by everyone at the time. In no single way are we more vividly reminded of the change of outlook in social science during the latest two decades, than in the extent to which talk about "sciences" has given place to work upon problems.

The condition of sociological theory for a decade or more following 1892 may be indicated from another angle, by consideration of Mr. Tolman's findings. He says:<sup>1</sup>

While the growth of sociology is obvious, it would be idle to deny that certain tendencies are at work which tend to challenge its right to an important position in the field of the sciences, or in educational institutions. The action of certain of our most important universities, as noticed in the first part of this paper, is evidence enough of this movement. The arguments of such critics may perhaps be stated somewhat as follows: Sociology must define itself either as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. It has tried to define itself as a body of doctrine, and it has failed in the attempt. If it is merely a point of view, it cannot be separated from the matter in discussion and must subordinate itself to the various social sciences. It has yet made no serious attempt to develop itself as a method of research, and must develop itself on these lines, and show its fruitfulness before it can demand consideration at the bar of science. It is no part of the business of this paper to answer these charges theoretically. If an examination of the classified list of sociological courses shows them to be well founded, then there is nothing to say, unless, indeed, it be to advise the sociologist to develop sociology as a method of research as rapidly as possible. My purpose in calling attention to this tendency is merely to give a true representation of the present status of sociology in the academic world. No treatment of this subject would be complete which minimized this attitude.

As to the state of things which Mr. Tolman reported quite objectively, it must be said, first, that the sociologists presented a clear case of coping with a condition, whatever rôle was played before, at the time, or afterward by their own or other people's theories. This condition was that the squatter sovereignty exercised by earlier comers in the social science field was not in accordance with any scientific theorem which can be permanently maintained. There was a condition of things in the assignment of work to different people in the social field, or rather in connection with the claims staked out by different people, which could not be sanctioned by objective analysis of the work to be done. Under those circumstances, to get a hearing the sociologists had to meet the

<sup>1</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, VIII (1902), 86.

conditions which they encountered, in the only way that was open to them in the then existing state of mind about the relation of subject-matter to academic departments. They had to appear in the name of a "science" in order to get standing in court.

It must be observed, secondly, that it is not yet possible to express this situation in a way that will command the assent of many scholars outside the sociological ranks, or for that matter of all scholars within those ranks. The academic facts as I see them, however, constituted in 1892, and in a high degree still constitute, a temporary, provisional, unstable relation in social science. Support of this assertion is one of the essentials of the sociological case.

It must be noted, thirdly, that the whole academic division of labor in the field of human relations corresponds with an obsolescent conception of reality. In principle this conception is not merely obsolescent but obsolete. Everyone who ranks as a scholar today assumes, in one lobe of his brain, that the reality which it is the common task of social scientists to interpret is an incessant working of impulses as causes, transformed in and through their workings into effects, and reappearing in the changed form, or in repetition of the original form, or both, as modified causes, reproduced in modified effects, in series to which our knowledge can assign no limits.

The academic division of labor in the social sciences, however, corresponds rather to the conception of things fixed in an eternal state. If our experience brings us into contact with objects of knowledge corresponding with that conception, it is appropriate to mark out divisions of knowledge accordingly. It seems to me to be taken as true, that in the pedagogical no man's land between the grades in and for which earnest work in pedagogical psychology is attempted, and that paradise of independence of academic pedantries where pursuit of knowledge is followed whithersoever it may lead—that is, in the bulk of high-school, college, and graduate-school instruction—we are obliged for pedagogical purposes to deal with minds as though they could not form an idea of anything unless it is represented as statical, or at least, if in motion at all, as moved only in the way in which dirt is carried in a

wheelbarrow, not as parts of an intricate interplay of reciprocities. For instance, in historical narrative we must not venture nearer to genetic or causal interpretation than to exhibit things or acts (treated as in effect things) in the mere temporal relation of succession. If we get a second or even a third dimension of causal connections, it is within a pitifully short radius. In political or economic interpretation we must deal with institutions, past or present, as though they were so many beads strung on a mere chronological thread without any effective prying into the psychology of the relationships of those beads as consequents of antecedent and contemporary causes, or as antecedents of subsequent effects. This pedagogical presumption has never been sufficiently studied to establish or to discredit its authority. Still less has a formula been reached for the stage of mental development at which transition should begin, and the rate of acceleration at which it should proceed, from superficial treatment of objects of knowledge as successions of assorted specimens to treatment of them as phases of eternally recombining correlations of forces.

One of the results of these facts is that our academic divisions of labor in the social sciences have remained in their outward form as they were shaped by the statical conception of their subject-matter. If the task of investigators is to describe things as fixed in an eternal state, our traditional division of academic labor is in a measure defensible, though it is obviously inadequate. The moment, however, that we begin to pry into the genetic relationships of the phenomena with which we are dealing, our traditional division of labor becomes indefensible. It grows more and more irrational and obstructive the more seriously we take our task of pressing back and out along every discoverable line of causal antecedent or conditioning circumstance.

For analogy: No physiologist can be merely a physiologist. In addition he must deal not only with anatomy. He must be prepared for recourse at any moment to chemistry and physics and all the biological specialties. In case he is not a mere pedagogical middleman, but seriously in search of knowledge, it is impossible at a given instant to predict whether the next necessary phase of his inquiry will be in one type of physical relationships or another.

It is precisely so in the field of human relationships. Suppose one calls oneself a historian, and suppose one's interest focalizes upon the concurrence of causes of which the German Kaiser's conception of his office is the latest phenomenon. He may write entertaining magazine articles on different phases of the doctrine of the divine right of kings; he may even read learned papers before the Historical Society on versions of the doctrine that have been current at different periods. In order to ascertain anything precise and reliable about the heredity of the Kaiser's version of the divine-right idea, its antecedents must be traced along lines of causes which run back through all the physical geography, and economics, and politics, and psychology, and philosophy, and theology of Europe. In order to locate every mesh in the web of causes, and not to credit imaginary causes, one must be able at a hundred crucial points to distinguish between primary and secondary and negligible degrees of the importance of factors with which the political historian, for example, might not have more than a layman's acquaintance. That is, to make an actual contribution to knowledge of the genetic history of the doctrine of the divine right of kings, in its Hohenzollern version, the particular technique most necessary at a given time might be that of physical geographer, economist, militarist, civilist, philologist, psychologist, or theologian.

The like is true of every type of investigation within the range of human experience. It must always be an investigation of causal connections which ramify back and forth through the entire scope of human interests and activities. Pursuit of knowledge then is something which cannot possibly be conducted within the definitions of procedure implied by the academic divisions of labor corresponding with the pedagogical traditions to which we have referred. Pursuit of knowledge within the sphere of human relations confronts the task of solving problems of causal connections within a circumference in which the differentiations of causal factors are innumerable. It makes no difference whether our problem in its most obvious features is biological, or economic, or political, or psychological, or aesthetic, or religious. It may presently lure the investigator into a plexus of causal relations in which the peculiar technique developed of, for, or by his original

interest may prove to be nearly or quite worthless. It may show him that, in order to solve the next question in his main problem, he must command the services of people whose center of interest is remote from his own.

To construct an illustrative case out of facts which came to my knowledge during the autumn of 1914: Suppose a jobber of watches in Chicago had said in July, 1914, "The nations of Europe may go to war all they please. It doesn't concern me. I don't sell European watches, and none of my customers are in Europe." Within the next few months that man would have discovered that a war in Europe may be almost as paralyzing to the trade in American watches in the United States as though it had actually killed off possible American purchasers. By suspending commerce in cotton, it may suspend the purchasing power of the particular territory containing that jobber's customers, and in that respect the virtual equivalent of war may be given.

Just as every competent economist knows that antecedents which are not primarily economic at all may be changed, as they work, into economic consequents, and vice versa, so in the whole realm of human relations we are dealing with transformations of forces more subtle than the changes of wheat into nutritive fluids, and nervous energy, and thought, and conduct; and these facts demonstrate the absurdity of the old static divisions of territory in the social sciences.

Returning to the main point of this explanation, it is to be remarked, fourthly, that the early sociologists came to consciousness at a time when this sort of perception had made very little impression upon men already working in the field of human relations. As a rule these elders seemed to be content, in theory, with the preserves to which custom, even if of very recent origin, had given them prescriptive titles.<sup>1</sup> There was little prospect that they would pay much attention to innovators professing their conviction that work in the social sciences ought to be reorganized in accordance with the dynamic conception. One sufficient reason for this moral certainty, we must confess, was that these same innovators had themselves at that time not sufficiently trans-

<sup>1</sup> For allusion to the fact that practice was very different, see *infra*, p. 840.

lated human relations into dynamic terms to make their renderings very intelligible or impressive. It was in the order of things that they must be convincing before they convinced. Whatever the logical character of the procedure, it was strategically necessary for these innovators, if they were to make a visible impression during their lifetime, to gain ground by playing the academic game under the existing rules. Their instincts rather than deliberate calculation prompted them to speak for a "science" in the old uncritical sense, and having announced themselves as the exponents of a "science," they were under bonds to "make good" by trying to assemble a body of material which would as plausibly represent a "science" in the old sense, as the material guarded within their respective stockades by the older claimants to social territory.

Suppose that in 1892 the sociologists had already sufficiently oriented themselves within human relations to be able to say to their predecessors in the social sciences: There are aspects of human relationships to which nobody has paid enough attention to insure for them the kind and degree of influence which they must have, if people in the future are to see human relationships more nearly as they are than we are able to now. Make room for us, whether we start from premises primarily anthropological or psychological, or historical, or economic, or political, to bring those aspects of human association into the full meaning in our interpretation which they actually have in the functional operations of society. In effect this occurred in certain instances, but it now seems improbable that the sociologists could have made as successful a struggle for existence as they have made if this appeal had been their sole recourse. The fact was that by no means all the men who were ready to enlist for the sociological campaign were sufficiently clear in their own minds about its essential relations to the tasks of the social sciences, as a whole, to be able to express their ambitions in this simple form. Both subjectively and objectively, therefore—that is, both as a matter of abstract reasoning and as a matter of feasible academic policy—it was impossible a quarter of a century ago to make a different sort of entry into the sociological field from that which actually was made, viz., by proclamation of a new "science," co-ordinate in right, if not in logical classification, with the older

so-called social "sciences,"<sup>2</sup> and it is still both subjectively and objectively difficult for sociology to make much headway academically except by following the other social science departments in accommodating itself to the persisting prestige of an academic superstition.

It may as well be confessed then, fifthly, that neither in 1892 nor in 1901 had sociology justified itself as a body of doctrine, as a point of view, or as a method of research. I shall try to show later that we have only recently become sufficiently certain of our orientation to be in a fairly tenable scientific position. At the time of which Mr. Tolman speaks, a few individuals were assured in their own minds that their message to the world in the name of sociology was a self-vindicating body of doctrine, point of view, method of research, or perhaps all combined. The deplorable fact was, nevertheless, that no one of these sanguine individuals was totally convincing to a single other individual who called himself a sociologist. The alleged "science" of sociology, as a discipline appealing for the recognition of responsible scholars, not merely of schoolboys or even of benevolent boards of trustees, was in reality more of a denial that all the other social sciences put together were conclusive, than it was a plausible substitute for, or even reinforcement of, the older so-called social "sciences." Sociology was more of a yearning than a substantial body of knowledge, a fixed point of view, or a rigorous method of research. It was rather a determination to follow a few promising clues, to see whither they would lead, than an assured body of scientific results or an adequate methodology for reaching results.

This then, sixthly, is our estimate of the situation which Mr. Tolman reported: The essential justification of the sociologists in an aggressiveness which quite naturally affected the older social scientists as presumption was their more or less clearly formulated

<sup>2</sup> Whether sufficient evidence is on record to prove it or not, I have certain persuasive reasons for believing that the academic beginnings of all social sciences in this country were in this respect substantially like those of sociology. There are certain hints to this effect in the paper of Professor Jameson cited above (p. 776). I was elected to the faculty of a New England college in 1880 on recommendation of the president, in spite of protests by all the professors, the latter on the express ground that "history and political economy are not suitable subjects to be taught in college."

discovery that none of the older alleged social "sciences" had a valid claim to that designation. They may not have been willing, at the time, to admit that sociology was more a running advertisement of the *need* of a science than a realized science. They were approaching willingness to make this confession, however, through their perception that the older types of attempts to explain human experience were able to pass as sciences only because they had silenced, if they had not satisfied, minds more docile than the minds of the sociologists. In other words, successfully conventionalized minds were convinced that history, politics, and economics—not to speak of other divisions of labor in the social field—were sciences in the strict sense. The primary contention of the sociologists was virtually a categorical denial of this presumption. In order to obtain standing-ground for support of this denial, it seemed necessary and proper to set up a claim for sociology which now, but for a reason quite different from that which repelled the older scholars, appears as extravagant and even paradoxical to some of the sociologists as it did then to everybody else, *viz.*, that sociology *is* a science, and not only *a* science, but *the* science within the field of human phenomena. It was only by maintaining a claim at least to the former part of this assertion that the sociologists could acquire title to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," *as sociologists*.

The only sense in which the explicit or the implicit claim of the earlier sociologists just referred to could be valid would be a sense which would identify sociology with the logic, or the methodology, of social science as a whole. I shall argue later that the synthetic function for which the most far-seeing sociologists have always spoken is essential to the construction of an organon of knowledge which deserves the name "science"; but that there is more probability of the discharge of that function through some sort of co-operation or at least reciprocal understanding between the different specialists within the field of the social sciences than through evolution of a species of super-scholars to be charged with organizing the findings of sub-scholars, or through the supererogation of a particular type of sub-scholars who detail themselves for the service.



As it will not be practicable to include in this paper an elaboration of the proposition, it is in order merely to state here, without argument, the methodological conclusion to which in the writer's judgment experience tends, viz.: The further we penetrate into knowledge of human experience as an evolving continuity of interpenetrating activities, the more evident it becomes that the utmost knowledge of this reality which is within human reach will be gained at last by the application of  $\alpha$  types of research techniques, each adapted to investigation of a phase or phases of the involved processes. When we are a little more advanced in our mental adolescence we shall have, instead of supposedly independent "sciences," types of scholars who start with common conceptions of the nature of the human reality as a whole, and with a common modicum of knowledge about the relatively obvious facts of human conditions and activities. Each type of scholar will then be expert primarily in the use of one of these techniques, and intelligent secondly in co-operating with similar technicians in co-ordinating the findings of each and all into an increasingly objective rendering of human experience. That there will be a use for the sort of technique which the sociologists are developing, need not be doubted.

Returning to the facts of our sociological situation in 1892-1901, it turned out that the center of attention which chiefly challenged those sociologists whose primary interest was synthetic was the *interrelations between human activities*. Their response to this challenge was a reaction against the type of specialization upon human phenomena which had developed during the nineteenth century. We may illustrate that sort of specialization in this way: Suppose one type of interest in American experience had been fascinated by the sequences of events which made up the winning of the United States, considered as a wilderness conquered by a technique of agricultural, manufacturing, and transporting exploitation. Suppose another type of interest had centered upon the picturesque persons who had carried on the process—from the Plymouth and Jamestown colonists to the builders of the Panama Canal. Suppose another type of interest had been very feebly conscious of these external activities or of these dramatic person-

alities, but had centered about the development of political ideas and institutions in the colonies and states; suppose still another type of interest had been blind and deaf to all the former, but had been eager to find out everything possible about the phenomena of theological belief and of religious practice in the new country.

The sociological interest proper was neither of these; but speaking now concretely rather than in the most abstract way, the sociologist wanted to find out how it was, and why it was that these different sorts of activities—technical, personal, political, theological, religious, etc.—were not only contemporaneous but co-operative and reciprocally conditioning, both positively and negatively, both by way of reciprocal reinforcement and by way of reciprocal restraint. Surely this was a no less legitimate inquiry than those which prompted men to investigate from the other centers of attention. Surely the facts which might be ascertained from the other centers of attention would be left in a lamentably unsettled state, so far as intellectual comprehension is concerned, if the relationships in question from this latter center of attention were not also ascertained and correlated with whatever might be learned from each and all of the other possible centers of attention.

Acting upon this insight, the sociologists fell to tracing out *relationships* between different familiar types of human activity, relationships of cause and effect, relationships conditioning or qualifying, relationships stimulating or repressing, relationships increasing or diminishing the activities—always with more or less obvious and avowed effort to organize these relationships into some sort of a system supposed to represent human society as a whole.

This sort of study opened up a tropical jungle of uncontrolled facts; and the deeper we penetrated into this jungle, the more we were confirmed in the belief that we were right in protesting against the insufficiency of the traditional social “sciences.” At the same time this experience soon began to develop in our subconsciousness misgivings which it took us a long time to be willing to confess, about the sufficiency of our own “science.” We did not confess it then, and recollection of my own innocence at the time leads me to suspect that few of us were aware of it; but as might have been predicted from the nature of things and from the behavior

of minds, in spite of our brave purposes to the contrary, most of our work resulted, not in explanations, not even to a great extent in making out secondary causes and effects, but chiefly in exhibiting a miscellany of societary forms. We alleged processes more than we detected them.

It would incidentally furnish a beautiful test of the competence of the traditional social "sciences" for purposes of interpretation, to call upon them in turn for an explanation of how it came about that in the course of their championship of sociology the sociologists have become a much changed species of thinkers, with a procedure greatly altered from that which was prevalent among them in the decade following 1892. If the facts are ever recovered in detail and if the correlations between them are ever reconstructed, it will certainly not be the work of any single division of labor in our present academic organization. At present it would be impossible to go much beyond bare mention of certain indexes which show that movement was occurring, but which reveal comparatively little about the impulses behind the movement or about the precise methods of their workings. To put the whole experience in the form of the unanswered question: Who knows, and who knows how to find out, in what ways and in what ratios the evolution of sociological thinking has been impelled from within the sociological ranks, and how and how much by impulses from other divisions of social science, and by extra-academic factors, and what has been the formula of the interaction of these factors? If this question is ever answered, it will be as a result of such reciprocity as I have indicated as a scientific desideratum.<sup>1</sup>

It cannot be doubted, that the joint meeting between the historians, the economists, and the sociologists at New Orleans in 1903 was one of the crises from which impulses to further sociological analysis emerged.<sup>2</sup> The prime factor in the episode was a paper by Professor Giddings, entitled, "A Theory of Social Causation." Professor Seligman, as president of the Economic Association, presided. The paper was discussed by Professors Burr, Emerton,

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 804, 819-20, 833.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3d Series, V (1904), 383-443.

and West for the historians, and Cooley, Small, and Ward for the sociologists. It is to be regretted that Professor Emerton did not furnish a copy of his remarks for publication, for some of his statements voiced the extreme remove of opinion from that of the sociologists. The discussion proved to focalize upon two chief points: first, the merits of the pretensions of sociology to be "the over-science"; second, the merits of the conception that there can be an "explanation" of human experience at all.

Neither party represented in this debate was able precisely to formulate the opposition between historians and sociologists. The essential reason for this was that neither party was unequivocally conscious of its own attitude. In that vague state of mind neither party could precisely express the antithesis between its own attitude and that of the other party, because each was doubtless at least as beclouded about the other as it was about itself. From this distance, the main issue seems much more distinct, although it is still impossible to say how many members of either party would vote assent to the following formulation.

As I see it, the historians were assuming that the aspects of affairs which interested them as a guild of scholars had a value of their own, which made them independent of all revaluation by any or all other scholars. The sociologists, on the other hand, were trying to articulate the perception that things get their final meanings and values not from the appeal which they make to particular interests, whether material or intellectual, but from the part which they turn out to have as factors in the whole evolution of human values. No scholars, therefore, can permanently maintain the position that the aspects of things in which they are interested have an absolute value; that formulation of these aspects of things, apart from the aspects of things which complete the system of human experience, can constitute a "science"; that having satisfied their own interest in applying criteria to past facts, they have thereby made of those past facts *res judicata*, not to be examined further by any type of incredulity as to their status as last words about the processes in which they occurred.

Consequently, the two parties were actually doing this: The historians were in effect saying, "We are bent on finding out and

putting on exhibit as much as possible of aspects of affairs which interest *us*." The sociologists were virtually saying, "We are bent on finding out what aspects of affairs it is necessary to understand in order that the experience of past people may be as instructive as possible to present people."

It is hard for a sociologist to understand how anybody with sufficient intelligence to be interested at all in human experience in general can fail to see that these two purposes are complementary. Suppose, for instance, we should some time find out that no human event important enough to be noticed by historians had ever occurred without having been a resultant of at least  $x$  factors. Suppose we should discover that no historian had ever concerned himself about more than  $x$ - $y$  factors in dealing with a given movement. Is it not evident that no historian could have covered the facts in terms of  $x$ - $y$  factors, if it had been previously proved that all human occurrences are resultants of  $x$  factors?

No responsible sociologist or psychologist is likely to claim that we can fix in advance the exact number of influences involved even in a single occurrence, still less in all social occurrences. Every sociologist and psychologist is sure today, however, that if all the facts were ascertained about any selected social occurrence, it would probably be found that more elements had entered into it than any of the historians had discovered, or at all events more than had been finally evaluated; and that very possibly the elements upon which the historians had placed the most emphasis were not necessarily the elements which were most decisive in the given case. The sociologists and the psychologists consequently maintain that until a technique has been worked out by means of which all the factors which have entered into past events may be discovered, and the ratio of influence which the different factors exerted may be exactly computed, it is chimerical to talk of representing a past event just as it was—*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*. The sociologists say that telling the past event *as it interests the historian*, without proving that the event in that aspect is the precise link in the chain of causes and effects which occurred at the given time and place, may exhilarate the historian, and it may entertain his readers, but it is at best only the beginning of a dependable explanation of that

particular passage of human experience. The sociologists say that if the historians are to maintain themselves as scientific investigators, rather than as literary artists, they must at least consent to join in the invention and use of a technique which will exhibit the complexity of social causation to the last detail which psychological analysis can discover. Then the previous knowledge of how complex all social phenomena are, not the mere group choices of the historians themselves, will determine what the historians must do in order to represent past occurrences objectively.

Moreover, it is a special task to carry out the analysis of social forces and processes, so as to exhibit their greater complexity than conventional history recognizes. No discreet sociologist claims that he has any distinguishing gift which marks him out, rather than the historian, for this analysis of social forces and processes. All that the sociologists now claim is that this latter division of labor makes demands exacting enough to occupy one type of specialist; that consequently no man who gives his time chiefly to using on particular historical problems the historical apparatus as we have it is likely to have time that can be used profitably upon these more abstract problems of social forces and processes in general: that there must be co-operation between these types of specialists if the work of either is to attain to its maximum value.

Suppose we take for instance the history of the Civil War in the United States. In a general way we all know the course of antecedent events. In a strictly objective way we have yet to learn the precise conjunctions and collisions of influences which produced that war. The interpretations of it which had been written previous to 1903 and the estimates of it which had gone into our popular traditions, had treated it either as a politicians' war, or as a slaveholders' war, or as an abolitionists' war, or as some sort of a confusion of the three. These conceptions of such a social experience affect the psychologist or the sociologist, and the later school of historians also, very much as the biologist would be affected by assumptions that the human organism could be adequately described *as it actually is*, in terms of flesh, bones and blood.

When we come to think of it, even politicians and slaveholders and abolitionists are like other human beings in that they are

moved by mixed motives. Some of the ingredients in the mixture are conscious, some are unconscious. When we come to think further, we bring to view the fact that, say in 1854, the people of the United States who were neither politicians, nor slaveholders nor abolitionists probably outnumbered those three species several times over. It appears antecedently probable at least that these more numerous classes must have had several sorts of significance, both positive and negative, in making the war just when, where and how it occurred. When we have gone just so far in bringing to bear the mere rudiments of sociological analysis upon the situation, we have suggestions which make all the interpretations of the Civil War that had been written up to 1903 look extremely inconclusive.

But to return to the New Orleans episode. From this distance it seems evident to me that the session was a profitable exhibition of provincialisms and prematurities on both sides. The historical attacks hardly touched the contents of Professor Giddings' paper, they concentrated on previous questions as above indicated. I do not wonder that the historians were contemptuous toward what they regarded as the censoriousness of the sociologists. I do not wonder that they thought they detected in our expressed and implied conceptions of interpretations a yearning for a type of exploration which historians had thought about for generations, and had decided to be illusory. Possibly we were unwittingly looking at the time for a sort of explanation that would be parallel with a history of our earth in terms of chemical reactions, and which might purport to show an unbroken line of causes and effects in an alleged serial order of all the chemical reactions that occurred between the detachment of the nucleus of our earth from the total mass of star-dust and its present condition. All the speculative attempts to interpret past events as a whole have been requisitions for explanations upon this ground pattern. If we were in any way, shape, or manner perpetuating hopes of that sort, and if the historians referred to visions of that kind when they ridiculed us, they were to that extent nearer right than we were. As I shall try to show later, the sociologists are rapidly coming into sight of a different sort of synthesis in principle from that which may have been at issue between them and the historians a dozen years ago. The

most important difference at the time between the historians and the sociologists on this matter was that the historians were betrayed into an attitude of opposition to the very idea of finding an interpretation of human experience. On the other hand, the sociologists were confirmed in their impression that history, in so far as these utterances represented it, is a self-confessed futility, and in their resolution to keep on trying to perfect a technique which would serve to make human experience more intelligible. The sociologists present were most affected by those passages in the remarks of the historians which were in the line of the following allusion, and implied inferences from it, in the remarks of Professor Burr:

It is not the sciences alone which have a right to their names and to their fields. There are the literatures and the arts. Science is, after all, but an old Latin word for knowledge; and I gladly grant that knowledge is not the highest aim of history. It is no historical sentimentalist, no mere quibbling pedagogue, but a great constitutional historian of England, who holds the chief worth of history to lie, not in the knowledge it gives, not even in its training of the imagination, the sympathy, the insight, the judgment, but in the growth it brings to him who studies it for its own sake. It is travel, acquaintance, experience, life. History *is* society. Where else will the sociologist find that past with which he deals? Even of yesterday he knows only through the newspaper; and the newspaper is history.<sup>1</sup>

As I review the debate, I am impressed that the most prophetic part of it was the contribution of Professor Cooley. His remarks so truly foreshadow the subsequent trend not only in sociological thinking, but in the social sciences at large, that they belong of right in this historical survey. Professor Cooley said:

In discussing this notable paper I wish to confine myself to only one of the fundamental questions upon which it touches, namely, that of the nature of history as regards cause and effect; and my aim will be to distinguish three ways of thinking about it; first, the *materialistic*, second, the *idealistic*, third, what I would call the *organic*. In the preference I shall avow for the last I hope that the distinguished author of the paper will, on the whole, agree with me, though I am not sure that he does not, here and there, show a certain leaning toward the first.

The materialistic view assumes that physical conditions are in some sense original and ultimate causes of the movements of history; that they are primary as compared, at least, with such complex products of the mind as institutions and social ideals, which are held to be secondary or derivative, though perhaps

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 435.



of equal immediate importance. The best known representative of this way of thinking is Herbert Spencer, whose whole philosophy assumes the primacy of material facts, and aims to show how mental and social facts grow out of them.

The primacy claimed for material elements must, I suppose, be a primacy either in time or in logic. As to time, I am unable to see from what I have learned of history and anthropology, that the physical aspect of life came before institutions and ideals, or was, generally speaking, of relatively greater importance in the past than at present. No doubt institutions and ideals have greatly developed, but no more, perhaps, than have economic activities. To me these seem to be co-ordinate phases of existence which have ever marched side by side. When I look back through the past I seem to see human nature, language, institutions, modes of conflict, modes of getting a living, philosophies, and aspirations, ever as one indivisible life, even as they are at present; although certainly the whole and every phase of it becomes cruder as we go back. We have learned from the works of Professor Giddings that we can no longer regard human nature as separable from language and other institutions; the individual no more created these things than they created him, all is one growth. Even poetry is, in a sense, as old as man himself; for language is truly said to be fossil poetry, and language and human nature, we now believe, arose together.

But have not the economic activities at least a primacy in logic, as being the necessary basis of everything else?

I cannot see that the getting of food, or whatever else the economic activities may be defined to be, is any more the logical basis of existence than the ideal activities. It is true that there could be no ideas and institutions without a food-supply; but no more could we get food if we did not have ideas and institutions. All work together, and each of the principal functions is essential to every other.

I am not sure that the feeling of the primacy of material conditions has any better foundation than their tangible and visible character which makes them stand out more clearly before the mind and gives an illusion of their independence. As they exist in society, or for us, they are really as plastic and changeable as thought itself. Social and psychological science is, in my opinion, far too complaisant to that prejudice of the physical scientist which identifies the ideal with the vague, and wishes to have as little to do with it as possible.

I do not object to the interpretation of history from the materialistic point of view, so long as it is recognized that this is partial, deserving no logical preference over the idealistic point of view, and always needing to be balanced by the latter. But, so far as I have noticed, writers who start from material data are inclined to hold not merely that this is *a* place to start, but that it is *the* place; and if so, I think they are justly charged with materialism.

I do not quite agree with the paper in the view that materialistic interpretations fail to satisfy us only because they have not explained the ideal. I

should not be content with seeing how the ideal proceeds from the material, but I should wish also to begin at the other end and see how the material, as it exists in society, proceeds from the ideal. The industrial society of the nineteenth century, for instance, is perhaps as much a result of the institutions and philosophies of the eighteenth as it is a cause of those which are to be in the twentieth. And, finally, I should wish to unite these partial views so far as possible into a total or organic view, a perception of the living fact.

I will not dwell upon the merely idealistic view of history, since it has little vogue at the present time. It has as much one-sidedness as the other. Looking upon thought as the causal force in all life, it treats things as no more than symbols.

I would not, however, conceal my opinion that it is quite as plausible and legitimate, quite as scientific, if you please, to treat the human mind itself as the primary factor in life, and history as its gradual unfoldment, as it is to begin with the material. Why should the stimulus or spur of progress be ascribed to things more than to the mind itself?

The organic view of history denies that any factor or factors are more ultimate than others. Indeed it denies that the so-called factors—such as the mind, the various institutions, the physical environment, and so on—have any real existence apart from a total life in which all share in the same way that the members of the body share in the life of the animal organism. It looks upon mind and matter, soil, climate, flora, fauna, thought, language, and institutions as aspects of a single rounded whole, one total growth. We may concentrate attention upon some one of these things, but this concentration should never go so far as to overlook the subordination of each to the whole, or to conceive one as precedent to others.

One who holds this view is not content to inquire whether the economic interpretation of history is the fundamental one. Back of that, he thinks, is the question whether there is, in fact, such a thing as a fundamental interpretation of history, in the sense that one aspect of society is in its nature more ultimate than others; whether life actually proceeds in a one-two-three manner, and not rather in a total manner, each special phase of it at any given time being derived not merely from some other special phase but from the total condition of mankind in the preceding epoch. He believes that life, go back as far as you will, is a progressive transformation of a whole, in which the ideal, institutional, and material phases are co-ordinate and inseparable.

History is not like a tangled skein which you may straighten out by getting hold of the right end and following it with sufficient persistence. It has no straightness, no merely lineal continuity, in its nature. It is a living thing, to be known by sharing its life, very much as you know a person.

In the organic world—that is to say, in real life—each function is a center from which causes radiate, and to which they converge; all is alike cause and effect, there is no logical primacy, no independent variable, no place where the

thread begins. As in the fable of the belly and the members, each is dependent upon all the others. You must see the whole, or you do not truly see anything.

Supposing that this organic conception is a just one, what practical bearing, let us ask in conclusion, has it upon the method of expounding or of comprehending history? It by no means discredits the study of history from particular points of view, such as the economic, the political, the military, the religious. The whole is so vast that to get any hold of it we need to approach it now from one point of view, now from another, fixing our attention upon each phase in turn, as all the world did, a few years ago, upon the influence of sea-power when Captain Mahan's work appeared. But no study of a special chain of causes can be more than an incident in that perception of a reciprocating whole which I take to be our true aim.

If we think in this way we shall approach the comprehension of a period of history very much as we approach a great work of organic art, like a Gothic cathedral. We view the cathedral from many points, and at our leisure, now the front and now the apse, now taking in the whole from a distance, now lingering near at hand over the details, living with it, if we can, for months; until gradually there arises a conception of it which is confined to no one aspect but is, so far as the limits of our mind permit, the image of the whole in all its unity and richness. And it is such a view as this at which we aim in the study of history. Every competent student may help us, whether his work is narrative or philosophical, large or minute, written from one point of view or several; but after all, what we would like to get is nothing less than a living familiarity with the past, so that in the measure of our faculty, we might actually possess it in something of the various unity of life itself.<sup>2</sup>

The immediate impression of the discussion upon the sociologists present was probably reflected truly by the closing comment of Professor Giddings. At the same time his self-control deprived his remarks of the color with which agreement with him was expressed less guardedly in private. He said:

The only comment that I wish to make upon this discussion of my paper may be put in the form of a question. Do the historians wish to include the problems of social causation within the field of history, or to exclude them, as foreign to the historians' proper task? I care nothing for mere labels. If history properly comprehends an examination of the problems that I have set before you tonight—and I gather from the remarks of Professor Burr and Professor West that they think it does—I am quite as ready to hear these studies called history as to hear them called sociology. If, however, history has no business to meddle with such questions, and if the historian ought to

<sup>2</sup> For permission to make this and other quotations from its publications, I am indebted to the courtesy of the American Economic Association. It is also with Professor Cooley's consent that his remarks are republished here.

hold—as I understand Professor Emerton to hold—that the study of social causation is an impossible undertaking, that can end only in vague and worthless generalization, the historian cannot reasonably object if those who, like myself, hold a different opinion, take to themselves another name and attempt in their own way to build up a branch of science in which these problems are made the central themes of investigation.<sup>1</sup>

There can be no doubt that a second notable factor in precipitating sociological opinion was the comparison of views on aims and methods in the social sciences, in connection with the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science, 1904. Although this event followed so immediately in time the apparent deadlock in the New Orleans meeting, just discussed, factors were in evidence at St. Louis which made it plain to close observers that methodological thinking in the social sciences had not come to a halt. It is impossible to demonstrate this fact in detail, but consultations during preparation for the Congress, during its sessions, and in subsequent review of its record have convinced me that it was an occasion for general taking account of stock, and of casting trial balances by leading thinkers in all divisions of social science. The program, so far as it can be exhibited in a schedule of the principal papers and their authors, was as follows:

# THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY PROBLEM OF METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES<sup>2</sup>

## HISTORY

- Sloane, W. M. The Science of History in the Nineteenth Century. II, 23.  
 Wilson, Woodrow. The Variety and Unity of History. II, 3.  
 Robinson, J. H. Conception and Methods of History. II, 40.  
 Lamprecht, K. G. Historical Development and Present Character of History.  
 II, 111.  
 Bury, J. B. The Place of Modern History in the Perspective of Knowledge.  
 II, 142.

## POLITICAL ECONOMY

- Conrad, J. Economic History in Relation to Kindred Sciences. III, 199.  
 Patten, S. N. Present Problems in the Economic Interpretation of History.  
 III, 215.

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 443.

<sup>2</sup> The references are to different volumes of the *Proceedings of the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Science*.

- Fetter, F. A. *The Fundamental Conceptions and Methods of Economics.* VII, 7.  
 Miller, A. C. *Economic Science in the Nineteenth Century.* VII, 21.  
 Clark, J. B. *Economic Theory in a New Character and Relation.* VII, 47.  
 Hollander, J. H. *The Scope and Method of Political Economy.* VII, 57.

## POLITICAL SCIENCE

- Lowell, A. L. *Social Regulation.* VII, 263.  
 Dunning, W. A. *Fundamental Conceptions of Nineteenth-Century Politics.* VII, 279.  
 Andrews, E. B. *Tendencies of the World's Politics.* VII, 293.  
 Willoughby, W. W. *Political Philosophy.* VII, 399.  
 Wilson, G. G. *Problems of Political Theory.* VII, 326.  
 Needham, C. W. *Fundamental Ideas of Jurisprudence.* VII, 459.  
 Beale, J. H., Jr. *Jurisprudence: Its Development in the Past Century.* VII, 470.

## SOCIOLOGY

- Giddings, F. H. *The Concepts and Methods of Sociology.* V, 787.  
 Vincent, G. E. *Development of Sociology.* V, 800.  
 Thomas, W. I. *The Province of Social Psychology.* V, 860.  
 Ross, E. A. *Present Problems of Social Psychology.* V, 869.  
 Hall, G. S. *The Unity of Mental Science.* V, 577.  
 Höfding, Harold. *The Present State of Psychology and Its Relation to the Neighboring Sciences.* V, 627.

The actual thought-movement in the social sciences in the United States, during the first decade of the present century, will never be understood without a firm grasp upon the meaning of the different intellectual tendencies exhibited by this collection of arguments. They cannot be fairly evaluated unless the several divisions of thinking be considered in immediate reference to one another. The sociological papers in particular are speaking witnesses that the emphasis of the sociologists was not only shifting from social forms to social processes, but that attention was turning from mere generalization of types of social processes to the substantial objective in which, as I think, the strictly peculiar work of sociologists as contributors to general social science is to center, viz., the methods of analyzing the behavior of selected groups with reference to their formation by, and their activities in pursuance of, distinctive interests. This leads to more detailed reference to a third cardinal factor in the recent evolution of sociological thinking,

It is beyond question that since 1901 the American sociologists have advanced a long step, first, toward consensus about the location of precise problems in the direct line of their impulses, and, secondly, about ways in which those problems must be handled. For convenience we may speak of this phase of sociological development as the advance of social psychology. In order not to risk a defection into the archaic type of statical treatment, I will not attempt to define what I understand by social psychology. The fact which I want to signalize is that we have become increasingly attentive to the states of mind which characterize people in groups, and to the connections between these states of mind and all the activities which the respective groups perform. To express it in terms which seem most convenient to some of us, we are more and more seeing our distinctive vocation in trying to find out what interests are actually effective in the members of selected groups, and in what ways they shape the group fortunes. Approaches by somewhat different paths to this common rendezvous are to be found in such books as Ross, *Social Control*, a *Survey of the Foundations of Order* (which turns out to be a signal for survey of much more than mere order); Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Organization*; Sumner, *Folkways*;<sup>1</sup> Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*; and Ellwood, *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*. A variation of the common type is visible in all the work that Professor Giddings has been carrying on from the clue suggested in his later title, *The Social Marking System*.<sup>2</sup> I referred to this as follows during the debate previously discussed:

Before closing, I would express my admiration for the insight displayed in the third and fourth divisions of Professor Giddings' paper. I believe he has there reached some cardinal contributions to sociology. I cannot refrain from pointing out once more in this connection, however, that there is a vast void, which nothing but a new order of historical work can fill, between our present ignorance of actual social reactions and confirmation of such theories as Professor Giddings has proposed. We need to know, in the concrete, just how human interests have combined with each other in every variety of circumstance within human experience. There has never, to my knowledge,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. above p. 733, note.

<sup>2</sup> *American Journal of Sociology*, XV, 721; *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, IV, 42.

been a fairly successful attempt to schedule efficient human interests in general, till Ratzenhofer did it less than ten years ago in *Das Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, and *Die soziologische Erkenntnis*. With this work sociology attained its majority. Henceforth all study of human relations must be rated as provincial, which calculates problems of life with reference to a less comprehensive scheme of interests than his analysis exhibits.

The sociologists are settling down to as strict and positive analysis of the sort of thing that takes place in human reactions as the chemists have carried on in their sphere. Men in other divisions of labor within the social sciences cannot afford to leave the sociologist out of the account. Professor Giddings' position is impregnable, that we have something to say to each other, and that each of us needs the other's help for the completion of his knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Other men must assemble their testimony before it can be known to what extent Ratzenhofer's work had been a factor in the development of American thinking, and to what extent the tendencies to which I am now referring developed independently of him. I merely take this occasion to record the facts in my own case.

In the Preface of *General Sociology* (1905) I said: "Our thesis is that the central line in the path of methodological progress, from Spencer to Ratzenhofer, is marked by gradual shifting of effort from analogical representation of social structures to real analysis of social processes."

I have no record to show when I discovered Ratzenhofer. The four volumes named above came into my hands at the same time, and they impressed me as so much of a find that I began at once to absorb them into my own thinking and writing. It was with mixed emotions that I found in them much more complete results than I had reached by following substantially Ratzenhofer's method in my lectures for several previous years. My plan for a book on general sociology was not only worked out, but I supposed the material was nearly ready for publication. Although I did not altogether agree with Ratzenhofer's preliminaries, his analytical process following the clue "interests" was nearly identical with the one I had been following for several years, and his conclusions seemed to me in general to reinforce my own tentative results. A consequence was that in one or two years my lecture notes, intended for incorporation in my book, had become so interlaced with

<sup>1</sup> *Publication of the American Economic Association*, 3d Series, V, 425.

Ratzenhofer's work that it was no longer possible for me to distinguish between the parts which I had arrived at independently, those which had been slightly expanded by drawing upon Ratzenhofer, and those which were entirely his own. It presently dawned upon me that I must choose between the alternatives of rendering myself liable to conviction as a wholesale plagiarist from Ratzenhofer, in those parts of my book which followed his method, or to abandon the hope of credit for originality and frankly assume the position of a commentator upon the man who had anticipated me both in method and in scope of its application. My only regret over choice of the latter course is that I was not as successful as I wish I might have been in showing the precise cleavage between Ratzenhofer's thought, my rendering of his thought, and those portions of the argument which are entirely my own.<sup>1</sup> And this regret is not on my own account. Doubtless here and there an American scholar in the future will want to know Ratzenhofer's precise thought. I now wish I might have saved them the trouble of comparing my version with all the passages which it may have epitomized, or of disentangling my elaborations from Ratzenhofer's leading propositions.

My impression is that a number of American sociologists found themselves sooner or later in virtually the same relation to Ratzenhofer which my own case typified. Our thinking had been gravitating into the method of interpreting group situations, whether passive or active, as phenomena of the interests of the members of the group. This aspect of sociological problems has of late years impressed most of us as more immediately promising for sociologists as such than investigation of the reactions between physical conditions and human groups on the one hand, or attempts on the other hand to accomplish at once, in terms of the motivations of persons, a convincing interpretation of that inclusive group which used to hold the center of our attention under the name "society." It seems to me that the sociologists are today beginning to locate research problems in a way which must appeal to other investigators

<sup>1</sup> The titles and subtitles of *General Sociology*, and in particular the note, p. 249, attempted to acknowledge my debt to Ratzenhofer in full, and at the same time to accept complete responsibility for all variations of my treatment from his.



in social science as real; and that these scholars must eventually see the economy of associating the sociological technique with their own in arriving at generally desired knowledge.

By way of summarizing this section, we may epitomize as follows: Our present way of formulating primary methodological problems in sociology reflects a tremendous advance in objectivity within the last two decades. In 1895 we were in full cry after the answer to the question, What is sociology? Most of the people in the world at that time who had heard of the question were confidently volunteering variations of the answer: "It is a crazy trick of disordered imaginations." One of the reasons why the sociologists made no more headway than they did in convincing people that this sort of answer was not conclusive was that the sort of people whom they were trying to convince were already beginning to have some healthful suspicions about the sort of methodology which expresses itself in this form. The suspicions were not then articulate or general enough to make much trouble with the conventionally accepted sciences, but they had enough force to make themselves felt against a new applicant for acceptance as a science. In point of fact, the form of question, What is sociology? pointed to a radically questionable mental attitude. The question really amounts to this: What is the body of presumptions adopted as the working capital of a type of people calling themselves sociologists, who desire to be received into good and regular standing among scientists? That is, the question points inward into the consciousness of the people adopting the new designation, rather more than it points outward to a distinct portion or aspect of objective reality.

Nor was there much comfort to be derived from the circumstance that this subjective habit was a vice of all the actually accepted sciences. The very fact that they were accepted was proof that their vitiating subjectivity had escaped detection. This would not insure acceptance of a new aspirant to conventional rank. In fact, the question, What is history? has been discussed more or less since Herodotus, and it has scarcely for a moment been withdrawn from academic discussion since Niebuhr began to criticize the Roman legends. But the question, What is history? has always

received for its answer an account of the opinions and preferences of a person or a select number of like-minded persons as to past occurrences which it is worth while to study, and as to the ways in which it was preferable to study them. The question has never been officially answered by reshaping itself in this form: How can we find out what past occurrences are most worth studying, and in what ways they must be studied if they are to yield up the most of their meaning?<sup>1</sup> Thus the question, What is history? has always been virtually a question as to what is a *convention* among certain persons claiming authority in certain premises. It has not been an unequivocal and unrestricted inquiry as to the things which must ratify or demolish conventions.

In principle, the same was true of all the so-called sciences, whether physical or human. There was this difference. In the degree in which the objects of attention are simple and uniform, and do not admit of expression varied by human opinion, the conventionality carried along in the definitions and procedures of scholars tends to disappear. The formulations tend earlier and more constantly to approach the objective reality. Accordingly, if the astronomer, the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist asks and tries to answer the question: What is astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology? the answer must tend rather rapidly to discredit any a priori opinions which astronomer, physicist, chemist, physiologist may hold about what the facts and relations are or ought to be. In these cases it will make comparatively little difference how the people immediately concerned answer the question: What is this, that, or the other "science"? The reality to which they give their attention soon proves more compelling than any conventional opinion about those objects of attention and the proper attitude of mind toward them.

In proportion, however, as the objects of attention are complex and, so far as human knowledge has gone, irregular, the room for play of opinion about ways of inquiring into them increases. Schools of thought about them may acquire plausibility and conventional authority. It is comparatively easy for each of these

<sup>1</sup> Lamprecht's attempt to reshape historiographic methodology in this sense made him a suspicious character among his German colleagues.

schools, with its own constituency, to defend its own conventional answer to the question as to the sphere and scope of its alleged "science," and to discredit with this same constituency any trespassers upon the preserve so claimed.

Thus it has come about that scholars for a large part of the latest two thousand years have carried on intermittent discussions that have been meanwhile almost utterly sterile about the scope and definition of the sciences. In so far as scientific method, i.e., procedure necessary to find out objective things as they are, has been concerned with inorganic and organic phenomena only, objectivity has come rapidly into the place of conventionality ever since freedom of scientific inquiry has been enjoyed. In the field of human phenomena, however, the range of illusion is greater, and the persistence of conventionality has been more tenacious. Very few people even now perceive that it is a crudity to ask either of the questions: What is history? What is political economy? What is political science? What is sociology? Very few scholars in any of the divisions of labor so indicated realize that encouraging or tolerating the asking of the question in that form is a hindrance to the progress of knowledge. It is no wonder then that the sociologists had to pay the penalty of their interloping crudity when they tried to get room in the sun upon territory already occupied by vested crudity. From the standpoint of the sort of conventionality which prevailed twenty-five years ago, and which has never extensively withdrawn its claims, all the ground for scientific occupancy had been parceled out, and a new comer was not only as unwelcome but as impossible as an unbidden thirteenth guest at a table large enough for only twelve.

Not attempting now to inquire into the extent to which the older conventionalities still control the ideas of other scholars in the social science field about division of labor in their subjects, the crudity of the sociologists about their own interests has certainly passed into clearer intelligence. Whether we might have made a stronger impression if we had seen the situation twenty-five to a hundred years ago as it presents itself to us now, it would be futile to inquire. The facts are these: Without having thought it through clearly, certain men here and there, from the forties

of the eighteenth century down to the present, have had inklings that the work of investigating human experience was not organized so as to yield the fullest results. The men who have promoted sociology in the United States have been distinctly of this type. While in form they were trying to give a convincing answer to the question: What is sociology? in substance they were trying to answer the question: What variations must we introduce into our ways of studying human experience in order to learn the most from it? This is a point of order which always has precedence in the parliament of science. Whatever the division of science, a hearing must always be given to him who can show probable cause for distrusting the finality of the current methods of that science.

Whatever might have been our fortune if we had earlier presented our case in terms of the question just formulated, the whole range of the social sciences is now coming under the influence of men whose attitude is more or less affected by the spirit of that question. The leading American sociologists have all implicitly asked that question, and stimulated others to ask it. The whole body of American sociological theory is virtually an attempt to contribute to the answer to that question. The sociologists have never thought of themselves under the aspect of explorers trying to find an undiscovered country where they might establish an isolated kingdom. Their ambition might rather be compared to that of men who are trying to discover ways of intensifying cultivation in territories already occupied. More literally expressed there is no range of human relations not immediately or remotely involved in the observations which we call history as written, for example, by Herodotus. Probably no historian today would be content, however, with an account of any passage of human experience which represented no more minutely analyzed inquiry as to all the factors concerned than the reflections of Herodotus represent. In general, every modern historian holds that there are factors in every passage of human experience which call for investigation with the technique of geographer, and anthropologist, and philologist, and psychologist, and legist, and economist. Every one of these latter specialists recognizes that there is work for the historian in collaboration with men of his own type, in giving

the completest possible reality to the details which it is a co-operative task to reconstruct. Now the sociologists believe that all the previous divisions of labor in reconstructing human experience have failed to provide adequately for certain vital factors in the process. Of course they must assume the burden of proof until their belief has become a part of common knowledge. Assuming that they do establish their claim, they will simply have added one more to the recognized methods of viewing human experience, each of which is necessary to the reinforcement of all the rest.

Another important preliminary to the study of American sociological theory must be noticed. As we have said, in substance, each of the men who have helped to develop sociological technique was obeying an impulse which might have been expressed in the question: What variations must we introduce into our ways of studying human experience in order to learn the most from it? Not one of these men had an answer to this question with which he was satisfied. Each was feeling his way toward an answer. Each made use of certain clues by means of which he was trying to work out an answer. Each of these men must be interpreted by the latest phases of his thinking, not by the tentative thinking which he may have abandoned.

If there is an exception to this rule, it is in the case of Lester F. Ward. He is certainly the only American sociologist whose thinking was crystallized in permanent form and substance in his earliest version.<sup>1</sup> Whether this was absolutely true in Ward's case or not, it was certainly more nearly true than in the case of his successors. They were all conscious of experimenting with means of interpretation. However confident they may have been in their forms of expression, they were obliged to change their minds about certain matters, and the very fact that they did change their minds shows that their confidence was largely hypothetical, and their dropping of untenable hypotheses adds to the credit of their entire method.

Probably there is no more mortifying case in point than one of my own youthful indiscretions. There was a time when it seemed to me wise to project the three divisions "descriptive, statical,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 752.

and dynamic sociology," and to define the scope of each in a certain way.<sup>1</sup> I cannot now think myself into a state of mind in which I could imagine that this classification corresponds with reality. It helped me for a time, however, but I have tried since to work out some of the penance due for having been so naïve. I should certainly plead both the statute of limitations and subsequent good behavior as bars to action against me for this early misdemeanor. This is by no means the only fault of the kind which might be brought home to me. I fancy my colleagues have some similar skeletons in their own closets. The timely thing now is not to recall our earlier mistakes in superfluous proof that we are fallible, but to criticize our present thinking.

I fancy I am not far from the conclusions of my sociological colleagues when, for my own purposes, I use this description: *Sociology is that variety of study of the common subject-matter of social science which trains attention primarily upon the forms and processes of groups*. I fancy that, along with clarified conception of our task in accordance with something like this description, we find ourselves in a much different state of mind from that of two decades ago about our relation to other types of social scientists, and we have arrived at certain steadying preliminary results which give us confidence for pursuit of our work.

We now know, for instance, that men and women are irrepressible want-generators. We know that men and women universally reach out after satisfaction of their wants. We know that in pursuit of their native impulses to satisfy their wants they inevitably both combine and collide with one another in the crossings of interests which their several wants create. We know that everything visible in human life is a permutation of these elementary facts.<sup>2</sup> We know that the task of understanding the precise causes and effects within a given group is the task of getting at the precise qualitative character, and the proportional quantitative influence of the simple terms in the foregoing propositions,

<sup>1</sup> See Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> Of course it is a prime problem of social psychology to discover in particular, and in general, in what ways the metaphor "permutation" fails to indicate the kind of factors, and the mode of their relations actually operating in social groups.

as they are presented in the particular instance. We know that human approval or disapproval of any actual or possible choice of human aims, in the satisfaction of individual or collective wants, has no other positive standard than the knowledge which we have derived, or may derive, about the comparative tendencies of one type or combination of aims and another, with reference to the sort of people probably to be the resultant of either. We know that the problem of social intelligence is that of comprehending the workings of these want-factors, in the particular combinations in which they present themselves in the group or groups with which we are concerned. We know that the problem of social efficiency is, first, the problem of evaluating the competing wants in the given group, and, secondly, the problem of concentrating group volition upon that selection of wants which will justify itself in a relatively high degree of group achievement.

By putting the results of our sociological methodology into this compact shape, we by no means assert that exhaustive and adequate knowledge of our human lot has become easy. We simply assert that a formal expression of the contents of a given group experience may be more feasible by this means, and that it may carry less admixture of fictitious elements than in the case of previous attempts at expression. Instead of dealing with somewhat mystical renderings of life, the form in which we now render group phenomena brings us face to face with the elemental problems of people, in terms of, first, physical antecedents, temporal and spatial, which constitute the minimum conditions of human realization; secondly, the human body, the organic setting of our psychical peculiarities; thirdly, human groupings or the more or less plastic structures of persons in reaction with persons; fourthly, the phenomena of that psychical initiative which branches out into all the variations of driving activity that give group characteristics and group programs; and, fifthly, the types of results, in the shape of individual and group achievements, subjective and objective, which promotion of alternative types of activity tends to produce.<sup>1</sup> There is nothing fictitious about all

<sup>1</sup> Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Part I, has exhibited these relations at some length.

this. In principle it is objective throughout. It presents the problems of social self-knowledge in the most matter-of-fact form in which they have been construed up to date. It indicates the task which everyone confronts who tries to understand any selection out of human reality. To know anything at all about human reality, we must know it, to the extent that we know it, as a veracious factor in the complex of factors thus formulated.

It must be admitted that to the initiated the foregoing passage is a code message. If one has the key, if one can read into these propositions all that they mean to the trained sociologist, it amounts, to venture a different figure, to a tabloid form of the essentials in our whole sociological literature up to date. Dropping both figures for another, there will be nothing worth while in these propositions unless they function as seed truths rather than as food truths. That is, very little knowledge of any kind can be assimilated out of hand in the form of results taken over from another. Knowledge that becomes vital has to be gained by personal experience along the main lines of operations which arrive at the results.

It would be unfortunate not to include in this summary a reference to the effect of recent sociological thinking upon our present attitude toward genetic interpretation of experience in general, and upon our impressions as to the adequacy of the traditions of the historians to indicate methods of arriving at satisfactory interpretations. This subject is referred to in the next section.<sup>1</sup>

#### IX. AN APPRECIATION OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

At once I must disclaim the purpose to undertake all that this subtitle appears to promise. I shall not venture beyond an attempt to indicate certain additional important elements which should be included in the multiple standard of value by which the sociological movement up to the present time should be measured. For this purpose it will be necessary to repeat in slightly modified form much that this monograph has already contained.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *infra*, pp. 837-38.



In the first place, we must remember that this movement has never been the operation of a single factor. From the date which we have chosen as our starting-point, it has been the operation of two principal factors, each highly composite; first, an impulse to improve ways of improving the world; secondly, an impulse to improve ways of interpreting the world.<sup>1</sup>

In the second place, we must remember that the people who have called themselves, or have been called by others, sociologists have by no means been of a single type, and they have not carried on a single type of work. On the contrary, we may distinguish at least eight types of program which would have to be understood in their peculiarities and in their relations to one another, if a valid appreciation of the sociological movement as a whole were to be reached.

The different kinds of work to which the name sociology has been indiscriminately applied include the following:

1. Promotion of innumerable efforts for immediate betterment of concrete conditions; from first aid to the injured, and pure milk for babies, to reconstruction of marriage or attempts to abolish war.

2. Training persons for service in the different kinds of ameliorative agencies.

3. Developing technologies as distinguished from techniques of social improvement; for instance, restorative v. retributive theories in penology; or vocational v. cultural conceptions in education.

4. Investigation and teaching of abstracted phases of social conditions, with inconstant relations to ulterior use of the results. The variations here referred to range from physical anthropology to social geometry (Simmel).

5. Investigation and teaching of comprehensive syntheses of human relationships. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology* may be taken as an illustration of this type of work.

6. Investigation and teaching of group psychology. This is a specialty as distinct from either 4 or 5 as physiology is from geometry on the one hand and from cosmic philosophy on the other. It has already differentiated into several types of research program.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 726 and 769; also Small, "Points of Agreement among Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, XII, 633; "The Meaning of Sociology," *ibid.*, XIV, 1; "The Sociological Stage in the Evolution of the Social Sciences," *ibid.*, XVII, 804.

7. Investigation and teaching of the methodology of the social sciences, as a means of criticizing the objectivity of each and every technique of interpreting the human reality.

8. Investigation and teaching of pure and applied ethics.

In the third place, we must remember that each of these varieties of effort, whether, as carried on by given persons, closely or remotely connected with one or more of the other varieties, is nearly or remotely connected by descent or by affinity or both with the whole antecedent body of social science. Before finishing an audit, therefore, of the investments and returns in those divisions of labor which have been known as sociological, it would at least be safe to consider the ways and degrees in which the findings, for better or for worse, commit the finders to similar findings in the case of the other divisions of social science. No one is competent to evaluate any portions of the sociological movement who is unintelligent about the differentiation of the movement from the forms of reflection upon human conditions which had been in the course of evolution previous to the middle of the nineteenth century. No one is competent to evaluate any portion of the sociological movement unless he is aware that the personnel of each of its divisions is made up of men and women whose competence to make necessary appeal to the general sciences and technologies and techniques by which their special activities must be reinforced, compares favorably with that of corresponding specialists in other divisions of physical or social science and their derivative arts.

In the fourth place, we must remember that the distribution of the divisions of sociological labor has not been uniform. There are cases of workers who have made an impression in only one of these eight fields. There are perhaps a few workers who have had a certain influence in each of them. It is not certain that those who have done work in the larger number of these fields have had identical logical or psychological centers for the different portions of their theory and practice.

In the fifth place, we must observe that it is an absurdity to apply the name sociology to each and all of these divisions of labor, and at the same time to insist that the term is an instrument of scientific precision. Certain demands of convenience might justify

an inclusive name for gardening, and cooking, and nursing, and teaching. To analyze the roots and branches of each, four somewhat different techniques would be necessary. To the present writer the choice of terms of, in, and for the social sciences is a matter of relatively trifling concern, provided there can be progress toward a consensus about the meaning of terms and consistency in the use of them. Up to the present time, the attempts to standardize the term "sociology" have all been prompted to some extent by the desire of each person who employed the term to make it a comfortable roof for shelter of his particular combination of activities. Especially if he was a teacher, he has strained after a definition of sociology which would seem to indicate a foreordained association between all the elements in the conglomerate which he purveyed to his students. The consequence has been that, so far as classification was concerned, academic sociology has often exhibited reminders of that pre-scientific spirit which inscribed in the faculty list of a certain American college the legend: "A.B.C., Professor of History, Ancient and Natural."

If we consider for a moment the eight types of activity just specified, and if we remember that each of them is sometimes called sociology, it will be obvious that the designation "sociology" is a mischievously ambiguous middle term. Each of the eight activities scheduled has a legitimacy of its own. Any one of them might possibly make out a better claim than any other to the name sociology. No contention about that possibility is involved here. The one essential matter is that the present ambiguity of the term "sociology" compromises each type of work to which it is applied. Self-interest not less than scientific responsibility demands that as soon as possible the sociologists shall free their own minds and the minds of others from the confusions which this ambiguity perpetuates. They are unlikely to accomplish this very successfully until they fix upon a terminology as distinguishing as that which indicates the division of labor in biological science.

In the sixth place, and expanding especially the third proposition in this series (*supra*, p. 829), the sociological movement, especially of the fourth to the eighth types inclusive, cannot be accurately evaluated if it is considered solely as a phenomenon apart

from the other divisions of social science. If we may assume license for an extravagant and not altogether dignifying figure, the sociological movement in one aspect is a laboratory "culture," the prime purpose of which is to visualize a process taking place less artificially in living organisms. More literally, the sociological movement has been spoken of above as a revolt against unsatisfactory academic conventionalities.<sup>1</sup> Now it would be as contrary to the facts to assume that the movement for improvement in the methods of social science was confined to the sociologists, as it would be to assume that the movement for reform in the Catholic church was confined to the Protestants. Luther and Calvin merely represented more peremptory and daring demands for reforms which in some kind and degree were in demand among the most docile supporters of the Papacy, and which in some kind and degree were realized by the Council of Trent. It would also be premature to assume that the existing division between traditionalists and revolvers in social science is to be permanent. It is certainly permissible to look for a more reasonable outcome. Meanwhile, it would clarify the present situation wonderfully if we could have a complete survey of the extent to which the methodology of the older divisions of social science has actually tended toward removal of the defects which provoked the sociological revolt.

In the seventh place, for reasons similar to those which set limits to the scope of our inquiry in a previous section,<sup>2</sup> we must refrain from expressing judgments about those phases of the sociological movement which center in the types scheduled as 1, 2, and 3 above.<sup>3</sup> It is evident that those divisions of labor have precisely the same relation in principle to fundamental social science that every other technique or technology has to the general science or sciences which are logically antecedent. Our further discussion will confine itself accordingly to the sociological movement as represented by workers in the lines 4-8 inclusive.

Speaking then for those five divisions of labor in particular, suppose we try to take an inventory of ourselves. Or suppose we first indulge in a forecast. I will venture to put myself on record with the guess that in a hundred years there will be writers on the

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 769.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, p. 771.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, p. 828.

history of the social sciences who will point out that between the years 1865 and 1915 a decomposition and a recomposition of social science were occurring, and that in effect, though not in detail, the change resembled the reorganization which had its preparatory period in Germany between 1765 and 1815.

It is needless to particularize the comparison. The outstanding resemblance between the earlier period and that which we may refer to as though the year 1915 were its terminus, is that in both periods there were resolute attempts to run scientific dividing lines and containing lines between social sciences. In the earlier case many of these lines were transient, and my prediction is that the same story will presently be told about many of the lines of definition which have been drawn by social scientists during the later period.

For one, I feel safely intrenched in the position that, whatever the coming changes, social science will prove to be a growing reality, while only the provincial foolishnesses of social scientists will be put to shame. Few social scientists are ready to adjust themselves to the fact that social science, like any other science, is not an entity, not a thing. Few are ready to admit that it cannot be divided at will into office space, like a skyscraper, to serve the convenience of tenants. If we understand by science *comprehension of phenomena*, social science is an unresting emergence of problems, and response of effort to solve the problems, and accumulation of positive and negative results of the efforts, in cycles as far as we know without end. Men do in part make these problems in the backs of their heads. Sooner or later the problems which are chiefly subjective are crowded out by those which are more objective. The moving world engages observing minds with the incessant challenge, Watch me, and explain me if you can! Less and less is any division of science what detached preference would have it. More and more it is what objective occurrences compel it to be. Science is more than the camera of life, but it is like the camera in depending upon external objects for the veracity of its results.

All of these reflections furnish an introduction to the larger generalization that before much more time has elapsed, all the men who are actually explorers in social science are likely almost

with one accord to realize, first, that they have not been so very different from the sociologists in claiming for their own technique more than it can conceivably perform; secondly, that, just like the sociologists, they have assumed that they were arriving at their conclusions by means of a technique wholly their own, while in fact they were borrowing for their own structures building material from every available source; thirdly, that the really scientific part of their work is the invention of tools and methods of research into particular phases or evidences of phenomena, which phenomena must also be investigated by other tools and by other methods; fourthly, that the invention of these tools and methods, and practice with them upon abstracted subjects are after all merely preliminary to actual scientific processes in the full sense. Social science, as distinguished from the dilettantism of satisfying curiosity about mentally segregated aspects or episodes of human experience, must consist in comprehending units of human experience, whatever they turn out to be, to the extent that the modes of their coherence each within itself are so completely made out that no inquiry about those correlations is left unanswered; although inquiries will sooner or later arise about the coherence of the given unit with a larger human complex. Thereupon, through inevitable reference to the larger human complex, another unit of experience will be given, and the realness of science will be tested again by its adequacy to make out the correlations within the larger unit, and so on to the utmost content of human experience. This understanding of actual units of human experience presupposes, therefore, the co-operative use of all the techniques which have been elaborated or which may be elaborated by all the divisions of social science.

I base this prediction, first, upon what has actually been taking place wherever investigation of human experience has occurred; and, secondly, upon the probability that the future will not reverse the rule of the past that the intellectual perceptions of the few presently become the property of the many.

There have been innumerable variations of this process, but we may say in the rough that, since 1800, prestige has tended to depart from all phases of attempts to establish the authority of

omnibus interpretations of reality, and prestige has tended to gather around every attempt to isolate a relatively controllable problem, and to bring to bear upon it all the aids to solution which are credited with competence to throw light upon the problem. Thus the once imposing "philosophy of history" has today no scientific standing; while at the opposite extreme the case method of studying child psychology is treated by scientific men in general with a degree of respect beyond the proportion of its merits as measured by unquestionable results.

In sociology, this reaction from omnibus interpretations to study of rather definitely bounded units of experience is a distinctive mark of our present stage of thinking. In and of itself this change is a scientific achievement. It is a result of much futile bombardment of the citadel of all reality, and of consequent recourse to intensive operations upon details of the structure and processes of reality. We are becoming aware of the relative superficiality of our knowledge of the most immediate and ordinary units of experience. What, for instance, are the springs of motive, the processes of the fusion of motives, and the resources for control of motives in the different boys' groups in our own community? What is the precise series of antecedents and consequents that have resulted in the break-up of a given family—not to speak of a formula of causes of family disintegration in general? What is the precise composition of interests which furnishes a constituency for a given local elective official? By virtue of what combination of factors did the people of the United States arrive at the state of mind which they expressed in a given presidential election?

Waiving now the question whether a scientific answer to such questions is thinkable, this much is certain: the people who have focused their attention upon such questions can no longer be hoodwinked by the scientific pretensions of any more wholesale and summary methods of asking and answering questions about human experience. If we are at our wits' end to understand the boys in the nearest schoolyard, it is barely possible that no one has any better understood the crusade of the children. If we are not quite sure about the rights and wrongs involved in the troubles of the Smith family in our own set, it would not be so strange if we

turned out to be incompletely informed about the details and the social significance of the domestic relations of Henry VIII. If we find ourselves guessing about the undercurrents of politics in our own ward, the suspicion naturally steals in upon us that we may have believed fairy tales about the Wars of the Roses, or the revolts of the Italian cities, or the European war of 1914. If the United States of America in our own day and generation, with the whole publicity apparatus of our modern civilization, baffles the comprehension of the wisest of us, what are the chances that we have the key to the combination which makes any other previous or contemporary culture area intelligible? In a word, this at least is a contribution which present fashions in sociological research are making to the objectivity of social science in general, viz., we are demonstrating the complexity of those group relationships which it should be easiest for us to investigate, and we are correspondingly challenging the credibility of accounts of more remote experiences to which no such analysis has been applied as we find necessary for the credibility of interpretations of experiences near at hand. Otherwise expressed, the sociologists are at least performing the negative service of encouraging a wholesome suspicion that much remains before anything which is conventionally accepted as social science will be able to stand the test as more than one of the tributary techniques of science, or as a gathering of materials for science. In this respect sociology is not essentially different from those older divisions of labor which have been conventionally accepted.

More than this, it is no longer possible for moderately sophisticated people to be deluded by the superstition that such knowledge as we have of any past or present unit of experience has been given to us by a single academically defined science, or that if we have only such knowledge as is literally the find of a single academically defined science, it has relatively more evidential value than the brick which the Greek in the story carried about as a sample of the house he wanted to sell.

As a matter of fact, the mortal assumption that the different so-called social sciences have developed each in an air-tight compartment of its own must be one of the standing jokes among the



immortal gods. Ever since there have been any pretensions of social science, each exponent of any part of it has appropriated everything within his reach in other social sciences, if he had wit enough to see that this scrap information or cunning tool or wise method could be utilized in his particular pursuits. Every commentator upon any phase of human experience whatever has greedily grabbed up every stray item of information from investigators of other phenomena, provided some way could be seen to weave that information into the projected plan of explanation. Resistance of this program has been a sign of invincible ignorance or of insuperable prejudice.

For example, one of the humors of the evolution of thought in the latest century has been the self-righteous indignation of the so-called Manchester economists over the outrageous violation of their sanctuary by the historical school. The latter miscreants actually proposed to call in historical precedents to test the correctness of the classical generalizations. After a body of doctrine had comfortably established itself, it was sacrilege of course to confront it with mere historical facts which weakened the conclusiveness of the previous historical generalizations!

When this violation of the temple began, and when indignation became hot against the disturbers, none of the priests of this economic holy of holies seems to have remembered that the whole structure purported to have been founded upon the historical basis. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* had been accepted as the revelation of a new orthodoxy in part because it gave itself the manner of an induction from all previous economic experience. What the range of Smith's historical knowledge really was, is immaterial. His book is ostensibly a digest of all the teachings on economic relations which previous experience had bequeathed to his time. It turned out that while enough history to serve as the basis of an acceptable economic cult was welcome to the British economists, enough more history to raise doubts about that cult was taboo.

Today the tables are turned, and there is intermittent eruption all along the historical heights, because explosives lodged by economic perceptions are bursting the crust of historical traditions. The affairs of nations are not as simple as the convenience

of historians chose to make them; and historians who read the omens are facing the alternatives of involuntary bankruptcy or reorganization of the business. At the same time others besides the wisest historians have abandoned the type of hope that used to be cherished about the sort of knowledge which may be gained about the past.

Nor have we told the whole story yet. Learning about human experience today is not only not an affair of logically delimited academic "sciences," or departments. So far as contemporary phases of the process are in question, it is not primarily an affair of "science" at all, in the constructive sense of that term, any more than the manual labor of serving a machine gun is generalship. Suppose we subject the best books that have come from the press in all the major social sciences in any recent year to a minute analysis of the sources from which the authors drew, and of the ratio between the authors' own contributions and the aggregate contents. We should presently be aware that the differences between either of these books and a volume published fifty years earlier on a similar subject represent, in the first place, a largely increased mass, and a more highly criticized control of intermediately accumulated material, with knowledge of which the later author approaches his work. This part of his equipment is not necessarily a departmental monopoly at all. Having once been given to the world, it actually becomes a part of the outfit of every fully trained scholar in social science. In the second place, the later author has enriched his book through use of certain techniques which are equally at the service of scholars in every other division of social science—that is, library administration in general, and particularly the work of cataloguers, indexers, and bibliographers. No thoroughly modern book in social science is as provincial as it would be if it actually observed the boundary lines drawn for it by the academic department which it is supposed to represent. It is actually a variant of a common scientific tradition.

In brief, then, the sociologists have less in common than we had a decade or two ago with those wide-reaching thinkers who used to follow, closely or afar off, the lure of an ideal of causal interpretation which may be symbolized by a chain stretching from

the beginning of man's life on the earth to the present moment. We believe today that explanation of the human episode is conceivable not in the sense that it will ever be possible to connect each subsequent event as a link in an endless chain of antecedents, or as a link in an endless web made up of interlinked parallel chains; but in the sense that we see in the whole bulk of human phenomena a more or less differentiated mass of functional occurrences, the principles of which functional occurrences we partially understand.

To reduce this hypothesis to the simplest expression, we believe:

First, that from a certain level on, human life is always and everywhere primarily an affair of groupings of some sort between people.

Secondly, that wherever we encounter an observable phenomenon of human life, we have given in that phenomenon always the same essential factors, namely: (1) the relations between people and their habitat; (2) the essentially similar physiological and psychological outfit of the persons, by virtue of which they move toward a certain control of the physical conditions; (3) the social problems in the strict sense, i.e., the play of personal forces in various group formations; (4) the prime factors of social motivation proper in the wants of the persons themselves.

Thirdly, the elements of human experience, or, as we have just called them, the prime factors of social motivation, are the both spontaneous and deliberate outreachings of these prime factors to satisfy their cravings, physiological, psychological, or social.

Fourthly, the content of these cravings varies from time to time in quality, and quantity, and proportion; but if we have made out the generic types of physical and psychical wants ("interests"), we have in them the clues to all the specific cases of moving impulse in all human situations.

Fifthly, the consequence is that we have come to visualize human experience in the large as a very inadequately charted world. We see that in this whole very much more than can be symbolized in terms of only two dimensions, but confining ourselves for the present purpose to that inadequate type of expression, we may vary our figure by describing what we make out in a general survey

of human experience as a disorderly procession of persons formed into groups of different sizes, stabilities, and degrees of dependence upon, or independence of, one another. These groups are at different removes from one another both in time and in space. As we see them in the form of an only partially organized procession, we cannot escape the impression that different elements in this procession, whether we observe them longitudinally or laterally, have some sort of reciprocal relations. Positive evidence of this reciprocity may be within our control only in an utterly inadequate degree. For convenience we may call these groupings which we make out in the procession of human events, "units of experience"; that is, reactions of persons who affect the mind of the onlooker as having some sort of coherence, but who, so far as the onlooker can see at first glance, have only invisible or at least negligible connections with the other persons in the procession. In extent these "units of experience" may reveal themselves to the observer in every gradation of magnitude, from the crisis in the latest disrupted family that the United Charities visitor has discovered, or the latest bell boys' strike, to units of experience that are national, like an American presidential campaign, or international, like the present European war.

The present sociological contention is that we can explain human experience genetically only in the degree in which we can make out both the physiology and the psychology of all the units of experience out of which human experience as a whole is composed. A very short clinical experience, in attempting to discover the precise physiology and psychology of a familiar contemporary group, will induce wholesome skepticism as to the permanence of the prestige which our present social sciences enjoy as authoritative interpreters of human life as a whole.

This summary of considerations which must be weighed in forming an appreciation of the sociological movement at its present stage would be incomplete, and perhaps it would be justly condemned as injudicial, if it did not make frank confession of certain crudities which the sociologists have not entirely outgrown.

First, then, in common with all other academic men, and particularly with all the other social scientists, we have suffered from

imperfect differentiations between the pedagogical and the investigating sections of our work. Not only in the colleges but even in the universities, the decisive question has usually been, not what aspects of reality most urgently demanded investigation, but with what sort of material one could most certainly establish oneself as a teacher. The consequence has been much sacrifice of scientific integrity to pedagogical expediency. Not a division of social science in the United States has escaped the corruptions of academic politics. Not a division of social science in the United States has fully defended itself against the lure of profits from textbooks. Whether in the less obvious struggle for standing-ground in a faculty, or in the more obvious deferring of the question, What most needs to be investigated? to the question, What sort of mental pabulum will the market digest? the union in the same persons of the two functions of teaching and research has encountered hindrances to the effectiveness of both. A large part of the reasons why such miscellaneous activities as we have scheduled still bear the common name, "sociology," may be found in this connection.<sup>1</sup> I am bound to contend, however, that the situation is not essentially different in any other division of social science. Nowhere does the actual teaching conform to the pseudo-scientific formulations of the scope of the department. Francis A. Walker's textbooks of political economy, widely used a couple of decades ago, may be cited as symbolical of a general condition. Walker began his smaller book by alleging that "political economy has to do with no other subject, whatever, than wealth." Yet he does not finish the page on which this statement appears without referring to "mankind," to "individuals," and to "communities"; and only special pleading could make it appear that a single page in the book confines itself strictly to the subject of wealth. This is because wealth is really a function both of material and of people; and it was one of the marks of the juvenility of science to suppose that such a block system of demarkation lines as that to which Walker paid verbal tribute could actually be observed in practice.

If sociology could stand strictly on its own merits as an intellectual pursuit, it would rank either as a luxury for a few or as

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 828.

a penance for a different few. It would be a millstone hung about the neck of the many. In competition for registrations with teachers of subjects which may legitimately be made more immediately attractive, the sociologist would have to be a superman if he did not unconsciously try to commend his subject by presentation of it in ways which could not pass a very rigid methodological censorship. But what historian is content to offer college classes merely drill in historiographic technique? What economist rests his case with students solely on discipline in analyzing purely economic cause and effect? When such a man as Thomas Davidson accuses the universities of frivolity, his position is respectable, whatever our opinion of the merits of the charge. It is at least true that, until a revolution has occurred in the methodology of academic social science in general, it will remain a case of the pot calling the kettle black when men in the other divisions of labor blame the sociologists for breaking scientific discipline.

To many teachers of sociology, and to many more teachers of other subjects, what I have said may seem to make for the conclusion that the material of instruction which has been brought into academic schedules by the sociologists has no value and ought to be excluded. Precisely the opposite conclusion seems to me to follow from the facts. Without discussing the case at length, I merely remark, first, that in writing this sketch I have had in mind a very sharp distinction between the *value* of things called sociology and questions about methodological classification and arrangement of those things. We must not allow conclusions which we may reach on the latter subject in any way to prejudice the former, any more than we should allow our opinions about the place of mathematics in scientific classification to influence our judgment about the availability of mathematics for purposes of general or special education. Secondly, whatever we or others may think about divisions of labor in social science, no one who is teaching in any part of the fields which the sociologists have cultivated need have any fear that the sane pragmatism which has made room for these subjects in our curricula will ever reverse this action. The intelligence of men must steadily become confirmed in the belief that there never can be more vital education than that

which is gained by dwelling upon the constructive interests of men, their ways of manifesting themselves, their abortive experiments, their achievements, their contemporary problems, and their prospects of further realization. If we should extinguish the name sociology altogether, and if we should reconstruct our entire system of the social sciences, these phases of life which the sociologists have brought to academic attention would certainly hold their own under some title or other, by virtue of their intrinsic importance.

Secondly, we are still shiftily in our attempts to specify the precise functions which we feel ourselves called to discharge. We have not come to a complete understanding with ourselves about our relations to that lightning change artist "society," alias "association," alias "activities." These are all omnibus designations. They are conceptions. That is, they are already essays in interpretation. A procedure which starts to investigate an intellectual expression for reality instead of stark reality itself, simply tolerates a curtain between itself and objectivity.

Until the social psychologists, in groping after a vocation for sociology, tore that veil away, the sociologists were only semi-conscious of a phase of reality not yet investigated in a thorough fashion. That phase of reality consisted most obviously of persons always appearing in certain species of groupings with other persons, and behaving themselves toward one another in certain ways within one type of grouping different from their manner of behavior in other types of grouping. Accordingly the problems sooner or later arise, whatever may turn out to be their ratio of importance: What are the relations between these groupings and the types of behavior within the groupings? To what extent are these relationships constant, and to what extent variable? To what extent do they depend upon factors not immediately given by the forms of groupings on the one hand, and by the behavior on the other? These uninvestigated relationships had been imperfectly investigated as they had appeared in various partial disguises. They had never been stripped naked, and examined apart from their multitudes of trappings and attachments.

These relationships are then, in general, *persons wanting satisfactions and trying to get satisfactions in unavoidable contact with other*

*persons trying to get similar or dissimilar satisfactions.* In a word, human experience is an affair of human groupings, with the one plausible clue to the phenomena of these groupings, viz., the *wants* impelling the units. So far as we know, this is the stark reality, conventionalized in the term "society" or its alternates. Now the distinct task presents itself of beginning to observe this reality in all the variations in which it can be found, from the casual group of two alien tribesmen, to the permanent group of two marital partners, and then through the permutations of groupings numerically and functionally as far as it is possible to observe and report. This reduction of social reality to terms of *socii* (Baldwin, Giddings) and their behaviors, I will now for convenience call the sociological clue.

Nothing but perception that studying human affairs by means of this clue is a method which has attracted very little attention, that it looks promising, and that it is more appealing than any visible alternative pursuit, can compel a given person to devote himself occasionally or permanently to the use of this clue. No law, human or divine, has such efficient sanction that one who is not attracted by the prospects of the sociological clue need give it a trial against his will. If, however, one does enter into a course of research ostensibly guided by the sociological clue, one is immediately under obligation to use it for what it is worth, as literally as possible, until it seems to have exhausted its usefulness for him, or he has exhausted his usefulness with it. Especially is a teacher who undertakes to show students how to use the sociological clue bound to do his utmost to show its various leadings.

Since we have arrived at the understanding of groups as functional, rather than logical, and especially since we have grasped the fact that, in the world as we find it, performance of function is inextricably mixed with derangement of function, we are not as much inclined as we once were to suppose that we can ever work out a completely schematic rendering of the phenomena of human groupings. In compensation for this disillusion, we find that a world of uncriticized group phenomena falling within the formal categories "structure" and "function" invites investigation. It is also a spur to this investigation to realize, as sociologists



now realize, first, that nothing which has already been observed in any division of social studies or of homely experience in the way of behavior of human groups need be negligible for this particular kind of induction; and, secondly, that everything which can now be generalized from existing evidence about the behavior of human groups will probably lend aid to other divisions of social science, by calling attention to correlations of their own kind of material, which they had partly or wholly neglected, and which might indicate still more fruitful pursuit of their own division of labor.

To take the most threadbare illustration: Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of books have been written in a score of different languages on the constitutional law, or the constitutional history of selected countries, the underlying conception of which treatises was that political constitutions are affairs of legal construction alone; that they are held together solely by the bonds of certain presuppositions about political principles and personal rights and duties, and that they are to be judged solely by the criterion of their consistency with these principles, or by their relations to some other constitutional and legal system adopted as a standard. Perhaps an equal number of books have been written about economic relations, with the presupposition that these relations are affairs of men concerned wholly about gainful occupations, and affected by no influences outside of those occupations. Suppose the perception dawned suddenly upon an author of each of these types of books that the sort of relations he had been theorizing about are in reality devices of groups of men who for generations and centuries have been dividing their time between struggling for economic gains at one moment and for more satisfactory legal adjustments at the next. Suppose that these men did not go beyond this discovery to the perception that these groups of men with economic interests and political interests were at the same time groups structuralized and motivated by topographical interests—"Ye crags and peaks, I'm with you once again"—and racial interests, and creedal interests, and composite physical, intellectual, aesthetic, and moral interests of innumerable sorts. On the basis of the primary discovery alone that economic groups are at the same time also political groups, and vice versa, these two authors

ought at once to perceive that their ways of explaining the institutions with which they had been dealing must be reconsidered from the beginning. If they penetrated deep enough into the facts to see that these groups were interplays of more than the two interests, and perhaps of as many as I have suggested, these authors would cease to have confidence in their attempt to understand real life as an affair of a single factor.

This is merely a trite illustration of the concrete aspect of experience on a large scale when it is looked at through the medium of initial insight into the workings of human wants. At the more homely extreme, a case in real life is typical—and typical not merely of many everyday situations, but typical also of much supposedly critical treatment of concrete facts. I was brought up among people of a deeply earnest evangelical type, to whom I do not believe the idea ever occurred that actors were human beings like themselves, with the slight variation that they got their living by trying to entertain people, instead of trying to sell them groceries, or lumber, or dry goods, or sheep skins, or medicines. They were “stage people,” and that was the end of it. “Stage people” were of course not *people*, in a sense which made them in any way profitable objects of attention for church members. It had never occurred to those good Christians to associate “stage people” with the homely concerns of ordinary commonplace folks. No inkling had ever entered their minds that stage people go through life, like other people, worried about getting money or credit to stave off the boarding-house keeper, and the shoemaker, and the dressmaker, and the tailor; that they have fathers, and mothers, and brothers, and sisters, and children, and friends, and enemies, like other people; that they have headaches and heartaches, and ambitions and disappointments, and aspirations and discouragements, like most of the millions who have lived and died on the earth; that they are even, like the rest of mankind, in certain recesses of themselves, religious inquirers, and perhaps religious believers, or at all events that like other people they have a certain reserve of wistfulness about the mysteries which the creeds profess to explain. These good friends of mine would have been speechless with astonishment if anybody had suggested that church people

ought to find some point of contact with stage people. The fallacy of the whole situation was in the ecclesiastical myth then obsessive that actors are actors instead of people. The moment we dissipate this myth, the moment we discern plain people in all sorts and conditions of men, the moment we realize that wherever there are people there are in principle the same conflicts of cross-purposes within them, urging them with or against people of their kind to get ahead in efforts to satisfy these purposes—the moment we entertain this rudimentary idea of what the human lot is, from that moment we have a point of departure for exploring the given case of the human lot which is next to us, whether it is a special individual or a group of scores, or hundreds, or thousands, or millions. The clue expresses itself interrogatively in the diagnostic questions: What is the precise kind, degree, and combination of the wants actuating this person or group? What is the order of valuation, by the person or the members of the group, among the wants in this combination, that is, which would be canceled first, second, third, etc., under the stress of circumstances by the persons moved by the wants in the hope that at least the residual want might win at last? What adjustments with other persons, or what enmities against other persons, or possibly what independencies of other persons, have the people in question inherited or adopted in conscious or unconscious effort to satisfy their wants? What failures of normal attachments to others exhibit pathological features of their situation? What resources are within reach of these persons for setting up a normal circuit between themselves and others in furtherance of their wholesome desires?

In drawing out an illustration to this length I have not forgotten what it was to illustrate. To come back to the point, the sociological clue to human experience, namely the study of persons as they act in structural and functional group relations, under pressure of wants that spring up in the consciousness of each, partly because of and partly in spite of their contacts with others—this clue, to be of any scientific value, must be systematically applied. Or perhaps it would be better to say, if one is to become scientific and efficient in the use of this clue, one must get acquainted with the typical forms of the manifestations of these factors—the

gamut and combinations of subjective wants on the one hand, and the phenomena of combinations and actions of persons impelled by these wants, and gravitating into groups in the effort to realize the wants on the other.

We have among the sociologists many promising beginnings of plans for exhibiting the typical human relationships in some of their most important workings. We have not arrived at such agreement about these plans that there is a very impressive degree of uniformity of method among us. This is partly because we do not evenly apply our underlying plan to control of our actual program either as teachers or as investigators. One not familiar with the development of sociological thinking might read many different specimens of our literature without getting a definite notion of the clue conception which all are trying to follow. The uninitiated might easily miss the key that all are trying to translate human relationships, throughout their length and breadth, into terms of *people employing group connections to realize their respective types of wants*. We can scarcely wonder that such readers are in doubt whether the sociologists have come to a settled understanding with one another about what they believe to be the literal terms of human experience.

This last remark might be varied by putting it in this form: The sociologists often fall behind the present standards of objectivity by repeating the immemorial artificiality of hypostatizing certain aspects of human experience, and then using those mental constructions as data, instead of pursuing research into more closely observed characteristics of persons in the relationships so conventionalized. That is, if we do not pry back of the omnibus terms "society," "association," "activities," we are stopping short with composite mental snapshots of reality which are as different from the whole of reality as a snapshot of a horse at a given point in the circuit is from the whole race he is running. In other words, we are still putting so much emphasis on the process side of life as such, in its merely formal aspects, that we make little impression with our attention to the *content* or substantive aspects. The essence of human life is not the ways in which it conducts itself, but the inchoate and developing personalities that conduct

themselves in those ways. Life is a transaction in which infant human animals become adults not merely in body but in character. Not merely do infants of successive generations repeat the advance from infancy, through adolescence, and maturity, and then down the decline of senility, but certain individuals in every large group in every generation excel other individuals in certain physical, mental, and moral attributes of personality. We speak of this casually in various terms of personal character. Still more, through the generations further unfoldings of personal variations occur. The amateur becomes the professional; the jack-at-all-trades becomes the specialist; the sensuous type passes into the more controlled type; the credulous become critical; the provincial become cosmopolitan, etc. These human maturings, or people pursuing their own realization and the realization of their larger selves in readjusting their group reciprocities—these are the substantial things of life, or human values, as the sociological phrase goes. It is one of our chief tasks at present to push this realistic conception of human experience to the front as consistently as possible; and at the same time we are in a stage at which we are peculiarly tempted to drop back into practices which tend to throw the spotlight so brightly on *conceptions of processes*, that our attention is sidetracked from the literal persons who in their forth-putting of themselves in their individual and group character are the reality. If we talk so much about “association” that we call off our search for better knowledge of *persons as they associate*; if we promote the concept “activities” to so high a rank in our esteem that it arrests our inquiries into why people act and how they act, we have made, not a scientific advance, but a retreat. There is a valid and an invalid use of general categories, as the paper to which this is preliminary will attempt to show. The sociologists are not to be blamed for using general categories as parts of their apparatus of research and report. Nothing to the contrary is implied in the foregoing. The emphasis, however, is on the consideration that the categories must be controlled as means of comprehending those aspects of reality which they are supposed to generalize. They may never be allowed to substitute themselves for those realities. The philosopher musing over the category

*space* so dreamily that he loses his actual bearings among landmarks is a symbol of what is not a scientific use of categories. They are viciously used if they take the place of reality. They are validly used if they aid us in orienting ourselves within reality. We have often erred on the side of magnifying "society," "association," "activities," and minimizing *socii*, people associating, and people acting.

In brief, a sociological method tends backward toward sterile dialectics in the degree in which it encourages the impression that progress can be made in objective knowledge by reflecting upon conceptual representations of experience. A sociological method makes for complete objectivity in the degree in which its employment of categories promotes first-hand acquaintance with that reality which the categories provisionally symbolize.

Thirdly, we have not yet wholly emerged from the state of mind in which extravagant claims are made by sociologists for sociology. Before we fully find ourselves in the ranks of social science, we shall have to make very clear, first to ourselves and then to others, that we have a clue to a particular quest, and we shall meanwhile have called in our juvenile pretensions to be the masters of everything while we are giving proof that we can discover something.

We used to compare the relation of general sociology to the whole range of human activities with the relation of general biology to all the phenomena of organic life. Most of the sociologists at one time made assertions to that effect without a suspicion that they were comical. In fact, neither term of the comparison was conceived in accordance with reality. Biologists today do not recognize a science of general biology, except in the sense of co-operation of many divisions of labor in a field designated generally as biology. No more is there such a possibility as general sociology which is not a division of labor upon a reality common to all the social sciences. The only possible contradiction of this assertion must be in terms of a methodology of social science as a whole. The early presumption of the sociologists was virtually that the most vital functions of social science in general are the special preserve of sociology. The assertion which I have substituted for myself, and

which I shall develop in a later paper, is that this generalizing claim for sociology is an accrediting to our specialty of that which is the ambition of our broadest humanity, regardless of specialties. We delude ourselves, however, if we suppose that our specialty is furnishing us the wherewithal to satisfy, as far as we do satisfy it, this aspiration of our whole personality. The fact is, as we have seen above,<sup>1</sup> that we draw upon all that we can borrow from all other men, plus all that we can derive from our specialty, to give us our conspectus and interpretation of life as a whole. Other men do precisely the same thing. It remains to be seen (let us hope it will some day be seen) what proportions of credit for the final perspective of life will fall to the different scientific divisions of labor.

When, therefore, we have descended from our exceeding high mountain, where the hereditary sociological devil has tempted us with an option on the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, we have found a certain humdrum of homely work falling to the sociologists' lot. Making due deductions for our haltings and wanderings, we have not shirked this work. Much has been accomplished. Perhaps it will turn out, however, that the tangible results of the sociologists' work up to date consist quite as largely in the changed attitude which men in the other divisions of social science have grudgingly adopted, as in any body of conclusions to which the sociologists can maintain exclusive title.

Fourthly, we are still crude in our ideas about the relation between sociological discovery in the strict sense and ethical evaluation of the things discovered. Some of us are still identifying sociology and ethics. If we mean by ethics a comprehensive system of valuations covering all the dimensions of conceivable human activity with judgments of the principles, policies, and precepts of control which should prevail throughout those diameters, it is unthinkable that there can ever be a specialized academic department which could have such a system in its keeping. A little later I shall discuss this proposition in a somewhat more concrete form. I anticipate briefly here what I shall express more in detail. An ethic, considered as a standard and a moral technique

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 835-36.

for the whole program of all living persons, can be credible only in the degree in which all the different planes and areas of experience have contributed their portions to the valuations and the programs of which the ethic consists. It is safe to assume that the human race will not have reached its mental and moral limits until all persons, whatever their division of labor, do their share of work with ever-present consciousness that, to the extent of its scope, what they are doing is a tentative theorem of the most worthy way in which that part of life might be conducted; and that the work to that extent is an indispensable factor in the inductive derivation of an inclusive human ethic. This assumption might be put into the concrete in numberless ways. For example, it is a human function to do a family's washing, or scrubbing, or cooking as it ought to be done. It is a human function to run a grocery store or to use medical knowledge for the relief of sickness so that the utmost service will be rendered. It is a human function to administer the machinery of financial credit, or to shape the moral sense of a community into the form of legislation which will represent that moral sense in the most salutary way. What I am trying to say is that we humans will be relatively juvenile in our moral development until each of us has vision enough and sense of responsibility enough to be moved by an imperative within himself to do the particular job which falls to him *as a human function*, as a part of the task every fraction of which must be performed for the best it is worth, or the whole work of humanity will be so much retarded. It is not probable that there can be a single science of all these ethical tasks which are presented by all the functions of life; and in particular it is not probable that sociology can be such a science; nor that it can remain very long under the impression that it can be such a science, without putting in jeopardy the distinctive function which it seems called to perform. The attitude of most of the American sociologists with reference to this matter seems to me to have been as provincial as the attitude of each separate vocational group in the United States that believes in military preparedness would be, if it claimed that its vocation is the one distinctively responsible for, and pre-eminently competent about, military preparedness. As a matter of fact, the butchers' or



bakers' or candlestick-makers' union might conceivably do more successful agitating for military preparedness at a given time than any or all other groups; but this would not prove that butchers or bakers or candlestick-makers are qualified as such to write the specifications for adequate military preparedness, or to organize preparedness in accordance with the specifications. These are functions which may be utterly beyond the competence of persons who are most eager to have the functions performed, or of any other single type of persons. They must be performed by a wide co-operation. We sociologists have mistaken our perception of the importance of group control with reference to intelligent and just ends, for a vocation to write the specifications of purposes and programs which would realize those ends. We have mistaken our share of that human aspiration which is normal after mental and moral infancy have been outgrown, for call to the distinctive social function of guiding that aspiration.

Some of us have been carried away by the more or less cultivated instincts of the preacher. We have set before ourselves such incandescent pictures of the importance of the far-off divine event, which our longings project, that we have been seduced into moralizing when our job demanded analyzing. True, there are possible and desirable moral interpretations of every conceivable human incident; but a teacher of sociology makes a mistake if on the one hand he claims to act in a scientific way, and if on the other hand he treats his public as a congregation to be preached to, rather than as a company of laboratory investigators preparing to find out for themselves how to know what is worth preaching. Some of our misapplications of energy during the past quarter-century have been due to allowing the homiletical habit to take the bits in its teeth and start upon a preaching circuit, when the work to be done was really a digging down after something fit to preach. The best that all humanity has learned about the values of life is what ought to be preached; but whoever of us goes to preaching it as his leading occupation is pretty sure to diminish his usefulness for any division of scientific research which may be not strictly and safely incidental to a preacher's experience.

In my student days the divinity schools were giving their classes the impression that the only divinely sanctioned method of deriving spiritual truth was through finical dissection of biblical texts; or perhaps still more highly favored of God was extortion of some elusive shade of meaning from alternative readings in the oldest versions or manuscripts. I have heard men schooled in these methods utter fervent exhortations not to risk our own and other people's souls by missing the shade of idea hanging in the balance between an imperfect and an aorist. This was really one of the amusing and at the same time pathetic variations of egotism. It centered in the assumption that the things to which one gives the most studious attention must be the most revealing things in the world. Given the homiletical impulse and habit, and one man gets sermons out of the stars, another out of the growing crops, another out of children's prattle, another out of the phenomena of society. But sermonizing does not make astronomy, nor botany, nor child psychology, nor sociology; no more does it furnish a worthy program for the pursuit of either science.

There is a type of sociology which starts where it hopes to end. That is, it virtually does what the conventional preacher does when he announces his text. Literally, it is then "all over but the shouting." The text is supposed to be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, except that it is supposed also to be in itself proof of the truth and guaranty of the truth. If there is a scientific technique corresponding to the name sociology, and if there is a substance of knowledge ascertainable by use of the technique, the immediate business of the investigator in sociology is to apply that technique so that it will reveal knowledge; or if he be a teacher, his business is to initiate students into the use of that technique, so that they in turn may make it useful in gaining knowledge. If there is a preaching value in this knowledge, it will be time to develop that side of it after its credentials have been established. If as teachers we "feature" the preaching value of sociology; at least, if we allow this aspect of the case to appear while we are laying the foundations of our teaching, we virtually offer an emotional bribe for attention to a dubious subject

It would be an anticlimax after that to let our treatment drop down to the level of plain objective analysis. One is bound thenceforth to maintain the evaluative manner in a degree which forbids the necessary dull prying into objective relations, regardless of their presupposed ethical values. That is, whatever analysis one does after such a beginning must remain incidental to one's preaching, instead of being ruthless exploration, regardless of any moralizing which the results may justify.

I hope I have not seemed to imply that I find no ethical values in sociology. On the contrary, I have always believed that social science is at its highest power only when it has arrived at ethical expression. I should have no use for sociology if I did not believe that it is an essential factor in that veracious social science which must furnish the content of positive ethical theory. It is necessary to understand primary arithmetic in order to be able to understand what it means to be honest with our neighbor. One cannot be reliable in converting honest intentions into honest acts if one has not the necessary arithmetical knowledge for calculations of the quantities concerned in everyday transactions. It does not follow that the best way to learn arithmetic is to listen to sermons on the the virtue of honesty. So with sociology and ethics. The one deals with certain objective structural and functional relationships. The other assigns values to the relationships. In the nature of the case it is a mental impossibility to pay very much attention to observation and analysis of these relationships without beginning to evaluate them; and I see no reason why a teacher, whether of physiology, or psychology, or history, or economics, or sociology, or anything else for that matter, should try to arrest this tendency, provided that it is not allowed to interfere with the requirements of valid scientific method. There can be no escape from such interference, however, if the evaluating process is pushed into the foreground and made to determine the whole plan of procedure.

Fifthly, we sociologists have taken ourselves too seriously as distinctively or pre-eminently interested in the welfare of mankind. There is a sense in which this claim is valid,<sup>1</sup> but the sociologists have also cherished a version of this claim which is egregiously in-

<sup>1</sup> Vid *supra*, p. 847-48.

valid. It is a fact that the sociologists have helped to rescue thought of human beings from almost total submersion in impersonal social science. The sociologists have followed a true instinct in making people paramount to any and all of the institutions of people, or generalizations about people. The sociological perception has steadily grown clearer that knowledge of occurrences within human experience, or of results consequent upon those occurrences, which can be expressed otherwise than in terms of developing personality, is relatively empty. Herbert Spencer has seldom been accused of being a sentimentalist, but his precept, "judge between alternatives of conduct by the type of society they tend to produce," made more directly than he imagined toward adoption of values pertaining to persons as the standard of all sociological judgments. The sociologists insist that all knowledge about externalities is trivial in comparison with knowledge of the sort of people we are, the sort of people we are becoming, the means within our reach of evaluating the types of persons that we are tending to become or that we might conceivably become, and our resources for controlling choice of means toward the desirable alternative.

On the other hand, the phase of these facts which is not equally familiar to the sociologists is that all this may be true, and that it may still be as exclusively cognitive as a mental activity may be; that is, it may have no necessary accompaniment of especially sympathetic characteristics. The theologians afford an instructive analogy. They have always been devoted to intellectual formulation of the "plan of salvation," the means whereby human beings might attain the supreme end of their existence. Those, however, who have been best qualified to compare theologians as a class, throughout the Christian era, with other types of religious people, have not bequeathed to us the impression that the former deserve to rank as uniquely ardent lovers of mankind. In like manner, our sociological technique no more certainly makes us the moral superiors of other social scientists than evolutionary biologists are necessarily superior in the moral scale to the pre-evolutionary morphologists.

I am bound to confess my doubt whether there has ever been an investigator, teacher, or writer in the whole field of the social

sciences who has not been stimulated in some degree by some type of interest in human well-being as a goal to be reached by conscious effort. Of course that interest at its lowest terms may have been mere intellectual curiosity. It has ranged from that moral minimum to the most self-abnegating devotion to human betterment; and the prevailing type of interest has not been determined regularly by the particular division of social science to which the individual was credited. In its ordinary types the underlying human interest has been perhaps more analytical or generalizing than emotional or motor. Yet it would be hard to find a thinker about human affairs from Herodotus down who has not been moved in some measure by care for improving the human lot, or for bettering the ways in which human beings adapt themselves to their lot. Often, to be sure, and for many reasons, this fraction of motive may have been obscured by various other motives. Many men have gone about the work of reflecting upon human conditions in precisely the state of mind to which Gibbon has testified in his account of the way in which he came to begin preparation for writing the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.<sup>1</sup> At first he early developed literary ambitions: "How often did I sigh for my proper station in life and letters!" Then he went about the search for a *subject* suitable to his talents. He seems to have done this with no greater reference to a possible philanthropic bearing of his ambition than a man about town might have in selecting a costume for a charity ball. In either case, however, a certain human element is involved. As Gibbon describes himself, he was a youth looking for a *historical subject*; not, so far as he expressed himself, looking for an opportunity to benefit the world by any light he might throw upon the course of events in some crucial time and place. Yet it is hardly credible that no remote reference to this ulterior consequence influenced his ambition. Even if he never analyzed the situation in this way, he knew at least vaguely that the prestige of history and of the writer of history is due to a certain traditional estimate that the writing of history is useful to the readers of history, and that the writing of history rates as something to be socially commended. It is incredible that his ambition could have developed

<sup>1</sup> Smith, *Milman's Gibbon*, I, pp. 72 f.

without some such social stimulus, no matter what other motives may have co-operated.

Taking Gibbon as a specimen of one extreme type, we may select the most fervid advocate of altruism who has ever cultivated any division of social science as symbolic of the other extreme type. On the one hand, men pursue social science mostly as a polite art, the intellectual interest being most in evidence, and a rather egoistic impulse being the chief incentive. On the other hand, men pursue social science from consuming zeal for humanity. They want to make other people better and happier. They regard any and every phase of social science as merely incidental to stronger and surer grip upon the means of shaping human destinies to human advantage.

If we could sift the recorded thinking in the social sciences during the modern period, say since the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*; and if, on the basis of the evidence so collected, we should divide the writers into two groups, first, those who show signs of pursuing social science because of some kind and degree of interest in the welfare of human beings; secondly, those who show no such signs; the former would not only many times outnumber the latter, but a candid critic would have to admit a strong probability that many of the writers whom lack of evidence had consigned to the latter group had simply abstracted their writings more completely than other authors had from visible connection with the whole body of their interests; and that, if the truth were known, the majority even in this second group might prove to have been liberally affected by concern for general human welfare.

Isolation of the intellectual problem in hand from all antecedents and collaterals and consequents has been the first rule of method during the period of scientific specialization. The severity of the application of this rule has been the first standard of scientific criticism. To betray an emotional attitude with reference to human facts has been as compromising as an exchange of mysticism for literalness would be in astronomy or physiology. To let opinion as to what is desirable affect judgment as to what is actual in such phenomena as the birth-rate, death-rate, marriage-rate, divorce-rate, wage-rate, crime-rate, cost of living, social unrest, tendencies

in property stratification, etc., would be as fatal to scientific prestige as to allow our color preferences to warp our conclusions from the data of optics, or our fancy in crystals to interfere with chemical analysis of their composition.

The facts may be generalized from a slightly different point of view in this way: Every division of social science is among other things a reflection of curiosity on the part of some human beings about the life of all human beings. Particular intellectual interests from time to time bring about differentiation of fields of inquiry out of the whole range of human phenomena. As this sort of specialization occurs, there also occurs, both as cause and effect, corresponding specialization in the peculiar interests of investigators. No one would be a historian, let us say, unless he were in some way concerned about the destinies of mankind. Suppose a historian gravitates, however, into pursuit of the history of sculpture, or painting, or literature, or a type of religious thinking. This change of focus and of emphasis by no means necessarily involves secession from general interest in the destinies of mankind. It simply means a difference of balance between interest in human destiny in general and interest in that incident in human destiny to which attention has been transferred. So if one begins with some type of interest in political phenomena, say the philosophy of law; this center of attention may have seemed to a given philosopher the focus around which all interpretation of human destinies must gather. Presently he may have found himself entangled in some relatively technical problem of political relations—without having a particular case in mind, let us instance hypothetically the different implications of sovereignty. Thereupon he becomes so devoted to this aspect of political phenomena that the traces of his former interest in human destinies become indistinct. To ordinary observation he seems to have withdrawn from interest in human affairs and to have accepted a retainer for an abstraction. In reality he may be moved by an ardent impulse to promote human well-being by putting in his work upon a subject which seems to him more vital than it seems to most men.

To speak more concretely, the major social sciences of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, history, politics, and

economics, were clearly ethical sciences in essentially the same sense in which the sociologists have later claimed that distinction for their division of labor. That is, the subjective dimension of these sciences reached back to appreciations of the value of human welfare, various in quantity and kind as the implicit valuations may have been. In their own minds the men who pursued each of these sciences were agents of mankind for particular intellectual functions; each of these functions being regarded however as in the service of human betterment. In the course of time, as the quests which they had undertaken became more and more exacting, as the processes which they had to perform in the course of their work became more and more technical, there was an inevitable change of the ratio between the broadly human and the narrowly special aspects of their programs. The tendency was for the more efficient specialists to shrink, so to speak, from world-citizens into departmental functionaries; and for the divisions of science which they represented to undergo a similar modification. The sense of immediacy between these departments of knowledge and the interests of human beings as such was weakened; while a feeling that the work had in itself an absolute value became more dominating.

Another variation of the same facts may throw light on the situation. As persons, all the people who have worked in the social sciences have been interested in the common destinies of mankind, and especially in the problems of human beings. As specialists, these same persons have reacted variously toward those general interests. These reactions may be divided into three principal groups, first, desire to reduce human phenomena in general to terms of those aspects of human phenomena upon which the given persons have specialized; secondly, desire to find the co-ordinating principle of all human phenomena within those aspects of phenomena upon which the given persons have specialized; thirdly, effort to discover some type of super-specialization above the current social sciences by means of which an objective rendering of all human events and values might be achieved. As a matter of fact, neither of these reactions is confined to a single division of social science. They are rather the reactions of different intellectual types within each division of social science. As a rough



generalization, these reactions will be prominent in the order scheduled in the degree in which specialists are repositories of a conventionally accepted and arranged body of conclusions. The classical economists are the most familiar case. When they supposed that they had reported and accounted for economic phenomena in general, they were dogmatic in their interpretation of all phenomena as economic, or as foreordained by economic antecedents. The Marxians present the same type with changed details. The philosophers of history are in principle essentially of the same sort, with variations of incidentals in their exhibit of the ground pattern. Reactions of the second type are frequent among specialists within the several social sciences, or men who have begun to depart from those conclusions. The leading cases are those German economic groups known in turn as the historical, the Austrian, and the ethical schools (e.g., Knies, Menger, Schmoller). The sociologists have been the most evident cases of the third type of reaction. As a rule they entered their present division of labor through the door of one of the older social sciences. Presently they found themselves cast for the rôle of Ishmael in the world of social science. They were wanderers from the ancestral tent, with no prescriptive rights. They were not decisively bound to one aspect of human phenomena more than to another. They were free to feel that human life is bigger than either of the aspects of human life which had furnished the older divisions of social science their means of subsistence; and while they were taking possession of a peculiar division of inquiry they instinctively insisted on views of life not dominated by either of the fractional views of life which had made themselves conventional.

Long ago, however, the tendency to repeat the reactions of the older social sciences has shown itself among the sociologists. It is not difficult to imagine our technique so developed that in our manipulation of it we shall have no more convincing *prima-facie* claim to the credit of being distinctively interested in human welfare than the specialists who devote their lives to collating documents, or analyzing the phenomena of demand and supply, or expounding comparative constitutional law. As sociology settles down to consistently characteristic researches, as it vindicates a

method of inquiry, and establishes itself as statecraft did by the side of history, and later economic theory did by the side of history and statecraft, the exception may begin to become the rule that, like his predecessors, the sociologist may be typically a bureaucratic routinist, not in his vocational consciousness and in his most obvious behavior a surveyor of the world *for* the world.

The moral of all this is that sociology is already far enough advanced so that it is in order for the sociologists to revise their early estimates of themselves. The sober truth is that we could originally pass with ourselves and sometimes with others as more humanitarian than the historians, the political scientists, and the economists; not because we actually were so, or at least not because in pursuit of any strictly controlled scientific procedure we were so, but because we were looking for a definite job and were meanwhile less standardized than they were. That is, we were capitalizing our share of rather general interest in humanity for the credit of our prospective specialization. Now that we are beginning to find ourselves with precise research tasks, the difference between us and other social scientists is to be expressed most exactly, not in terms of contrast in our favor between our supposed humanitarianism and theirs, but rather in terms of the comparative nearness or remoteness of the relations between the aspects of life which we are respectively studying and probable availability for the control of conduct. That is, a given pure mathematician may be more concerned about personally contributing to the welfare of mankind than a given social philosopher. On the contrary, it is to be presumed that social philosophy would afford more insight into ways and means of promoting the welfare of mankind than pure mathematics. A visiting nurse who worked for the pay only would be less of a philanthropist than the philosopher of history who aimed first and foremost to steady the world's brains by his labors. The comparative moral quality of the mercenary nurse and the unselfish philosopher must not be mistaken for the comparative functional rank of nursing and philosophizing.

In the days when sociologists were struggling for academic recognition, they were powerfully sustained by their own appraisal of themselves as more purely devoted than others to the essentially

human interests. Whether they retain the academic recognition they have won will depend on whether they turn out to be at least as scientific as the most responsible of their colleagues.

The lines of cleavage between humanitarians do not in reality correspond with the lines of division between academic departments. Among the most loyal workers for human well-being that I have known, and not confining myself to my immediate colleagues, I think at once of a list made up of philosophers, psychologists, geologists, economists, political scientists, professors of law, historians, mathematicians, biologists, etc. The humanitarianism is in the person, not in his academic division of labor. I have known sociologists who, as far as I could fathom them, were neither more nor less devoted to general human well-being than equally conscientious shoemakers. They were craftsmen and nothing more. They were classifying and analyzing human phenomena. They did it with no different quality of devotion to human destiny in general than might be exhibited by any honest carpenter, or mason, or blacksmith. Whether sociology affords a more advantageous base than history, or political science, or economics for humanitarian operations is another matter; and opinions about it are not likely soon to become unanimous. In any event, the character of the base does not settle the quality of the operations.

The primary fact is that the sociologists have found a function which reinforces scientific investigation of human experience. They are rapidly adjusting themselves to that function, viz., the discovery and psychological interpretation of group phenomena. It is possible for them to increase knowledge by discharging this function as non-socially as one might verify specimens in a museum of conchology. The secondary, and to be sure morally more significant, fact is that choice of group phenomena for investigation may be made so that the results of analysis will reveal points of maximum demand for contemporary social co-operation.

In other words, there may be study of sociology, as of mathematics, or physics, or metaphysics, or history, or politics, which is in form unimpeachably scientific, but in substance hopelessly sterile. The sociologists have found work for themselves which is not likely to be finished so long as the world furnishes spur and

scope for the variation of human interests. The spirit in which they perform this work will or will not entitle them to membership in the order of Ben Adhem.

Fortunately even for its reflex influence upon pure science, and still more happily for non-academic interests, it is the rule rather than the exception that men in each of the social sciences have been led to their vocation in part by urgings to do something for the general good, and that they tend to use their vocation more or less directly as a means of promoting the general welfare in ways not required by the letter of their academic obligations. The scientist in each of these cases is not the full measure of the man. Whether or not the sociologists will exhibit this tendency in the future to the same extent as in the past, either absolutely or comparatively, cannot be foreseen. My present emphasis is by way of warning against the illusion that there is anything in the sociologists' division of science which necessarily differentiates them as a more social species than others of the academic genus.

A generation ago we heard oftener than we do today that the criterion of science is its power to predict. In my college days I rather sulkily accepted this standard as the highest conceivable criterion of intellectual achievement. My feelings refused to acquiesce. It had not occurred to me that we are content to predict only when we do not dare to think of control. If we are dealing with astronomical phenomena, due humility may well rest with foretelling the movements of the heavenly bodies, without so much as entertaining the fancy of possible human modifications of their movements. On the contrary, we do not today stop content with analytical chemistry. We proceed to synthetic chemistry. We are not satisfied with predicting what chemical elements would do under hypothetical circumstances. We decide which of these things it is desirable for them to do, and we qualify ourselves to make them do it.

From the dawn of thought about human fortunes, or at least from the earliest recorded traces of that thought, we may detect signs of an inarticulate impulse not to accept life wholly as a fate, but to convert it into an art. There have been times in which that

which called itself science rebuked this impulse, and commanded men to acknowledge that the limits of their powers are reached in knowing things as they are. Today men are bolder than ever before in professing the belief that we cannot know things as they are unless we know large reaches of them as subject to human control. Social science is study of the correlation between the foreordained and the controllable in human affairs, together with the signs by which men may learn to what end it is rational to exercise their powers of control, and the means by which they may exert those powers. Whatever other functions are essential to progress in social science, no one who commands a wide outlook over human experience can doubt that there will be increasing rather than diminishing use for that type of study of the common problem which fixes attention primarily upon the forms and processes of human groups: the facts, the connections between the facts, and the implications of the facts for the problems of control.